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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Introducing the introduction
This is a work in the philosophy of explanation and understanding, where
the latter terms are meant in the sense of explaining and understanding
why something is the case. There are other uses of the words – to “explain
oneself” is to justify one’s actions, to “understand a Greek sentence” is to
know what its intended meaning is – but these will not be considered here.
The central questions that the philosophy of explanation seeks to answer
are these: What are explanations? What conditions must be met before we
understand something?
While we contemplate possible answers to these questions, many other
topics will arise. What is the relation between explanation and unification?
Must all explanations be causal? Are all explanations contrastive? Answer-
ing these more particular questions is part of finding a satisfactory answer
to the central questions, since the particular answers will inform the general
answer. In addition, there are questions about explanation that do not bear
directly on the central questions, but are nevertheless of philosophical impor-
tance; for instance, whether there is a form of inference that could be called
Inference to the Best Explanation.
The discussion of these questions, and thus the philosophy of explanation,
can be traced back to the ancients: it is, for instance, quite possible to read
Aristotle’s highly influential theory of the four causes as an early theory of
explanation.1 Explanation remained an important topic ever since, surfacing
especially when different ways of doing science came into conflict with each
other. Contemporary discussions can be seen as having been set in motion
1See Hankinson 1998 [37]; the centrality of explanation in Aristotle’s thinking is ad-
dressed from page 126 onwards.
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by Carl Hempel’s work: his paper on explanation in history (Hempel 1942
[39]) and his joint paper with Paul Oppenheim on the Deductive Nomologi-
cal model (Hempel & Oppenheim 1948 [44]) were especially influential. The
early analytic philosophers had generally dismissed the topic of explanation
as not belonging to the logic of science; but in 1989, it was already possible
for Wesley Salmon to write a long historical overview of “four decades of
scientific explanation” (Salmon 1989 [112]). Nor has interest slackened since
then: examples of the continuing evolution of the field are the book-length
attempts to develop more satisfactory theories of causal explanation (Wood-
ward 2005 [142]; Strevens 2008 [132]) and the development of theories of
scientific understanding (De Regt, Leonelli & Eigner 2009 [104]).
It is with this body of literature that the current thesis engages as it seeks
to answer questions of all the three types described above. The main focus
will lie on the central question: What are explanations?, and the aim will be
to present an answer to that question.
In this introductory chapter, I wish to do two things. First, section 1.2
gives an overview of the whole thesis. Second, section 1.3 discusses some of
the central methodological assumptions of my research; in particular, I de-
fend the method of analysing the concept of explanation by testing proposed
theories through common-sense examples of good, understanding-yielding
explanations.
1.2 Overview
This thesis aims to develop a full-fledged theory of explanation, that is, a
theory that gives necessary and sufficient conditions for something to be an
explanation. The main contenders in this field are, at the moment, several
unificationist theories, which attempt to define explanation in terms of uni-
fication, and several causal theories, which attempt to define explanation in
terms of causation. The theory developed here is much closer in spirit to the
causal theories, and takes many of its cues from James Woodward’s version;
however, it is not itself strictly speaking a causal theory.
In chapter 2, I discuss the unificationist theories and argue that they
are unsatisfactory. We first compare the theory of Philip Kitcher and the
theory of Gerhard Schurz and Karel Lambert, and conclude that the latter
is more satisfactory as a theory of unification. We then look at how the
unificationist theories deal with the asymmetries of causal explanation, and
how they deal with pseudo-explanation by spurious generalities. This will
lead us to the conclusion that the concept of unification is not sufficient to
define explanation. We then use several examples to show that perfectly
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good explanations can have a disunifying instead of a unifying effect, thus
showing that unification is not necessary for explanation either.
Chapter 3 is also mostly critical, this time about the idea of Inference
to the Best Explanation (IBE). According to defenders of IBE, the explana-
tory power of a theory is epistemically relevant: the more explanatory an
explanation would be if it were true, the greater the chance (other things
being equal) that it is true. If this idea were correct, theories of explanation
should clarify the link between explanatory power and truth. However, in
this chapter I argue against IBE by identifying three kinds of arguments that
have been used to establish the epistemic import of explanatory power, and
showing that they are not satisfactory. It is nevertheless the case that the
structure of explanations is relevant to scientific methodology, but in a less
dramatic way.
I develop my own theory of explanation, the determination theory, over
the course of the next six chapters. We start in chapter 4 with a discussion
of Woodward’s theory of causal explanation, which functions as my main
starting point. I show how his theory can be generalised in order to en-
compass non-causal explanations, such as mathematical explanations and
explanations of laws of nature, both of which are discussed in some detail.
The generalised notion of intervention that is developed here is one of the
main ingredients of the determination theory.
I then argue in chapter 5 that all explanations are contrastive explana-
tions, and in fact, that both the explanandum and the explanans have a
contrastive structure (the “double-contrast theory”). In doing so I argue
against the conjunction theory, which holds that contrastive explanations
ought to be reduced to non-contrastive ones. I also show how we can use the
double-contrast theory to solve the traditional problems of irrelevance. The
double-contrast theory is another of the main ingredients of the determina-
tion theory.
The determination theory is finally formulated in chapter 6, which can be
seen as the thesis’s central chapter. I first argue for the existence of a strong
link between explanation on the one hand, and determination and necessity
on the other hand. Then, using the generalised notion of intervention and
the double-contrast theory, I set down conditions that are meant to be both
necessary and sufficient for something to be an explanation, and discuss those
conditions that have not been discussed before.
The most controversial claim of the determination theory is undoubtedly
the claim that all explanations take the form of a deductive argument. This
is why the next two chapters are spent defending this deduction requirement
against several types of non-deterministic explanation that philosophers have
recognised. We consider both determined events explained statistically and
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truly undetermined (for instance, quantum mechanical) events in chapter 7.
We go over some of the same ground in chapter 8, where I argue against
Michael Strevens’s contention that non-deterministic explanations are often
much better than deterministic ones, even where the latter are available.
The combined claim of these chapters is that all supposed non-deterministic
explanations either can be understood as deterministic explanations, or are
not explanations at all.
Finally, in chapter 9 we look at several additional topics that have to do
with the determination theory. We will see that all explanations are argu-
ments, but that this does not have any of the bad philosophical consequences
it was supposed to have by, for instance, Wesley Salmon; that explanations
need not involve laws, and can in fact take the form of redescriptions; that
as long as there is no referential ambiguity, explanations of the same phe-
nomenon can be combined into larger explanations; that the distinction be-
tween explanation and understanding does not invalidate my method of using
understanding as a diagnostic criterion for explanation; that the determina-
tion theory suggests a way to see the link between Erklären and Verstehen;
that an explanation has non-zero explanatory power (and is therefore non-
trivial) if and only if it implies counterfactuals (of the right kind) that were
not implied by the explanatory request to which it is an answer; and that
this insight points to notions of intervention that might, in the final analysis,
not be purely objective.
I hope that this thesis will contribute to the philosophy of explanation,
first, by presenting a theory of explanation that is better than the ones
we already have; and second, by adding new and interesting arguments to
the discussions on unification, IBE, mathematical explanation, contrastive
explanation, deterministic versus non-deterministic explanation, and several
other topics.
1.3 Discourse on method
1.3.1 Analysis
We will now make a few remarks on the method followed in this thesis. First,
in this subsection, we will discuss the method of analysing intuitive examples
of explanations in order to test philosophical theories of explanation. Second,
in section 1.3.2, we discuss whether and, if so, under what circumstances it
is necessary to take these examples from contemporary science. Together,
these subsections function as a defence of the method of analysis chosen by
me and most other philosophers of explanation.
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One can ask at least three types of philosophical question about expla-
nation. Firstly, ontological or metaphysical questions: what entities in the
world do we refer to when we give explanations? What relation must there
be between two events for the one to be able to appear in an explanation of
the other? What must the world be like in order to be understandable? Sec-
ondly, epistemological questions: how do we construct good explanations?
How do we test them? When are we justified in believing that our explana-
tions are correct? And thirdly, analytical questions: what do we mean when
we talk about explanation and understanding? In what circumstances are
we willing to say that X explains Y , or that we understand Z?
Of these three types, this thesis will focus almost exclusively on the last,
and my method will be that of applying proposed theories of explanation
to uncontroversial examples of explanations and non-explanations. This is
by no means an uncommon or especially idiosyncratic choice, but it is not
entirely uncontroversial either. Paul Humphreys, for instance, argues in his
1989 [51] that the analytical questions are least important, and should be
mostly ignored. For according to Humphreys, my strategy
takes explanatory discourse as a given, a storehouse of factual in-
formation about explanations which, after philosophical analysis,
will yield the correct form for explanations. (p. 99.)
And this is problematic, since
there is no ground for supposing that languages which have evolved
over the centuries in response to various needs, most of them non-
causal and unscientific, should contain within them a coherent
representation of causal truths. . . (p. 4.)
Humphreys also suggests that if we look at scientists searching for an ex-
planation, we will see that they are not looking for a linguistic entity at
all:
What this systematic search for an explanation [of what turned
out to be the first outbreak of AIDS] was seeking was not a lin-
guistic entity (such as an argument or a speech act) but a real
thing, a cause or group of causes of the disease. (p. 6.)
This last argument seems particularly weak. It is of course true that
medical researchers are not looking for a linguistic entity: if they were, they
would not have to do any of the research they actually do. Linguistic entities
are not to be found in a Petri dish. But the scientists are certainly attempting
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to put themselves into a state where they can make justified assertions of a
certain type about the disease. Saying that an explanation is not a speech
act because scientists are looking for real causes is like saying that a verdict
is not a speech act because the judge is looking for real guilt.
The first argument is more interesting. Why should we suppose that we
can learn something about explanation by analysing our use of the terms
‘explanation’ and ‘understanding’? After all, if Galileo had believed that an
adequate theory of motion could be created by analysing the statements made
by his contemporaries, he would not have been one of the great scientists of
the Scientific Revolution. All he would have uncovered would have been those
ideas about motion that had had twenty centuries to insinuate themselves
into ordinary (and scientific) language – still interesting, perhaps, but not a
good guide to what motion really is.
There is, however, an important difference between motion and explana-
tion. When we attempt to understand motion, we attempt to understand
something external to us: we do not have privileged epistemic access to how
things move. But when we attempt to understand explanation, we are at-
tempting to understand the conditions under which the world makes sense
to us. And whereas it is conceivable that we have been mistaken all along
about the nature or the laws of motion, it is hardly conceivable that we are
to any large extent mistaken about what does or does not make sense to us.
Empirical study can show us that our explanations were false, even though
we thought they were true; but it cannot show us that they did not make
sense, even though we thought they did.2
This is an important distinction. In order forX to count as an explanation
of E, at least two conditions must be satisfied (we will assume that X is a
set of propositions):
1. the propositions in X are true, and
2. X would make us understand E if all the propositions in it were true,
where the second condition of course is meant as a preliminary characterisa-
tion, rather than as a rigorous analysis, of the concept of explanation.
I will have nothing to say about the first condition, which we may call the
truth condition.3 Whether or not the propositions in any given explanation
are true is a question, not for the philosophy of explanation, but for the
2Logical analysis of complex explanations can show that they are inconsistent or (if they
have form of arguments) not valid, and thus that they do not make sense even though
we thought they did before we saw the logical error. But we do not need metaphysics or
epistemology to get rid of such examples.
3Well, one thing: it is part of all well-known theories of explanation that an explanation
1.3. DISCOURSE ON METHOD 7
science of the subject in question. Throughout this thesis, as in the literature
in general, the question of truth will be bracketed. Thus, whenever I say that
X is a good explanation of E, it is to be understood that the truth of the
propositions in X is assumed.
The task of the philosophy of explanation is to answer questions of the
form: if the propositions in X are true, does X then explain E? Theories
that aim to answer this question can generally be tested by applying them
to specific examples and checking their answers with our intuitive judgments
about whether X helps us understand E. Against Humphreys’s criticism, I
wish to claim that these intuitive judgments, although perhaps not infallible,
must on the whole be correct, because to make sense is to correspond to
our (critically sharpened) intuitions of sense. There does not seem to be any
phenomenon other than our intuitions to which our theories of explanation
and understanding must be adequate. Empirical study can reveal that we
do not understand what we thought we understood, but it can do this only
by showing that the explanations we accepted are false.
Three further remarks need to be made. First, it is of course possible
that our intuitions are inconsistent; or that they are not easily extended to
new forms of explanation; or that they function well in simple situations, but
fail adequately to address complex situations. This is one of the reasons why
philosophical analysis is useful: starting from simple cases, we can argue
for a unified theory of explanation that will allow us to remove confusion
wherever it is found. Indeed, we will see many examples in this thesis about
which intuitions diverge. In such cases, the greatest success will be to show
why the intuitions diverge or seem to diverge, and to propose a theory which
reconciles them.
Second, it may be claimed that our idea of what makes sense has changed
through history; and that it is therefore very naive to believe that we have, in
our intuitions, something that is both more or less consistent and adequate for
making sense of modern science. This is a powerful argument, but I deny the
antecedent. For instance, there are few clearer examples of a change in our
explanatory standards than the demise of teleological explanation during the
Scientific Revolution. But it will turn out that on my theory of explanation,
teleological explanations are perfectly good – except, of course, in so far as
the truth condition is concerned. We simply do not believe that teleological
causes exist; indeed, we may believe that they are metaphysically (though
not logically) impossible. But if they did exist (hard as it may be for us to
must be true, and I too will require this. But perhaps this is too strong and approximate
truth is good enough, for instance when we use the laws of Newton to explain the behaviour
of slow objects in weak gravitational fields. This is an issue for further research.
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conceptualise this possibility), they would, surely, be explanatory.
Another well-known example is the shift from the idea that Newton’s
theory of gravitation was not explanatory because it involved action at a
distance, to the idea that actions at a distance were perfectly acceptable in
explanations. Was this a change in our idea of “understanding”, “explana-
tion” or “making sense of”? No; one can explain the change by pointing out
that Newton’s critics (of whom Newton was, famously, one) believed that
action at a distance was metaphysically impossible, while later thinkers did
not. If action at distance is metaphysically impossible, any theory using it
must necessarily be false, and hence cannot be even a possible explanation.
What changed was not the concept of understanding, but the metaphysical
ideas according to which Newton’s theory had to be false. So, although our
metaphysical and physical theories have changed, I doubt that our standards
of understanding have changed very much, even over the course of twenty-five
centuries.
Third, I will assume throughout this thesis that understanding and ex-
planation are very closely linked. However, this idea will be scrutinised in
section 9.5, where I will show that even if we modify this view in certain
ways, my method is still unobjectionable.
1.3.2 Contemporary science
The reader will quickly become aware that, with a few exceptions (such
as quantum mechanics), most of the examples in this thesis are taken not
from contemporary science, but from everyday situations. This may seem
strange for a thesis in philosophy of science. The main reason for this choice
is that the greatest virtues examples in this field can have are to be (a)
clear and easy to understand, and (b) evidently either explanatory or not
explanatory. Especially where the former virtue is concerned, examples from
contemporary science fare less well than more mundane ones. If I were to take
as an example the explanation of anisogamy in contemporary evolutionary
theory, or the explanation of the uniformity of cosmic background radiation
in contemporary cosmology, much time would have to be spent on providing
the necessary background information. If there is no corresponding payoff,
this is not worth the trouble.
Using everyday examples is extremely common in the philosophy of expla-
nation. It is justified by two assumptions. First, that scientific explanation
is merely a specific kind of explanation, and not something entirely different,
something to which common-sense examples are irrelevant. Second, that the
content of current science is in general irrelevant to our understanding of
explanation.
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The first assumption is of course prima facie justified: the very term
“scientific explanation” intimates that it is the form explanation takes in
science. Although scientific explanations may be subjected to additional cri-
teria – perhaps they must use scientific theories or models whereas everyday
explanations need not – there seems to be little reason to expect them to be
very different from other explanations.
Perhaps more controversial is the second assumption. Thus Ladyman &
Ross 2007 [65] argue that physics ought to be our guide to metaphysics, and
that metaphysicians who ignore cutting-edge science are doing bad philoso-
phy. However, as I said in the previous subsection, I doubt that the concept
of explanation (as opposed to the content of the actual explanations that
we accept) has been influenced very much by changes in science.4 Moreover,
where modern science gives us examples different in kind from those found
in everyday situations, such as the indeterministic processes of quantum me-
chanics, we will of course have recourse to the appropriate scientific theories
– although even here we can often make do with toy examples.
We can unapologetically ignore many of the results and all the details
of contemporary science because we are not doing metaphysics; we are not
trying to find a description of the world around us. This thesis is not about
the world; it is about our attempt to make sense of it.
4It is of course possible that changes in science make us extend our concept of under-
standing – for instance, modern biology may well move us to think of understanding less
and less as something psychological that is situated in an individual, and extend it to cover
states of scientific communities, databases, and so on. I suspect that such extensions will
not radically alter the basic idea of what an explanation is, but I will not consider them
in any detail.
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Chapter 2
Why Unification Is Neither
Necessary nor Sufficient for
Explanation
2.1 Introduction
Much recent literature on scientific explanation (Kitcher 1985 [56]; Wood-
ward 2003 [142]; Strevens 2004 [130]) states that there are two main philo-
sophical theories of explanation. The first is the causal theory, associated
with the work of Wesley Salmon (see especially Salmon 1984). The second is
the unificationist theory, first proposed by Michael Friedman 1974 [30] and
defended in radically revised form by Philip Kitcher (1981 [55], 1989 [57])
and by Gerhard Schurz and Karel Lambert (1994 [120]; Schurz 1999 [119]).
In this chapter I examine whether unification is indeed a concept which can
ground explanation. This examination will have two parts: first, I will eval-
uate whether unification is sufficient for explanation; second, whether it is
necessary. Both Kitcher’s theory, which is by far the best-known theory of
unification, and that of Schurz and Lambert will be considered. My conclu-
sion is that unification is neither sufficient nor necessary for explanation.1
In Section 2.2, I review the two versions of unificationism. I argue that
Kitcher’s theory entails that every proposition explains itself, and that his
proposed solution to this problem does not work. This problem, if not solved,
is fatal. The theory of Schurz and Lambert does not suffer from this flaw,
and is therefore more promising.
I turn in Section 2.3 to the sufficiency of unification. I argue that Kitcher’s
theory cannot generate the time asymmetry of causal explanation, and is thus
1This chapter is a slightly revised version of Gijsbers 2007 [31].
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unable to solve the so-called problem of asymmetry. Schurz and Lambert ex-
plicitly add causal principles to their theory, so for them the question of the
derivability of causality from unification does not arise. In addition, I argue
that neither of the two theories of unification is able to draw a distinction
between a class of explanations and a class of non-explanations that are tra-
ditionally separated by means of the distinction between laws and accidental
generalisations. I thus show that unification alone is insufficient to decide
whether something is or is not a genuine explanation.
In Section 2.4 the link between unification and explanation is analysed
in greater detail. Pace Schurz, I defend the thesis that one can explain
‘surprising’ events on the basis of equally or even more ‘surprising’ ones.
This will show that unification is not a necessary condition for explanation.
As I shall argue, unificatory power is relevant to explanation only as far as it
serves as a reason for belief, but this is a much weaker connection than the
one postulated by unificationism.
Finally, Section 2.5 summarises the conclusions.
2.2 Two types of unificationism
Both Kitcher’s theory and that of Schurz and Lambert are complex. I will
summarise them in a few pages, so inevitably some of the conceptual and
formal machinery will not be touched upon.
2.2.1 Kitcher’s theory
The best-known unificationist theory of explanation is that of Philip Kitcher
(1981 [55]; 1989 [57]). He starts out from the set of all scientific knowledge,
K, and develops criteria for its best systematisation, which he calls the ex-
planatory store over K, E(K). Kitcher defines explanatory patterns, sets of
which are called generating sets. A generating set, when applied to K, gen-
erates a set of arguments: namely, all the instantiations of the explanatory
patterns in the generating set that are acceptable in K. Kitcher then gives
(incomplete) criteria for the unifying power of a generating set. Intuitively, a
generating set is more unifying if it generates many conclusions from few pat-
terns; and also if the patterns it uses are stringent, and not catch-all patterns
that can be used to derive almost anything. Kitcher defines the conclusion
set C(D) of a set of derivations D as the set of all statements that occur as
a conclusion of at least one member of D. The unifying power of a complete
generating set for D varies directly with the size of C(D), directly with the
stringency of the patterns in the set, and inversely with the number of pat-
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terns in the set. The relative weight of these three criteria is intentionally
left unspecified.
Kitcher claims that this theory suffices to characterise acceptable explana-
tions: it is a total theory of explanation, giving both necessary and sufficient
conditions. As part of this claim, Kitcher also says that he can generate
the notions of causality and lawhood from the unificationist theory of ex-
planation; and that he can thereby solve the asymmetry problem of causal
explanation. I will examine these claims in Sections 2.3 and 2.4.
However, Kitcher must first solve a problem which his theory faces. I
address it in the next subsection.
2.2.2 The problem of spurious unification
The problem of spurious unification is recognised in Kitcher 1981 [55], pp. 526-
529, where Kitcher also attempts to solve it.2 The problem is this: given
Kitcher’s theory, it appears to be the case that a unificationist is committed
to the view that every fact F is explained by a derivation from F itself. The
reasoning is as follows. Let us take only a single argument pattern:
α
α
,
where the filling instructions tell us to put an accepted scientific statement
in place of α. How unifying is this tiny generating set? The number of
patterns it contains is minimal and the number of conclusions it generates is
maximal, but the single pattern is not stringent at all. We may conclude that
this pattern has little, if any, unifying power. This is good for unificationism,
as we would be loath to accept that self-explanation is a universally valid type
of explanation.
However, as Kitcher himself points out (Kitcher 1981 [55], p. 527), there
is a procedure that creates, for any generating set G, a generating set G′
that contains only self-derivations but is just as unifying as G. Take a single
argument pattern, A, from G. A generates a set of arguments, which has a
set of conclusions C(A). We construct an argument pattern A′ that is at least
as stringent as A and has the same set of conclusions. Argument pattern A′
has the form:
α
α
,
2It is not discussed in Kitcher 1989 [57], even though his theory as expounded there is
just as vulnerable to it.
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where the filling instructions tell us to put a sentence p in place of α that
conforms to the rule p ∈ C(A). Evidently, C(A′) = C(A). And because
each member of C(A) is the result of a different substitution of terms for
the dummy letters in A, the filling instructions of A allow at least as many
substitutions as those of A′. So A′ is at least as stringent as A. We repeat
this procedure for each argument pattern in G and together these patterns
form G′, a generating set that is just as unifying as G, but generates only self-
explanations. Hence everything is explained by itself. This is an unacceptable
consequence of a theory of explanation. If the problem of spurious unification
cannot be solved, it is fatal for Kitcher’s unificationism.
In order to solve it, Kitcher introduces a requirement that I will call R:
“If the filling instructions associated with a pattern P could be replaced
by different filling instructions, allowing for the substitution of a class of
expressions of the same syntactic category, to yield a pattern P ′ and if P ′
would allow the derivation of any sentence, then the unification achieved by P
is spurious.” (Kitcher 1981 [55], 527-528) What motivates this requirement?
Why should patterns whose filling instructions can be modified
to accommodate any sentence be suspect? The answer is that,
in such patterns, the nonlogical vocabulary that remains is idling.
The presence of that nonlogical vocabulary imposes no constraints
on the expressions we can substitute for the dummy symbols, so
that, beyond the specification that a place be filled by expres-
sions of a particular syntactic category, the structure we impose
by means of filling instructions is quite incidental. Thus the pat-
terns in question do not genuinely reflect our beliefs. (Kitcher
1981 [55], 528)
The patterns A′ do not conform to requirement R, as changing the filling
instruction to ‘put any sentence whatsoever in place of α’ allows us to derive
any sentence whatsoever. Requirement R thus gets rid of this example of
spurious unification. But is Kitcher’s reply successful in general? I will
argue that it is not. R is both too strong and not strong enough: it banishes
some patterns that we need to keep, but does not bar all forms of spurious
unification.
What patterns are excluded by requirement R? Those that can yield
any sentence whatsoever if the dummy letters can be replaced by anything.
This is just the class of arguments that have a dummy letter as their final
conclusion. For suppose that the conclusion also contains elements that are
not dummy letters. Then these will be present in all possible instantiated
conclusions, which means that sentences that do not contain these elements
cannot be derived.
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This raises two questions: Are all derivations with a dummy letter as
their final conclusion spurious explanations?, and Are all spuriously unifying
argument patterns of this form? I will argue for a negative answer to both
questions. A negative answer to the first question means that R is too strong,
whereas a negative answer to the second means that R is not strong enough.
We take the first question first. Some logical derivations are barred by
criterion R. For example:
α
α→ β
β
where the filling instructions tell us to put an accepted sentence in place of
α and any sentence in place of β such that α → β is an accepted sentence.
According to Kitcher’s criterion R, this derivation cannot be explanatory.
Relaxing the filling instructions completely – as any test of criterion R de-
mands us to do – will also remove the need to ensure that α and α→ β are
accepted sentences, since that need was encoded in the filling instructions;
and with that need removed, we can put any sentence we like in place of β.
But logical derivations can be explanatory. “Why is this rose red?” “Well,
you know that it was planted by John?” “Yes, I figured that out.” “And you
know that John plants only red roses, right?” “Ah yes, I see – I really should
have been able to make that inference myself.” (This explanation works even
though all non-logical vocabulary is ‘idling’.)
Let us look more closely at the role of logic in Kitcher’s theory. K is a
deductively closed set of statements, so if p and q are members of K, then
p ∧ q is also a member of K. Now surely, if we can explain p and we can
explain q, we can also explain p ∧ q. This holds for all (deductive) logical
derivations: if we can explain the premises, we can explain the conclusion.
So Kitcher’s theory should imply that the set of explainable sentences, C(D),
is closed under logical deduction. There are three ways of getting this result
from the theory, but they are all problematic.
1. We can add every valid deductive inference to the generating set as a
new argument pattern. This strategy will leave us with an infinity of
argument patterns, and hence every generating set will be completely
non-unified. In addition, when we apply requirement R, some of these
patterns will be rejected. Deductive closure of C(D) cannot be guar-
anteed.
2. Alternately, we can add a single argument pattern, LD (for ‘Logical
Derivation’), that has the form ‘α, therefore β’. The filling instructions
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tell us to replace α with any set of accepted conclusions from E(K), and
β with some proposition that deductively follows from this set. In this
way, C(D) is deductively closed and there are still only finitely many
argument patterns. Unfortunately, LD falls prey to requirement R,
because relaxing the filling instructions completely allows us to derive
any sentence whatsoever.
3. Finally, we can choose to add every valid deductive inference to the
generating set as a new argument pattern; but change the criteria of
unification so that deductive inferences no longer count towards the
number of patterns. They are ‘free’, so to speak. However, this choice
has the consequence that we will always achieve the greatest unifying
power by using only deductive inferences as argument patterns – for
instance, only self-explanations.
Requirement R is not as harmless as it seemed: when it is combined
with the claim that if we can explain a set of sentences, we can also explain
every logical consequence of that set, it follows that every generating set G
contains an infinite number of patterns. Requirement R cannot be accepted
by unificationists, as it would make unification impossible.
I will now show that requirement R does not eliminate all spurious uni-
fication. The demonstration is easy. Let A be a pattern in G that does not
fall prey to requirement R. This means that its conclusion is not a dummy
letter but has additional structure, like ‘α → β’, or ‘α is bigger than the
moon’. The set C(A) contains all the conclusions that are generated by A
when G is applied to K. We can now construct a new pattern A′ that is at
least as stringent as A, which generates the same conclusions, which is not
rejected by requirement R, but which is nevertheless spurious. For example:
α is bigger than the moon
α is bigger than the moon
,
with the filling instruction ‘choose an object for α such that “α is bigger
than the moon” ∈ C(A)’. Evidently, this pattern cannot generate every
sentence, no matter how far the filling instructions are relaxed; it passes the
test of requirement R. But it gives only spurious unification. If we repeat
this procedure for every argument pattern in G, we will get a G′ that is at
least as unified as G, and yet contains only self-derivations. Requirement R
is not powerful enough to solve the problem of spurious unification. This
completes my demonstration that Kitcher has not solved the problem of
spurious unification.
I wish to look briefly at one way in which the problem of spurious unifi-
cation can be avoided by unificationists who do not accept Kitcher’s theory.
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Let G be the generating set such that it contains as few patterns as possible,
that are as stringent as possible, yet that generate as many conclusions from
K as possible with as small a deductive basis of facts from K as possible.
The idea is to derive a lot of conclusions from a relatively small number of
premises. Self-derivations are not unifying patterns in this theory, since they
do not generate any conclusions that have not been taken as premises. With
self-derivations, you cannot derive many conclusions from few premises. So
by adopting a theory along these lines, one can avoid the problem of spurious
unification. This possibility is explored by Schurz and Lambert.
2.2.3 Schurz & Lambert’s theory
Intuitively, unification is reduction of the number of underived facts. In the
approach of Gerhard Schurz and Karel Lambert (Schurz & Lambert 1994
[120]; Schurz 1999 [119]), a corpus of knowledge is unified by connecting its
individual elements through ‘arguments in the broad sense’, keeping as few
basic facts as possible. Their notion of unification is defined in the context
of a theory of understanding (and explanation). I will first briefly survey
their account of understanding and then go on to sketch their analysis of
unification. I will also indicate how their theory avoids spurious unification.
We start from the corpus of knowledge of the epistemic subject (an indi-
vidual or a community). This cognitive corpus C is an ordered pair, 〈K, I〉,
where K is a relevant representation of the set of sentences that the subject
believes (KNOW ) and I is the set of ‘arguments in the broad sense’ (or ‘ar-
guments ibs’ for short; these include deductive, inductive and probabilistic
arguments) that he or she has mastered. That K is a relevant represen-
tation of KNOW means that it contains only KNOW ’s relevant elements,
which correspond to basic phenomena. These elements can be extracted from
KNOW using the notion of ‘relevant conclusion’ explicated in Schurz 1991
[118]. The effect is that K may contain P and Q, but not P ∧Q; that if K
contains ∀x : F (x)→ G(x), then it will not contain ∀x : F (x)∧H(x)→ Gx;
and so forth. KNOW is, as it were, represented by its logical atoms.
An answer A to a question ‘Why P?’ can contribute understanding of
P to C only if it shows how P fits into C. It must include the claim that
there is an argument ibs IP that connects P to other elements of C. An
argument can do this either by having elements of C among its premises and
P as the conclusion, or by having P among the premises and some element
of C as the conclusion. In addition, A must make C more unified. That is,
〈K + P, I + IP 〉 must be more unified than 〈K, I〉.
Unification is ‘coherence minus circularity’. Connecting statements in
K by arguments in I increases coherence; but circular connections do not
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increase unification, since circular ‘explanations’ do not yield understanding.
Formally, unification is defined as follows. K consists of two parts: the set
of basic phenomena Kb, and the set of assimilated phenomena Ka. A basis
of K is any subset K ′ of K such that every element of K not in K ′ can be
inferred from elements of K ′ using arguments in I. The unification basis of
K is that basis of K that yields the greatest unification of K, according to
criteria explained below. Kb is the unification basis of K; Ka is K −Kb.
Every element of K is assigned a value, which is negative or positive
depending on whether it is a datum or a hypothesis, and on whether it is
in Ka or in Kb. An experimental datum in Kb has value zero: new data
neither increase nor decrease unification. An experimental datum in Ka has
a positive value: assimilating data by inferring them from the unification
basis is exactly what scientific unification amounts to. A hypothesis in Kb
has a negative value: adding new theories to K decreases unification, unless a
significant amount of data from Kb is moved to Ka as a result. A hypothesis
in Ka has zero value: as a consequence of more fundamental hypotheses it
has already been paid for. The exact values are not defined by Schurz and
Lambert, who view unification as a comparative concept (Schurz & Lambert
1994, p. 78). But the following two conditions do obtain. First, adding a
theoretical statement to Kb costs more than transferring a datum from Kb
to Ka yields: it is disunifying to think up a theory that explains only one
datum. Second, complex theoretical statements cost more than simple ones.
An argument A can add elements to Kb or Ka, take them away or move
elements from Kb to Ka or vice versa. If the sum total value of all these
changes is positive, A is unifying; if it is negative, A is disunifying. It may
not always be possible to find out whether A has a positive or a negative
effect, as the criteria of Schurz and Lambert define only a partial ordering.
Schurz and Lambert’s theory is immune to the problem of self-explana-
tions that haunted Kitcher’s proposal. Since these argument patterns do
not decrease the number of phenomena in Kb, they are not unifying. Only
relevant inferences that decrease the set of basic phenomena or increase the
set of assimilated phenomena count as unificatory. Thus, Schurz and Lam-
bert’s theory is more promising than Kitcher’s – as a theory of unification.
Whether either of the two is successful as a theory of explanation will be the
question I address in the rest of this chapter.
2.3 Causality and lawhood
In this section, we will consider whether the concept of unification is suffi-
cient for grounding the concept of explanation, leaving the question of its
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necessity to Section 2.4. My arguments that unification is not sufficient
for explanation will have to do with the concepts of causality and lawhood.
These have been introduced into the theory of explanation to make distinc-
tions between certain classes of explanations and of non-explanations. If
unification is to be sufficient for grounding explanation, it must be able to
make these same distinctions, either by grounding the concepts of lawhood
and causality themselves, or in some other way. I will show that it is unable
to do so.
Causality and lawhood are natural starting places for investigating the
sufficiency of unification as a ground for explanation. It is often claimed that
causes explain their effects. Some theories of explanation, such as Salmon’s
(Salmon 1984 [110]), even postulate that causality is the essential ingredient
of explanation. It is also often claimed that laws of nature explain their
instances. The theory of Hempel and Oppenheim (Hempel & Oppenheim
1948 [44]) assumes that all explanations must use a law of nature; from a
very different perspective, Armstrong 1991 [4] and Dretske 1977 [26] argue
that laws explain their instances in ways that mere regularities do not.
What I have to show is that the concepts of causality and lawhood allow us
to distinguish between explanations and non-explanations that unificationists
cannot keep apart. In Subsections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2, I will analyse Kitcher’s
attempt to generate causality and lawhood from his unificationist theory of
explanation. I will argue that this attempt fails. In Subsection 2.3.3, we
take a brief look at the possibility of getting these notions from the theory
of Schurz and Lambert, and conclude that they do not succeed either. The
conclusion is that unification is not sufficient for explanation.
2.3.1 Kitcher and causal asymmetry
One of the most pressing problems that beset traditional accounts of explana-
tion was the problem of explanatory asymmetry. The paradigmatic example
is that of a flagpole and its shadow: we can use the position of the sun,
the length of a flagpole and the laws of optics to explain the length of the
flagpole’s shadow; but we cannot use the position of the sun, the length of
the shadow and the laws of optics to explain the length of the flagpole – even
though there is a valid deduction in both directions. The causal approach
pioneered by Wesley Salmon (Salmon 1984 [110]) is for a large part inspired
by such problems of asymmetry. The length of the flagpole is the cause of the
length of the shadow, whereas the latter is the effect of the former. Causal
theories can solve the asymmetry problem.
In order to prove its sufficiency, Kitcher’s theory should be able to re-
produce the explanatory asymmetry of the flagpole case. The notion of
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unification must somehow generate these asymmetries. Kitcher accepts this
challenge, and argues (Kitcher 1989 [57], pp. 484-488) that the best system-
atisation S(K) of K that contains the pattern deriving the length of a pole
from the length of its shadow is less unified than the best systematisation
tout court, E(K). We will follow Kitcher’s argument in order to assess it.
According to Kitcher, E(K) contains a very general argument pattern
that he calls the origin-and-development pattern. This pattern allows the
derivation of the size of material objects from the conditions in which they
originated and the changes they have since undergone. Using the origin-and-
development pattern, the length of a flagpole can be explained by describing
its genesis and the substantial changes it has since undergone. Since this
pattern can be used to explain the sizes of all objects, adding a new pattern
that explains these sizes from the lengths of shadows does not allow us to
derive more conclusions – and is therefore disunifying.
We may object that K may not contain the premises needed to derive the
size of every object using the origin-and-development pattern. In particular,
it is possible that K contains no statements about the origin and development
of the pole, but does contain statements about the length of its shadow and
the position of the sun. If this were the case – and this situation is not
particularly far-fetched – the shadow pattern would allow us to derive new
conclusions, and Kitcher’s argument would grind to a halt. As far as I can
see, the only way to avoid this counterargument is to restrict ourselves to
the ideal situation in which all information is available. This is a heavy
concession, as Kitcher explicitly wishes to avoid such idealising assumptions.
Returning from our critical excursion, we find Kitcher looking at the
possibility of entirely replacing the origin-and-development pattern with the
shadow pattern. If the shadow pattern can be used to derive the sizes of
all objects, then it might entail the same consequences as the origin-and-
development pattern and E(K) and its rival S(K) would be equally unify-
ing. However, not every object casts a shadow, as some are unilluminated,
transparent, or strong sources of light. That means we cannot instantiate
the shadow pattern to explain the sizes of all objects. The consequence set
of S(K) is smaller than that of E(K), and E(K) is to be preferred over its
rival S(K). If this analysis is correct, it would solve (at least part of) the
problem of explanatory asymmetry.
But Kitcher recognises that the asymmetry problem ‘cuts deeper’:
Suppose that a tower is actually unilluminated. Nonetheless, it
is possible that it should have been illuminated, and if a light
source of a specified kind had been present and if there had been
a certain type of surface, then the tower would have cast a shadow
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of certain definite dimensions. So the tower has a complex dis-
positional property . . . From the attribution of this dispositional
property and the laws of propagation of light we can derive a
description of the tower. (Kitcher 1989 [57], pp. 485-486)
However, Kitcher argues, there has to be one pattern for unilluminated ob-
jects; another pattern for transparent objects (involving a dispositional prop-
erty of casting shadows when coated with an opaque substance); yet another
pattern for light sources (perhaps involving a dispositional property of cast-
ing shadows when illuminated by a much stronger light source); and so on.
A large number of shadow patterns is needed to do the work that the o-
rigin-and-development pattern did all by itself. That means that E(K) is
better unified than S(K); consequently, the theory of unification excludes
explanations of the size of objects by the size of their shadows.
This argument is a complex tangle of thorns, and we will have to move
carefully in appraising it. First, notice that Kitcher allows dispositional
properties. Dispositional properties support counterfactuals, and hence they
have a close connection with both laws of nature and causality. This is
not the place to speak about the nature of this connection, but building
up a theory of causality by appealing to dispositional properties does not
appear to be an unproblematic strategy. So much the better for Kitcher,
perhaps: he can simply abandon dispositional properties and without them
the shadow pattern will be even less successful. However, it may be the case
that some of our scientific knowledge is dispositional, and thus part of K.
‘Electrons have mass m’ might be thought to imply ‘if a force ~F is applied
to an electron, it will undergo an acceleration of
~F
m
’. If this is the case, and
causal claims are implicit in the set of scientific knowledge K, then causality
cannot be generated by unificatory constraints on the systematisation of that
knowledge.
We will not pursue this issue here. There is an easier way to show that
causal asymmetry cannot be grounded in unificatory constraints. As a rival
to the origin-and-development pattern, I propose to define the end-and-re-
gression pattern. (A similar idea is pursued in Barnes 1992 [5].) This pattern
uses the final state of an object and the transformations it previously went
through as premises in a deduction of facts about its earlier states. Given
the fundamental time symmetry of the known laws of nature and the ideal
cognitive situation that we earlier had to suppose, this new pattern generates
explanations of all the phenomena that the old pattern generated explana-
tions of.3 The old pattern has been replaced with a new pattern that has the
3With the possible exception of the final states of objects. This is exactly counterbal-
anced by the end-and-regression pattern’s ability to explain initial states.
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same consequence set. It seems, then, that unificatory constraints cannot
discriminate between argument patterns that explain causes by their effects,
and patterns that explain effects by their causes. But if this is the case,
neither the flagpole and shadow example, nor any other causal asymmetry,
can be generated by a unificationist theory. Kitcher’s theory does not give
sufficient constraints on explanatory power.
2.3.2 Lawhood in Kitcher
We will now strengthen the conclusions of the previous subsection by demon-
strating that Kitcher’s theory is not sufficient for distinguishing between a
class of explanations and a class of non-explanations that can be prised apart
by using the opposition between laws and accidental generalisations. Laws of
nature featured prominently in Hempel and Oppenheim’s influential attempt
to analyse explanation using the ‘deductive-nomological model’ (Hempel &
Oppenheim 1948 [44]).4 In this model, an event can be explained only by
invoking a law of nature of which the event is an instance. The distinction
between generalisations that are simply true, and generalisations that are
laws of nature was of the essence for Hempel and Oppenheim because not
every generalisation is explanatory: that all members of a certain club are
bald cannot be used to explain John’s baldness, even if we know he is a mem-
ber of the club – assuming, of course, that there is no shaving ritual involved
in becoming a member.
The observation is this: “All men with hair of this-and-this type are bald
before the age of fifty” might feature in an explanation of John’s baldness,
but “All members of the local Rotary are bald” might not. The opposition
between laws and accidental generalisations allows us to make this difference.
The question is this: can unification also be used to make this difference?
Kitcher deals with laws in a short section of Kitcher 1989 [57]:
So we can suggest that the statements accepted as laws at a given
stage in the development of science . . . are the universal premises
that occur in explanatory derivations. (Kitcher 1989 [57], p. 447)
According to Kitcher, then, lawhood is conferred upon statements by their
role in explanatory derivations. Laws simply are the universal premises in
genuine explanations. Lawhood is thus conferred on generalisations by virtue
of their appearance in explanations.5 In order to establish that Kitcher’s
4The question of lawhood and explanation has remained topical; see, for instance,
Psillos 2002 [94].
5This is the exact reverse of the claim of Hempel and Oppenheim, who based explana-
tory power on lawhood.
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criterion of lawhood is unacceptable, it suffices to show that there are expla-
nations which contain generalisations that are not laws. I will do that in the
rest of this subsection.
Why is not a single member of the local Rotary a member of the Luxuriant
Flowing Hair Club? Because all members of the local Rotary are bald, and
bald people cannot become members of the Luxuriant Flowing Hair Club.
This, surely, is a perfectly good explanation. One of its premises is “All
members of the local Rotary are bald”, and hence Kitcher’s theory indicates
that this is not an accidental generalisation, but a law. But if it is a law,
there is no reason to reject the proposed explanation of John’s baldness
by his membership of the local Rotary; which is a highly counter-intuitive
conclusion.
The unificationist can reply in two different ways. First, he or she can
attempt to show that my explanation is not, after all, a good explanation;
and thus try to rescue the idea that lawhood is something that is grounded
in unification. Second, he or she can attempt to show that the unificationist
theory can reject the explanation of John’s baldness by the generalisation
about the Rotary in some way that does not involve lawhood. Our response
to the first strategy will lead to a response to the second.
In order to reject the explanation, the unificationist would have to say
that it will not be part of the most unifying set of argument patterns of
our knowledge. The real scientific explanation of the non-overlap between
members of the Rotary and those of the Luxuriant Flowing Hair Club will
be in terms of real laws: perhaps sociological or psychological laws; perhaps
even the laws of physics.
Two responses are open to us. First, if unificationists are bound to reject
the explanation we gave – an explanation all of us would accept – this is
in itself a counter-argument against unificationism. There are presumably
many explanations of the phenomenon we question, and rejecting all but one
(or a few) of them in the interest of having a ‘minimal amount of argument
patterns’ does not seem justified. This might be developed into a general
line of argument against unificationism: by seeking to retain as few potential
explanations as possible, it is blind for the abundance of explanations. But
we will not attempt to do so here.
The second response is more straightforward. It is simply this: we con-
struct a scenario in which the only explanation of the non-overlap between
members of the Rotary and those of the Luxuriant Flowing Hair Club is
the one given above, while no explanation in terms of real laws warrants
acceptance.
Suppose that, in an old shoe box in the basement, we find the following
items: a membership list of the Rotary and a membership list of the Luxu-
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riant Flowing Hair Club, both in the same town and in the same year; and a
black-and-white group photograph of the Rotary, all members of which are
bald. This is a historic discovery, because this town was completely destroyed
by a tornado, and all the information about its inhabitants was thought lost.
In fact, all of it is lost, except for these items.
If we attempt to explain why no Rotary member became a member of
the LFHC on the basis of social or physical laws, we face the problem of a
radical underdetermination of the theory by the evidence. There are many
potential explanations – perhaps the town employed a rigid caste system,
with each caste having its own clubs – all of which have their own unique
presuppositions about the social or physical structures in place. For the
sake of the example we will suppose that none of these presuppositions is
confirmed by the data to a degree that warrants its inclusion in the store of
scientific knowledge, K.
The scientific situation of which this example is a colourful illustration
is quite common. It often happens that the data underdetermine the choice
of a general theory to such an extent that we do not accept any theory, but
confess that we are ignorant. At the same time, we see patterns in the data,
and try to explain them. Since no general theories are accepted, and since an
explanatory argument pattern must use only premises that are in K (Kitcher
1981 [55], p. 519), we cannot use general theories to explain the patterns in
the data. But sometimes we can explain it using a local story featuring no
general laws whatsoever.
In our example, we can explain why no Rotary member became a member
of the LFHC by showing people the photograph and saying: “Well look, they
were all bald!” It is a good explanation. It is also the only explanation we
have, because all explanations based on social or physical laws are unaccept-
able as their presuppositions are not in K. So the best explanation in this
case is one that does not contain laws, and the first unificationist strategy
fails.
By modifying the scenario, we can also use it to defeat the second unifi-
cationist strategy: showing that unificationists can reject an explanation of
John’s baldness by his membership with the Rotary in a way that does not
use the notion of law. We will do this by showing that there are cases in
which the generalisation that all members of the Rotary are bald is genuinely
unifying.
Assume that we find a list of names of everyone who lived in the town.
Behind every name is written what clubs the person is a member of, and
whether he is bald or not. This is the entirety of our knowledge about the
town.
There is one strong correlation between the entries of the list: everyone
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who is a member of the Rotary is also bald. In the unificationist theory of
Kitcher, adding the argument pattern “X is a member of the Rotary; all
members of the Rotary are bald; therefore, X is bald” will increase C(D).
By making the number of members of the Rotary large enough, we can
always make sure this will more than balance the addition of a new argument
pattern, thus increasing unification. Hence, Kitcher must accept the non-
explanation as a real explanation.
We conclude that unification by itself is not enough to solve the problem
of asymmetry and the problem of accidental generalisations. For both of
these reasons, unification is not sufficient to ground explanation.
2.3.3 Lawhood in Schurz & Lambert
Schurz and Lambert explicitly add a causal theory to the body of knowledge
KNOW , which is meant to reflect the best knowledge about causality that
is available to a given cognitive agent or community. Arguments that pro-
ceed from causes to effects get a unification bonus, whereas arguments that
proceed the other way incur a unification penalty. This strategy ensures that
causal explanations are preferred to non-causal or counter-causal ones; but
it also means a relinquishing of the ambition of Kitcher to generate causality
from unification.
Nor do Schurz and Lambert fare better where lawhood is concerned. Let
us recall the final scenario given in the previous section, where we had found
a list of names, club membership and degree of baldness. In the theory
of Schurz and Lambert, adding the theoretical statement “all members of
the Rotary are bald” moves several pieces of data from the ‘basic’ to the
‘assimilated’ category. If the Rotary has enough members, this increases
unification and “John is bald because he is a member of the Rotary and all
members of the Rotary are bald” must be a genuine explanation – but it
isn’t.
In general, a generalisation is allowed in Kb whenever enough particular
facts that used to be in Kb can be derived from it by arguments ibs. These
facts will then be moved to Ka, generating a unification bonus. This bonus
will outweigh the cost of adding the generalisation to Kb if and only if some
(unspecified) number of particular facts is involved. Thus, whether a gener-
alisation is unificatory and hence allowed in Ka depends only on the num-
ber of its previously unassimilated instances. But the number of previously
unassimilated instances cannot be a criterion of lawhood: some accidental
generalisations have huge amounts of instances, while some genuine laws may
have none, like Newton’s first law.
This means that the theory of Schurz and Lambert must also condone
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non-explanation as explanation, or invoke the criterion of lawhood (or derive
lawhood from causality, if such a thing is possible). Either way, unification
is not sufficient for explanation.
I conclude that neither of the two unificationist theories I have discussed
gives sufficient conditions for explanatory power.
2.4 Is unification necessary for explanation?
In the previous sections I argued, first, that Kitcher’s theory of unification
is beset by a profound internal difficulty, and second, that neither Kitcher’s
nor Schurz and Lambert’s theory is strong enough to explain the roles of
causality and lawhood in explanations. I have thus argued that unification
does not yield sufficient conditions for explanatory power: additional con-
ditions involving causality and lawhood have to be added. In the present
section I will claim that unificationism does not provide necessary conditions
either: explanations do not have to be unificatory. I will defend the positive
counter-claim: some explanations disunify our knowledge.
Schurz presents a necessary condition of explanation, (U):
The explanatory premises Prem must be less in need of explana-
tion (in C + A) than the explanandum P (in C). (Schurz 1999
[119], p. 97)
One page later, he claims that this condition leads to a unificationist theory
of explanation:
In condition (U), being-in-need-of-explanation is the crucial con-
cept that leads to a unification- or coherence-based approach of
explanation. The being-in-need-of-explanation of a phenomenon
P in cognitive state C comes in degrees, and it depends of how
well P fits into C or coheres with C. . . . [I]f condition (U) is
satisfied, then the loss of coherence due to the addition of Prem
to C must be smaller than the gain of coherence due to the as-
similation of P to Prem in C+A. . . Hence condition (U) implies
that the answer can be explanatory only if the total coherence of
the cognitive corpus has been increased because of this addition.
(Schurz 1999 [119], p. 98)
Being-in-need-of-explanation is equated to fitting badly into the cognitive
corpus. Condition (U) thus demands that the premises from which the ex-
planandum P is derived fit better into the cognitive corpus than P itself does.
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The ‘total amount’ of being-in-need-of-explanation must decrease, which is
another way of saying that the unification of the cognitive corpus must in-
crease. If condition (U) holds, it is necessary that explanations increase unifi-
cation; and if it is necessary that explanations increase unification, condition
(U) holds. Whether condition (U) holds or not and whether unificationism
does or does not furnish necessary conditions for explanation will be decided
together.
Does condition (U) hold? Let us examine the example used by Schurz.
While sitting in your third-floor office, you see your colleague Peter falling
past the window. ‘Why did Peter fall past the window?’, is the question
that naturally comes to mind. After all, it is surprising that Peter falls past
the window; the proposition P , ‘Peter just fell past the window’, does not
fit well into your cognitive corpus. It was not to be expected. According
to condition (U), an explanation of P must derive P from premises that fit
better into the cognitive corpus C than P does.
Schurz illustrates this with two proposed explanations. Explanation A1
is: ‘Because one second ago, Peter was falling past the window of the fifth
floor’. According to Schurz, although my background knowledge allows me
to derive P from A1, A1 is nevertheless not explanatory because it is just as
much in need of explanation as P . It does not fit well into C either. The
second explanation is A2: ‘Because the fire brigade is testing a new jumping
sheet at our building’.
There is nothing puzzling about firebrigades testing jumping sheets:
though the event is not very likely, it has plausible ‘how possi-
ble’ explanations and thus is heuristically assimilated. Hence, the
answer A2 is completely satisfying. (Schurz 1999 [119], p. 108)
Is it possible that the fire brigade testing jumping sheets at my office
building at this moment of the day (a phenomenon which I will call Q) is
less in need of an explanation than Peter falling past the window? Let us
assume that we are not overly puzzled by its being Peter who fell, by his
falling past my window, by the fall’s happening at this exact moment, or
by any other detail that is not explained by answer A2 – let us assume, in
other words, that Q is connected to P by a deductive or strong probabilistic
argument. Is it possible that Q does not stand in need of an explanation
while P does? It certainly cannot be the case that Q has a high probability
and P a low one. An argument ibs guarantees that a high probability of the
premises implies a high probability of the conclusion; there is an argument
ibs connecting Q to P ; and therefore, Q cannot be very likely and P very
unlikely at the same time. So if being-in-need-of-explanation is a matter of
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probability, the premises from which a conclusion is reached can never be
less in need of explanation than the conclusion itself.
According to Schurz, being-in-need-of-explanation is not to be construed
in terms of probabilities. Something is in need of explanation if it has no
plausible ‘how possible’ explanations. A ‘how possible’ explanation is an
explanation that either shows that the phenomenon is truly random (such
as, perhaps, quantum wave collapse), or shows that the phenomenon can
be inferred from a theory T in K using boundary conditions Cd which do
not have to be in K, but must be compatible with K. Presumably, Q is
not a truly random phenomenon; but it is plausible that some theories in
K (about the practices of fire brigades, for instance) can generate Q when
combined with appropriate boundary conditions. So Q has a ‘how possible’
explanation, and is not in need of explanation.
However, there is ex hypothesi an argument ibs that connects Q to P . At
the very least this must mean that if Q is possible, P is possible. Surely, then,
P also has a valid ‘how possible’ explanation using T and Cd. In addition,
P has many independent alternative ‘how possible’ explanations including
Peter being suicidal; Peter having been thrown out of the fifth-floor window
by an angry customer; Peter testing a new bungee jumping cord for the local
bungee club; and so forth.
It is impossible that the conclusion of a valid argument ibs does not
have ‘how possible’ explanations if the premises do have them. Furthermore,
having a ‘how possible’ explanation does not ensure that a phenomenon no
longer stands in need of explanation. The possibility of Peter’s fall has not
been contested or doubted by anyone. Anyone with a little imagination can
come up with ten possible explanations of Peter’s fall in the space of two
minutes. What is asked for when we want Peter’s fall explained is not an
explanation of P ’s possibility, but an explanation of P . (It should be noted
that a fact that has no known plausible ‘how possible’ explanations will be
very disconnected with the rest of C, and will thus generally be very much
in need of explanation. The reverse, however, is not true: having a plausible
‘how possible’ explanation is a very weak condition, and does not imply being
well-connected with the rest of C.)
Giving an explanation of P can take two forms. P can be explained using
only propositions in K, by pointing out an argument ibs that leads from these
propositions to P . In such a case, the explanation merely adds arguments ibs
to I, the set of inferences in C. The other possibility is that new propositions
have to be added to K in order to explain P . These new propositions must
be surprising given the rest of K, that is, not certain or highly likely given
the rest of K, as otherwise it would not have been necessary to add them.
(One could simply have derived them.) Thus, as far as ‘being-in-need-of-
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explanation’ is an objective term, newly introduced premises must always be
in need of explanation. Condition (U) does not hold.6
Phenomena can be explained by other phenomena that are just as un-
likely and unexplained. Indeed, I venture the claim that the majority of
explanations we encounter in practice are like that. Are Newton’s laws less
in need of an explanation than the phenomena they help to explain? Is the
length of the flagpole less in need of an explanation than the length of the
shadow it helps to explain? Rather, what happens in each of these cases is
that we satisfy our curiosity about one ‘unlikely’ phenomenon by deriving it
from another ‘unlikely’ phenomenon about which we are less curious. But
the explanations would be just as good if the phenomena that feature in
the explanans were much more in need of an explanation than those in the
explanandum – provided, of course, that both these sets of phenomena are
admitted into the cognitive corpus K. This completes my demonstration that
unificationism does not furnish us with necessary conditions for explanatory
power.
I wish to make two more – related – points concerning this topic. First,
I wish to point out the difference between local ‘connectedness’ and global
‘connectedness’. Second, I wish to offer a brief explanation of the popularity
of the idea that unification and explanation are closely linked.
Schurz and Lambert represent our knowledge as a web of statements con-
nected by arguments. We may speak about the ‘connectedness’ of statements
as a measure of the number and strength of the arguments connecting them
to other statements in K. Schurz and Lambert’s unificationist theory of ex-
planation then states that something is an explanation of P only if it has
two effects: it increases the connectedness of P , and it increases the total
connectedness of K. P must be linked to other statements in order to be
explained; P ’s local connectedness must be increased. But the total set of
knowledge must also become more unified; the global connectedness of K
must increase. And global connectedness is equal to unification.
My analysis suggests that increasing the global connectedness of P is not
a necessary part of explaining P .7 Q can explain P even if adding Q to K un-
6My analysis is not inconsistent with the well-known fact that explanations are not in
general infinitely regressive. We stop asking explanatory questions and feel satisfied not
because some objective state of not-being-in-need-of-explanation has been reached, but
because at some point we are no longer interested in following the chain of explanations
further down. We are satisfied on being told that the fire brigade is testing a new jump
sheet today at our office using Peter as test subject, simply because we are not interested
in further explanations of this fact. It is lack of interest, rather than achievement of
unification, that stops the potentially infinite chain of explanatory questions.
7It may be necessary to increase the local connectedness of P , but we will not pursue
this question.
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ravels large parts of the web. Planck’s postulation of light quanta explained
the black body radiation curve, even though this postulate unravelled many
connections based on the wave theory of light. Of course, almost nobody was
willing to accept Planck’s postulate as true, including Planck himself. This
brings me to my second point.
Q can explain P only if we are willing to believe that Q is true. If Q
is a disunifying postulate, it is incompatible with statements we formerly
believed to be true. This will often decrease our willingness to believe Q.
Therefore, we are often unwilling to accept disunifying explanations; not
because explanations cannot be disunifying, but because the statements we
are asked to believe are incompatible with established parts of our knowledge.
The premises of unifying explanations, in contrast, can be compatible with
all our previous beliefs. The reason unifying explanations are often deemed
superior to disunifying ones is simply that we are more inclined to believe
the premises of the former. But if – for whatever reason – we are willing
to accept the premises of a disunifying explanation, it can function perfectly
well as an explanation. If Planck had been willing to accept the particle
nature of light, he would have regarded his theory of black body radiation
as a perfectly good explanation. And this would have been justified.
Unification is used as a measure of believability. It is in this capacity that
it is linked to explanation, because an explanation is acceptable only when its
premises are believed to be true (or probable). But this chapter has shown
that there is no stronger link than this between unification and explanation.
Whether an argument that contains premises we believe to be true actually
explains its conclusion is a question that will have to be answered separately
from any considerations of unificatory power.
2.5 Conclusion
The notion of unification is important and worthy of analysis. I have tried
to show that Kitcher’s proposal faces serious difficulties, but the theory of
Schurz and Lambert is more successful. As a theory of unification, I have no
quarrel with it.
However, as unificationist theories of explanation, both Kitcher’s and
Schurz and Lambert’s theory face serious difficulties. They are not suf-
ficient for the task, as they cannot generate the notions of causality and
lawhood which many believe to be important to characterise explanatory
power. Moreover, unification is not necessary for explanation. Explanations
can have a disunifying instead of a unifying effect. The only reason unify-
ing explanations are deemed preferable is that we are often more inclined to
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believe their premises.
Therefore, whatever the merits of these theories as theories of unification,
as unificationist theories of explanation they are not successful.
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Chapter 3
Against Inference to the Best
Explanation
3.1 Introduction
Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) – a term introduced by Harman 1965
[38], though the idea can be retraced to Peirce, Whewell and even Aristotle
– is a contentious topic in philosophy. According to proponents of IBE, the
observation of a theory’s success in explaining a phenomenon is a reason to
raise our estimate of the probability of the theory’s being true: in the words
of Lipton ([72], 56), “explanatory considerations [are] an important guide
to judgments of likeliness”.1 Its opponents, on the other hand, deny that
explanatory considerations are relevant for determinations of likeliness.2 In
this chapter, I will give a concise overview of the current state of the debate,
and I will present new criticisms of several arguments in favour of IBE.
In a first phase of the debate, proponents of IBE defended the thesis that
there is a correct inference scheme of the form “if E, and if H is the best
explanation of E, then H”. Several arguments were raised against this the-
sis, and the consensus is now that this thesis cannot be maintained. Recent
proponents of IBE have therefore defended somewhat weaker claims. They
claim no longer that IBE is a formal inference scheme on a par with deduc-
tion, but only that explanatory considerations point us to truth, and are thus
epistemically relevant. My arguments specifically target this more modest
1For other defences of IBE, see Lipton (1991 [69], 2001a [70], 2001b [71], 2007 [73]);
[38]; Psillos (1999 [93], 2007 [95]); Lycan 2002 [75]; Day and Kincaid 1994 [20]. The
latter article also contains an extensive overview of how IBE is used in different areas of
philosophy.
2See Van Fraassen 1989 [29]; Achinstein 1992 [1]; Salmon (2001a [114], 2001b [115]);
Barnes 1995 [6].
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version of IBE, and I will attempt to show that it, too, is too strong. Expla-
nation is not an epistemic category at all – where I use the term ‘epistemic’,
as I will do everywhere in this chapter, in the narrow sense of ‘relevant to
judgments of likeliness or truth’.
The arguments with which the modern, more moderate version of IBE
is defended fall into three broad groups.3 First, there are attempts to link
explanatory virtues like simplicity and scope to the epistemic virtue of high
probability. Second, there are case studies of scientific research where ex-
planatory considerations allegedly do epistemic work. Third, there are argu-
ments to the effect that IBE fits well with and therefore draws support from
Bayesianism.
Against the first class of arguments, I will argue that none of the so-
called explanatory virtues is conducive both to explanatory loveliness and to
high probability. For instance, an explanation which gives a detailed causal
mechanism is ceteris paribus more explanatory than one which is vague and
non-committal, but also and for the very same reason ceteris paribus less
likely to be true. In the reverse direction, rigorously applying the distinction
between loveliness and likeliness shows us that a virtue like simplicity is not
conducive to explanatory loveliness, even though it might be an epistemic
virtue.
The second class of arguments cannot be dismissed in toto: I have to
limit myself to discussing a single example. This will be Lipton’s (2004)
study of the research of Ignaz Semmelweis, which is the most convincing and
thorough study in the literature. I will argue that although the study shows
that explanatory considerations played an important role in Semmelweis’s
research, they did not play the role envisaged by Lipton. The case study
licenses only a much weaker explanationist position.
As for the third class of arguments, I will attempt to show that the
possibilities of reconciliation presented by Lipton 2004 [72] are not, in fact,
very promising.
I will conclude that we do not have good reasons to accept the form
of IBE defended by its recent proponents. If this conclusion is correct, we
have to rethink the role of explanation in science, and reassess a large set of
arguments for scientific realism that depend on IBE.
3I will be mainly concerned with the arguments given in Lipton 2004 [72], since his is
by far the most extensive defence of IBE yet given.
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3.2 IBE as an inference scheme
It is unfortunate that IBE is called IBE, because this gives us the idea that its
defenders posit an inference scheme like those of deductive logic; an inference
scheme – let us call it S – that would roughly be “if E, and if H is the best
explanation of E, then infer H”.
However, there are at least three reasons for thinking that S cannot be
valid. First, we may not yet have thought of a good enough explanation
of E: if we have only unconvincing explanations of E, the rational thing
to do is to withhold our assent from them all, including the best of them.
For instance, string theory may be our best explanation of certain physical
phenomena, while not being a good explanation of those phenomena. That
it is the best is by itself too weak a ground to believe it to be true.
This argument is known in the literature as ‘the argument from a bad
lot’, and there is consensus that it shows that S cannot be valid – see, for
instance, Lipton (2004 [72], p. 63). Nevertheless, there has been a debate in
the recent literature about this argument. This debate was kicked off by Van
Fraassen (1989 [29], pp. 142-150), who presents the argument from a bad
lot as a decisive argument against Inference to the Best Explanation. Both
Psillos (1999, [93], pp. 215-222) and Lipton (2004 [72], pp. 151-163) attack
Van Fraassen’s argument, which might give the impression that they try to
save S from Van Fraassen’s criticism.
However, this is not the case. Lipton and Psillos attack Van Fraassen in
order to save scientific realism; and in their defence of realism, they affirm
the invalidity of S. Thus, Psillos writes (1999 [93], p. 216): “[I]t is logically
possible that our best theory is the best of a bad lot. Clearly, any sensible
model of abduction must allow for this possibility.” He then proceeds to
defend the idea that under some circumstances, often realised in science,
we may nevertheless have good reasons to believe that our theories form a
‘good’ lot. But a scheme of inference that is valid only if certain unstated
background conditions are true is evidently not itself a correct scheme of
inference. Lipton takes the same approach.
Second, there may be too many good explanations available, and in such
a case, the difference between the best explanation and the other explanations
might be too small to warrant inferring to it. It may be irrational to choose
even among a good lot if we don’t have strong reasons to prefer one alternative
over all the others.
Third, S would commit us to an epistemic form of the Principle of Suf-
ficient Reason. If it is valid, then for any phenomenon E, if there is at least
one potential explanation H of E, it is rational to conclude that there is a
true explanation of E. But some things – the decay at a particular time
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(rather than some other time) of a radioactive atom, the existence of some-
thing (rather than nothing) – may not have true explanations at all, though
they do have potential explanations (hidden variables, the necessary exis-
tence of God).4 Since S would have us infer to the best explanation of these
phenomena, it precludes the possibility that they cannot be explained.
There is consensus in the current literature that no scheme like S is valid.
Salmon (2001a [114], p. 62) speaks of IBE as “a slogan, not [...] an accu-
rate account of any form of nondemonstrative inference”; Lipton (2004 [72],
p. 57) says that “it still remains more of a slogan than an articulated ac-
count of induction”, after which he goes on to qualify the slogan in various
far-reaching ways that dash any hopes that IBE might be a simple scheme of
inference; Day & Kincaid (1994 [20], p. 275) state that “IBE is not a special,
foundational inference scheme”, by which they mean that explanatory con-
siderations give us only defeasible warrant; Psillos (2007 [95], p. 442) says
that IBE is “an instance of [. . . ] defeasible reasoning”. All these authors
except Salmon are proponents of IBE.
Recent defenders of IBE have thus abandoned the idea of IBE as a scheme
of inference. Instead, they claim that explanatory considerations do not
determine but only inform our judgments of likeliness. Henceforth, we will
be concerned only with this weaker form of IBE, which will be formulated in
more detail in section 3.4.
3.3 Loveliness and likeliness
In the previous section, we saw that Inference to the Best Explanation is not
really inference; in this section, we will look at the second half of formula.
We must eliminate a major ambiguity in the term ‘best explanation’, namely,
that between what Peter Lipton has dubbed the loveliest explanation and the
likeliest explanation – or rather that between loveliness and likeliness, since
there is little reason to continue speaking in superlatives once the idea of
scheme S has been renounced.
A lovely explanation of a phenomenon F is an explanation which, if it
were true, would offer a satisfying explanation of F ; or, in other words, an
explanation which, if it were true, would give us the great understanding
of F . (What makes an explanation satisfying? We would of course like to
have a detailed account of this, but the difference between loveliness and
likeliness can be understood without it, and a purely intuitive notion of
4Pruss 2006 [92] argues for the necessary truth of the Principle of Sufficient Reason on
the basis of the correctness of Inference to the Best Explanation; but I suspect that most
philosophers will see this as a reductio ad absurdum of this kind of IBE.
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which explanations are satisfying and which are not will prove enough for the
arguments in this chapter.) Loveliness is an explanatory virtue, or rather,
the summum bonum of explanation.
A likely explanation of a phenomenon F is an explanation which, con-
sidering all the available evidence, is likely to be true. Likeliness is thus equal
to probability, and an epistemic good (in the restricted sense of this term
established in the introduction).
An explanation can be likely without being lovely, and at least prima
facie also lovely without being likely. An example of the former is the ex-
planation of why people fall asleep after they have smoked opium by saying
that opium has a ‘dormitive virtue’. This is almost guaranteed to be true
(if we construe the term ‘dormitive virtue’ broadly enough), but isn’t very
satisfying. Whether and under what conditions we find the latter, that is, an
explanation that is lovely but not likely, is the central question of the debate
about IBE; and it will therefore be addressed throughout this chapter.
When the proponent of IBE tells us that explanatory goodness inform
our judgments of likeliness, what do they mean by explanatory goodness?
Do they mean loveliness or likeliness? Lipton (2004) argues persuasively
that if IBE is to be an informative doctrine, it must be the doctrine that
loveliness informs our judgments of likeliness. If being a good explanation
simply means being a likely explanation, then of course we should infer to
good explanations – because likeliness is an epistemic good, prior to and
independent of any explanatory considerations.5 Explanatory considerations
become relevant to epistemology only if they allow us to make inferences we
wouldn’t have been allowed to make without those considerations. Thus, the
defenders of IBE must postulate a link between loveliness and inference; their
doctrine must be that sometimes we can infer to an explanation because it
is a lovely explanation.
On the other hand, it would be absurd if the proponent of IBE were
to ask us to infer to an explanation that we judge less likely to be true
(even after we take into account explanatory considerations) than some of
its competitors. We should always infer to that theory which is most likely
to be true. So the defender of IBE has to claim that lovely explanations
can also be judged (after we take into account explanatory considerations)
to be likely explanations; and in order to do so, he must forge a link between
loveliness and likeliness. This link must be such that we sometimes find out
about likeliness by considering loveliness.
5Harman 1965 [38] was not clear about this, glossing “best explanation” as “most
plausible explanation”. A sensitivity to the likely/lovely distinction is one of the virtues
of modern defences of IBE.
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3.4 The guiding thesis
Before we look at the arguments given in favour of IBE, let us formulate the
doctrine somewhat more rigorously. Lipton introduces a formulation of IBE
which he calls the ‘Guiding Thesis’. The Guiding Thesis states that when we
are looking for true theories (2004 [72], p. 56) “[explanatory] considerations
tell us not only what to look for, but also whether we have found it.” This is
not to say that explanatory considerations alone can tell us whether a theory
is true; but it is to say that they are relevant to making such judgments.
Loveliness does not equal likeliness, but loveliness is a guide to likeliness.6
The guiding thesis is not equal to the claim that sometimes, the (subjec-
tive) probability of a theory T increases when we find out that some phe-
nomenon E of which T furnishes a lovely explanation actually occurred. This
latter claim is obviously true, and can be accepted by those who deny the
guiding thesis. We can often judge E to be evidence for T without taking into
account T loveliness as an explanation of E, and the vast majority of confir-
mation theories do so. Even theories that furnish only unlovely explanations
can increase in (subject) probability when we get new evidence that they
explain (in their unlovely way). “Opium has a dormitive virtue” becomes
(subjectively) more likely once we see some people fall asleep after smoking
opium, even though the theory gives us only an unlovely explanation of the
evidence.
The guiding thesis, then, is more specific. In saying that loveliness is a
guide to likeliness, it claims that sometimes, explanatory considerations play
an essential role in determining whether or not a theory is to be believed.
Insights in loveliness allow us to make claims that we would not be licensed
to make if we paid no attention to explanation. (On a Bayesian approach,
where there is generally no clear threshold for acceptance, we should refor-
mulate this as follows: insights in loveliness make a difference to our posterior
probabilities.)
The initial plausibility of the guiding thesis comes from examples where
we do infer to the best explanation of a phenomenon we have witnessed.
Salmon (2001a [114], p. 73) gives the example of two people who go to the
woods, find, collect, cook and eat some mushrooms, and then, several hours
later, suffer severe gastrointestinal distress. The best explanation of this is
6Barnes 1995 [6] calls this claim “Lipton’s Central Thesis”. His attack on it and mine
complement each other well: he discusses some arguments that I will leave aside, such
as the claim that Mill’s method is a form of IBE; while I discuss the Semmelweis case
study and Bayesian arguments, which he does not touch on. The only overlap is in our
discussions of the explanatory virtues: here we are in substantial agreement, though the
details of our arguments vary considerably.
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that the mushrooms they collected were poisonous; we do in fact infer this
hypothesis; and it is tempting to believe that we do the latter because of the
former.
But is this true? Do we infer the hypothesis because it is the best expla-
nation, or does that get the order wrong, and is the mushroom story the best
explanation because we are allowed (on other grounds) to infer it? Salmon
continues: “But how can we determine that consumption of poisonous mush-
rooms is the best explanation? It seems to me that we judge it to be best
because it is the most likely, among those available, to be true. ... [the]
explanatory beauty does not enter into our choice of the hypothesis as most
likely.” (Explanatory beauty is another term for loveliness.)
Consider the following alternative explanation of the gastrointestinal dis-
tress: although all the mushrooms were perfectly harmless, the mushroom
gatherers drank a bottle of red wine when they came back from their trip,
and this wine had been adulterated by CIA agents with a poison that causes
gastrointestinal distress. Is this a good explanation? Let us disambiguate
that question. First, is it a likely explanation? No, it is very unlikely to be
true (given the facts at our disposal and our background beliefs). Second, is
it a lovely explanation? That is, would it be a good explanation if it were
true? Well – yes. If it were true, it would perfectly explain the suffering
of the gatherers. Indeed, it appears as lovely as the explanation using the
poisonous mushrooms. And yet we do not infer to its truth.
We can now see that many supposedly obvious examples of IBE in ac-
tion are in fact no such thing. When the detective tries to solve the murder
– the naive defender of IBE may say – surely he infers to that hypothesis
that best explains the available evidence? True. But does he infer to that
hypothesis because it is the loveliest explanation, that is, because it would
be the most satisfying explanation if it were true? Or is the explanation ac-
cepted as that which best explains the available evidence because the evidence
makes it likelier than any of its competitors? In the latter case, explanatory
considerations do no epistemic work at all, and IBE does not take place.7
These considerations diminish the initial plausibility of the guiding thesis;
so before we accept it, we will need arguments. The task of a defender of
IBE, then, is to show that we do sometimes infer a hypothesis H because
7We have assumed throughout that explanatory and epistemic factors can be pried
apart. This is probably not true; it is perhaps the case, for instance, that H’s probabilistic
relevance for E is a necessary condition both for H explaining E and for E being evidence
for H. But we follow the literature in assuming that explanation is something more,
something not reducible to simple confirmation theories. If this assumption is wrong, so
much the worse for IBE; for it then would reduce to these simpler confirmation theories
that did not mention explanatory factors.
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a phenomenon E would be beautifully (that is, lovelily) explained by H if
H were true; and that it is not instead the case that witnessing E makes
H sufficiently likely to justify inferring it quite apart from the question of
whether it affords a beautiful explanation of E.
3.5 First argument: virtues
We turn to the first argument that the proponents of the Guiding Thesis
offer.8 This argument has the following form. Explanations that are lovely,
are lovely because they have certain properties. We call these properties
explanatory virtues. If it turns out that these explanatory virtues are also
epistemic virtues, then loveliness is a guide to likeliness. To make the ar-
gument more concrete, one has to identify the explanatory virtues, and one
has to show that these virtues are also epistemic virtues, that is, that these
virtues also point to likeliness.
One immediate worry with this strategy is that the role of explanation
appears to be very small. If the explanatory virtues are also epistemic virtues,
why not just call them epistemic virtues and leave explanation out of the
story? Still, it might be the case that it is harder for us to judge which
virtues are instantiated in a hypothesis H, and to what extent, than it is for
us to judge how good an explanation of the evidence H is. If so, explanation
would be psychologically necessary though analytically superfluous.
The real problem with the first argument is much deeper: there are in
fact no explanatory virtues that are also epistemic virtues. Simplicity, scope,
unification, precision, exhibiting a mechanism – all of these are either ex-
planatory or epistemic virtues, but none of them is both. And if that is the
case, the sought-for link between loveliness and likeliness is not established.
So what we need to do now, is to look at all the supposed virtues in turn and
see whether they can bridge the gap from the explanatory to the epistemic.
It is strange that the defenders of IBE have taken little trouble to defend
the idea that the explanatory virtues are also epistemic virtues. Lipton 2004
[72] spends about half a page (122) of a 200-page book on this topic, giving a
list of virtues rather than substantive arguments. Lycan 2002 [75] discusses
a number of virtues, but he makes no clear distinction between loveliness,
likeliness, and pragmatic reasons for theory acceptance, and argues only that,
all things considered, we prefer simpler (and so on) theories. We do – but
this does not establish a link between loveliness and likeliness.
8For another critical discussion of the explanatory virtues, see Barnes 1995 [6], pp. 257-
266.
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If we wish to judge whether, say, simplicity is an explanatory virtue, we
need to look at examples where a simpler and a less simple explanation are
competing with each other. Similarly for the other virtues; and thus, we
need some examples on hand before we continue our investigations. I will
give two.
1. I am carrying a bunch of red roses. Why am I carrying a bunch of
red roses (rather than something else)? Explanation A: I want to sur-
prise my girlfriend. Explanation B: I wanted to surprise my girlfriend,
so I went to the theatre to buy tickets for the performance of Medea
tonight. But then, when I walked home, I remembered that my girl-
friend loathes Euripides (because she agrees with Nietzsche that he
destroyed the Dionysian strength of Greek tragedy). So I went back,
but they wouldn’t refund me my money, which left me with only a
couple of euros in cash. All I could do then was buy a cheap bunch
of flowers, and these roses – which are already a bit past their prime
– were the cheapest they had at the flower shop. Neither I nor my
girlfriend like roses all that much, but it’s the best I could do.
Of these explanations, A is clearly the more likely, since B entails A.
However, B is the lovelier: if it is true, it would be a better explana-
tion of the phenomenon than A. This is not because B gives us more
details about the causal history of the explanandum, but because it
more specifically singles out the explanandum from its contrast class:
explanation A leaves open the possibility that I want to surprise my
girlfriend with tickets for Medea, or a gold ring, or an expensive bou-
quet, while explanation B excludes all those possibilities.
2. Heavy objects fall down, lighter-than-air objects fall up. Why is this
the case? Because of the law of gravity. If we add some details, we
have a good explanation for each occasion where something heavy falls
down or something light falls up.
Assume, however, that in my basement heavy objects fall up instead of
down, while lighter-than-air objects such as helium balloons fall down
instead of up. My basement is the only place in the world where this
happens. One potential explanation of these phenomena is that in my
basement, the law of gravity does not hold, but a reverse law of gravity
holds that involves a repulsive force rather than an attractive one.
We would be loath to accept this explanation, since it seems overwhelm-
ingly likely to be false. We would need an immense amount of evidence
before we would even consider believing it. But leave the epistemic
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considerations aside and suppose the hypothesis were true – would it
then offer us a good explanation of a brick’s in my basement falling
up? It would.
An explanation of something in my basement falling up in terms of a
reverse law of gravity is just as lovely as an explanation of something
elsewhere falling down because of the normal laws of gravity; it is just
as lovely, the only problem is that it is less likely.
With these two examples in hand, we will be in a better position to judge
the virtues.
Whether simplicity is linked to truth is a controversial issue. Salmon
points out (2001b [115], p. 129) that scientists often regard simple expla-
nations with suspicion and even reject them for being too simple. Thus
historians may well feel, and rightfully so, that any simple theory about the
decline and fall of the Roman Empire is bound to be wrong. A political
scientist who wishes to explain that there was a surge in the number of votes
received by populist parties in the Netherlands after 2000 may well dismiss
out of hand candidate explanations like “other parties didn’t face up to the
problems of immigration” – the proposed cause being too simple to be, on
its own, an explanation of the phenomenon.
However, let us grant for the sake of argument that simplicity is an epis-
temic virtue, and that simpler theories are ceteris paribus more likely to be
true than complex ones. The question remains whether simplicity is also an
explanatory virtue. Do simpler theories generally generate lovelier explana-
tions?
Our first example, about why I am carrying a bunch of red roses, casts
doubt on this proposal. It seems that as we get more details of a certain kind,
namely, details that help us to discard additional elements of the contrast
class, we are also able to understand the situation better. But more details
make a hypothesis more complex, not more simple; so there is at least one
aspect of simplicity – lack of detail – that harms rather than aids loveliness.
Good explanations are often very specific stories that appeal to contingent
features of the particular situation.
Is there another aspect of simplicity that does improve the loveliness of the
explanation? A simpler explanation can be used in more circumstances – it is
potentially more unifying than a complex one; but we will look at unification
as a separate virtue next, and see that it does not improve loveliness. A
simpler explanation is easier to grasp than a complex one; but this seems to
be a merely pragmatic advantage, not something that we can tie to loveliness.
A simple explanation of the fall of the Roman Empire may be easier to grasp,
but a more complex one that details the interaction between a host of causal
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factors will grant us more understanding once we’ve finally worked through
the details and understood it.
There may be other aspects of simplicity that do increase loveliness, but
it is up to the defenders of IBE to make them explicit. I conclude that as far
as our analysis has gone, simplicity seems to be an explanatory vice rather
than an explanatory virtue.
We now turn to unification and scope. Let us notice first that an
explanation of a particular phenomenon is not the kind of thing that can
unify, or that can have a scope. So the appeal to unification or scope must
be understood in this sense: if an explanation of a phenomenon P involves
theories that also explain many, or a great variety of, other phenomena, then
by virtue of this it is a lovelier explanation of P .
This is false, as can be seen from our second example. The reverse gravity
hypothesis is much less unificatory than the standard laws of gravity, and it
also has a much smaller scope. Yet if it is true, it gives a lovely explanation
of the strange behaviour of the objects in my basement. This explanation
would not become lovelier if more objects in the Universe were to behave in
accordance with this law – the behaviour of these other objects is perfectly
irrelevant for how much understanding the explanation gives us about what
is happening here in my basement. (It would, of course, become easier to
believe that the explanation were true if it applied to more objects; but this
is by definition irrelevant to how lovely it is.)
Suppose we see an explanation as the instantiation of a more general ex-
planatory pattern (as we must do to talk about unification and scope). Then
how lovely this explanation is can depend only on two things: the properties
of the pattern itself, and whether the pattern is indeed instantiated in this
case. The number of instantiations of the patterns is irrelevant. The dor-
mitive virtue explanation of opium putting people to sleep does not become
any lovelier when more people start smoking opium so that it can be applied
more often; nor does the explanatory loveliness of a Newtonian explanation
of the movement of our planets decrease if it turns out that the law of gravity
holds only in our local part of the Universe. So we have reason to doubt that
unification and scope are explanatory virtues.9
There is a sense in which unification and scope are ‘explanatory virtues’,
but this is not a sense that is useful to the defender of IBE. That sense is
this: if a theory is unifying, or has great scope, we can use it to construct
more explanations than if it were not unifying or had limited scope. So in a
quantitative sense, theories that unify and have great scope are better if we
9There is a substantial literature linking explanation with unification; for criticism of
this tradition, I point the reader to chapter 2 above.
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want explanations; but loveliness is a qualitative matter. We might want to
say that a unifying theory is explains more, and that this is a virtue of the
theory; but it does not follow that the individual explanations it furnishes
are any lovelier. Thus, Lipton (2004 [72], p. 122) is wrong when he states
(without argument): “An explanation that explains more phenomena is for
that reason a lovelier explanation”.10 In the absence of an argument or an
example, my examples are good reasons to believe that Lipton is mistaken
and the unification and scope are not explanatory virtues.
A final point we have to make here is that lack of unification or scope
can sometimes be an indication that a more lovely explanation is available.
For instance, the fact that Galileo’s law of free fall is valid near the surface
of the earth but invalid in many other parts of the universe, can be taken
to indicate that a deeper explanation is available. And indeed, there is the
explanation of free fall given by Newton’s theory of gravitation, which is
valid everywhere in the universe. Newton’s explanation is more lovely than
Galileo’s; it is also more unifying and has greater scope. In addition, it was
the failure of Galileo’s law to have a great scope that led us to think that
there might be a lovelier explanation available. Does this mean that scope
generates loveliness after all?
It does not, because the lack of scope is not itself a feature that makes the
explanation less lovely. Rather, it is an indication that we haven’t arrived
at the true causes yet, that a deeper explanation is available. In certain
domains, such as that of physics, we believe (for empirical, and perhaps
partly metaphysical, reaons) that the basic causal structures are uniform
over large areas of the universe. In such domains, we take a lack of scope to
be an indication that we haven’t arrived at those basic causal structures yet.
But what makes the scope-lacking explanations less than perfectly lovely is
that they don’t get at these true causes; it is this failure, not the lack of
scope, that lowers their loveliness.
Scope has an additional problem: it is not an epistemic virtue. Theories
with greater scope have greater content than theories with a more limited
scope; and they are therefore more likely to be false. It is more probable
that Newton’s Laws hold in my attic than that they hold in my attic and my
basement. We have excellent reasons to desire theories with a large scope,
but these are not and cannot be epistemic reasons (in the sense of that word
used in this chapter).
Finally, let us look at precision and giving a mechanism. It is clear
10It is of course not an explanation but an explanation pattern that can explain more
or fewer phenomena. A single explanation explains only one thing, its explanandum. But
we can assume that Lipton was thinking about patterns here.
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that these are explanatory virtues. But it is unclear that they are epistemic
virtues, or rather, it is (at least in the case of precision) blatantly obvious
that they are not. When I make an explanation more precise, the probability
of its being true decreases. Our first example shows this to be the case:
explanation B much more precisely picks out the explanandum from the
contrast class than does explanation A; it is also, precisely because of this
increased precision, less likely to be true.
When two explanations compete and one of them gives us a causal mech-
anism leading up to the phenomenon while the other does not, the former
may well be lovelier than the latter. I do not know whether this is a general
rule, but let us assume that it is. Is the explanation which gives a causal
mechanism also more likely? The opium example shows that this is not the
case: the ‘dormitive virtue’ explanation is very likely indeed, although it
does not give a mechanism; while any explanation that does give a mecha-
nism would be more precise than the dormitive virtue explanation, and hence
less probable.
But let us look at two explanations, one of which gives a mechanism and
the other of which doesn’t, which have an equal precision. Can we then say
anything in general about their respective probabilities? Is it more or less
likely that the plane crashed because a certain Al Qaida leader wanted it to
(no mechanism), than that it crashed because seven screws in the left wing
were rusted, broke in mid-flight, and caused the left wing to fall off (causal
mechanism)? The only way to answer this question is empirical-statistical
research; an appeal to the fact that the second explanation contains a mech-
anism is powerless. I admit to seeing no general way to link mechanisms
with probability; and that would mean that giving a mechanism is not an
epistemic virtue.
An appeal to explanatory virtues therefore does not help us bridge the
gap between loveliness and likeliness.
3.6 Second argument: case study
Another way to bridge the gap between loveliness and likeliness is to show
that explanatory considerations are used as guides to inference in actual and
successful scientific practice. While this would not necessarily decide the nor-
mative issue of whether IBE is epistemically justified, it would certainly be
a step in the right direction. This second type of argument, which must take
the form of a case study, is used extensively by Lipton (2004). The exam-
ple of actual scientific practice he discusses is Ignaz Semmelweis’s research
on childbed fever between 1844 and 1848. I will first summarise Lipton’s
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account, and then discuss its flaws and merits. (For a more complete discus-
sion, see Lipton 2004 [72], pp. 74-82; Hempel 1966 [42], pp. 3-8; Semmelweis
1861 [123].)
Ignaz Semmelweis worked at a Viennese hospital that had two maternity
wards. It was observed that significantly more women in First Obstetrical
Clinic than in the Second Obstetrical Clinic contracted childbed fever. Since
childbed fever was the most significant cause of death in these wards, the
mortality rate in the first ward was much higher than in the second ward.
Semmelweis set out to find an explanation of this contrast. After many
false starts, he devised the theory that medical students, who examined
women in the first but not in the second ward and often did so after dis-
secting dead bodies, infected the women with ‘cadaveric matter’. Making
the students disinfect their hands before examining the women led to an im-
mediate and highly significant decrease of the rate of childbed fever in the
first ward.
This was undoubtedly a case of successful science. If Semmelweis used
IBE, and had to use IBE, in order to reach his conclusions, we will have
a strong argument in favour of IBE. So the question to be answered is:
did Semmelweis infer to his final theory (at least partially) because that
theory was lovelier than any of its competitors? Let us look at the case
in more detail, and let us pay special attention to the role of explanatory
considerations.
The first thing we notice is that Semmelweis starts out by looking for
an explanation: he needs to know why the mortality rates in the two wards
are different. This means that he is looking for a contrastive explanation,
as described by Lipton (2004 [72], pp. 30-54) and Hitchcock (1996 [46]).
Semmelweis is looking for a causal variable A with the following properties:
(1) A takes the value a1 in the first ward, (2) A takes the value a2 6= a1 in
the second ward, (3) changing A in the first ward from a1 to a2 lowers the
mortality rate there to (approximately) the level in the second ward.
Given that this is the case, how does Semmelweis construct and test
hypotheses? He first notes a causal variable X that takes different values in
the two wards. He then constructs the hypothesis that the difference in X
explains the difference in mortality. This hypothesis must pass three tests
before it can be accepted. The first test – a kind of filter, rather – is to reject
the hypothesis if background knowledge tells us that it cannot possibly be
true. The second test is to verify that the variable assumes different values
in the two wards. If it doesn’t, it cannot be the explanation of the difference
in mortality. The third test is to actually change a1 to a2 in the first ward: if
this results in the hoped for decrease in mortality, the hypothesis is accepted,
and if it does not, the hypothesis is rejected.
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Let us see how this works in practice. The first test rules out all hypothe-
ses that violate our background knowledge, such as “the different names of
the wards explain the difference in mortality rate”. These hypotheses barely
cross the scientist’s mind, and are never written down. This first test leaves
us with those hypotheses that are not patently absurd. One of these is the
idea that perhaps medical students, who examine patients in the first but not
in the second ward, do so in a much rougher way than the regular nurses, and
that this explains the difference in mortality rate. However, this hypothesis
does not pass the second test: it turns out to be the case that the medical
students are not significantly rougher in their examinations than the nurses.
Hence, roughness cannot explain the difference in mortality rates.
This leaves us with those hypotheses that involve actual causal differences
(that are not obviously irrelevant to the difference in mortality). An example
of these is “seeing the local priest pass through the ward, when he is on his
way to give the last sacraments to a dying woman, is a cause of childbed
fever”. It was in fact the case that the priest, when he visited the hospital,
passed through the first but not through the second ward; and it was not
inconceivable that his presence depressed or agitated the women and thus
caused physical illness. However, this hypothesis did not pass the third test:
Semmelweis got the priest to take another route, but this did not change
the mortality rates. Hence, the presence of the priest did not explain the
difference in mortality.
Finally, Semmelweis hit on the hypothesis that medical students infected
the women with cadaveric matter, since they usually dissected corpses before
they came to the maternity ward. This hypothesis was not obviously absurd;
it described a real difference; and taking away the difference (by having
the medical students disinfect their hands with chlorinated lime before they
entered the ward) did in fact take away the difference in mortality rate.
Having passed all three tests, the hypothesis was accepted. Semmelweis
concluded that he had found the explanation of the difference in mortality
rate; and his policies of disinfection, later broadened to include instruments,
led to an almost complete disappearance of childbed fever from his hospital.11
This description of the case, which I have reproduced faithfully from
Lipton 2004 [72], is reasonable enough. But does it show IBE in action?
As far as we have seen, explanatory considerations helped Semmelweis to
11A brief historical note: Semmelweis’s theory met with much resistance from the Aus-
trian medical establishment, due to both scientific and political reasons. He was fired from
his Viennese hospital, and within a couple of years, the mortality rates there were back
to their previous levels. In the meantime, Semmelweis had gone to Hungary, where his
method of disinfection was quickly adopted with good results.
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formulate and test hypotheses; but it was the outcomes of the tests, not
considerations of explanatory beauty, that decided whether a hypothesis was
rejected or accepted. In fact, explanatory loveliness did not once enter the
picture. At no point were we forced to postulate that Semmelweis rejected
or accepted a hypothesis because of its (lack of) loveliness. Apparently, then,
Semmelweis did not use IBE.
Of course Lipton (2004 [72], p. 136) anticipates this remark. He con-
cedes that “[i]n effect, Semmelweis converted the question of which is the
best explanation of the original data into the question of which is the only
explanation of the richer set. We often decide between competing hypotheses
by looking for additional data that will discriminate between them.” This is
prima facie a problem for IBE. If loveliness could be used to decide between
the hypotheses, why would we need additional data? And if the additional
data rule out all but one hypothesis, why do we then need explanatory love-
liness? If there is, in the final situation, only one possible explanation, then
its comparative loveliness can no longer be an issue.
Lipton, however, qualifies his last claim (ibid.): “Perhaps in some ex-
treme cases that discrimination works through the refutation of one of the
hypotheses; but what seems far more common is that the additional evidence,
though logically compatible with both hypotheses, can only be explained by
one of them”. This brings us back to a familiar dilemma. Is the less fortunate
hypothesis discarded because it does not explain the additional evidence and
is therefore improbable, or is it discarded because the additional evidence
makes it less probable and therefore a bad explanation? I think that the
facts of the Semmelweis case leave the door wide open for the second option;
and if that is so, we do not need to postulate that he used IBE.12
If a priest passing through the ward is the main cause of childbed fever,
it is very probable that intervening on this variable will change the rate of
childbed fever. Semmelweis carries out the intervention and notices that the
expected change does not occur. This means that either (1) the priest is not
the causal variable that explains the difference, or (2) a highly improbable
statistical fluke occurred, or (3) the situation is akin to the famous philo-
sophical example of the two assassins, where only an intervention on two
distinct variables will make a difference in the outcome of the causal process
(pre-emption). The third possibility is relatively unlikely. The second possi-
bility is unlikely by definition. Thus, the first option is very likely: the new
evidence makes it very likely – quite apart from considerations of explana-
12Here one is tempted to quote the (probably apocryphal) remark of Laplace: “But
where is Inference to the Best Explanation in your scheme?” “Je n’ai pas eu besoin de
cette hypothèse.”
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tory loveliness – that the priest is not the causal variable that Semmelweis is
looking for. The new evidence alone, without IBE, is enough to reasonably
drop the hypothesis. This possibility of probabilistic disconfirmation is not
taken seriously enough by Lipton when he formulates his dichotomy between
deductive refutation and IBE.
One strategy that remains open to the defender of IBE is to argue that
although in this example IBE seems merely to duplicate the results of inde-
pendent probabilistic reasoning, there are nevertheless cases where it allows
us to refute hypotheses that could not be refuted in another way; that there
are cases, to slightly change Lipton’s words, where the additional evidence,
though not unlikely given either hypothesis, can be only explained by one of
them. In such a case, IBE would tell us to drop the hypothesis which cannot
explain the additional evidence.
But this criterion is far too strong. Recall the two potential explanations
of the illness of the mushroom gatherers. First: the mushrooms they collected
and ate were poisonous. Second: the wine they drank had been poisoned by
a CIA agent. Now, assume that the following additional evidence is gathered:
there are fingerprints on the bottle of wine that do not belong to either of the
two gatherers. This new evidence can be explained by the second hypothesis,
but not by the first hypothesis – hence, the criterion under consideration
would say that we have to drop the first hypothesis.
This is obviously absurd. It is true that the mushroom hypothesis does
not explain the fingerprints, because it doesn’t say anything about finger-
prints and bottles of wine at all. But since it is not particularly unlikely,
given the mushroom hypothesis, that there are fingerprints on the bottle not
left there by one of the gatherers (someone in the wine shop must have han-
dled the bottle, after all), the fingerprints give us no reason at all to ditch
the mushroom hypothesis. The fact that hypothesis H does not explain new
evidence E is not in itself a reason to drop hypothesis H. What, in addition,
is needed? Precisely, I would say, that E makes H unlikely. But if that is
the case, IBE again appears to be unnecessary.
At this point the defender of IBE may wish to retreat even further. He
may wish to suggest that my arguments hold water only in those situations
where we can make informed judgments about probabilities; but that in sit-
uations where we cannot make such judgments, we may still be able to make
judgments about explanatory loveliness. If this is the case, then perhaps in
such situations IBE can play an epistemic role, as a substitute for general
probabilistic reasoning.
This kind of proposal has been made within the context of reconciling
IBE and Bayesianism, and I will take it up in the next section.
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3.7 Third argument: Bayesianism
We have seen that what may appear at first sight to be Inference to the
Best Explanation can turn out to be describable with nothing more than
the standard theories of probabilistic reasoning. It is no surprise, then, that
some defenders of IBE have tried to set up an alliance between IBE and
probabilistic reasoning. The form this takes in Lipton (2004 [72], pp. 103-
120) is a set of arguments that set out to establish that IBE is a useful
addition to Bayesian reasoning. Day and Kincaid (1994 [20], p. 286) also
state this possibility: “IBE can be embedded in determining the priors and
likelihoods that make up Bayesian calculation”. Lipton goes into more detail,
so it is his version I will discuss.13
At first sight, Bayesianism leaves no room for IBE. We start out with
a probability distribution over all propositions. We get some new evidence
and, using conditional probabilities, we update the probability distribution.
This is our new state of belief. Explanatory considerations do not play a
role.
But let us not be too hasty. Lipton proposes three ways in which explana-
tory considerations might be hidden at the heart of the Bayesian machinery
(2004 [72], p. 114). First, explanatory considerations might figure in the de-
termination of likelihoods. Second, explanatory considerations might figure
in the determination of priors. Third, explanatory considerations might fig-
ure in the determination of relevant evidence. We need to look at these three
suggestions in turn.
The first suggestion is that explanatory loveliness is correlated with like-
lihood. Likelihood is a technical term that designates the conditional prob-
ability of the evidence on the hypothesis. Thus, if the hypothesis H is that
the diners ate poisonous mushrooms, and the evidence E is that they both
fell ill, then the likelihood of the evidence is P (E|H), which is the probabil-
ity of falling ill when you have eaten poisonous mushrooms. Lipton (2004
[72], p. 114) suggests that “although likelihood is not to be equated with
loveliness, it might yet be that one way we judge how likely E is on H is
by considering how well H would explain E.” This would be pragmatically
useful “if in fact loveliness is reasonably well correlated with likelihood, and
we find it easier in practice to judge loveliness than likelihood.”
13See Hitchcock 2007 [48] and Psillos 2007 [95] for other appraisals of Lipton’s attempt
to reconcile IBE and Bayesianism. Hitchcock argues that, although such a reconciliation
is probably possible, it cannot go through the explanatory virtue of simplicity. (However,
I argue above that simplicity is not an explanatory virtue.) Psillos argues that defenders
of IBE should be the enemies rather than the friends of Bayesianism, and suggests that
Lipton yields too much ground to the Bayesians. See Lipton 2007 [73] for replies.
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This proposal might be a good argument for IBE, if it were to be found
correct. In order to justify IBE, we must show that P (H|E) (the probability
of H on E) is positively correlated with how lovely an explanation of E is
given by H. Now, suppose we can show – as Lipton hopes – that loveliness
is positively correlated with the likelihood P (E|H). Then, using the rules of
probability and the two further assumptions that loveliness is not negatively
correlated with P (H) or positively correlated with P (E) (which would have
to be independently argued for), we can show that loveliness is positively
correlated with P (H|E). This is exactly what we need to prove in order to
vindicate IBE.
But do we base our estimates of likelihood on the explanatory loveliness
of H for E? What is it that we do when we desire to know the probabil-
ity that, say, people fall ill after eating poisonous mushrooms? We attempt
to gather the relevant empirical evidence. Experience, not explanatory con-
siderations, teaches us whether in 95% or 30% or 4% of the cases eating
poisonous mushrooms leads to illness.14
Let me elucidate this by an example where it is clear that (1) we know
nothing at all about likelihoods, yet (2) we can easily judge loveliness. The
following explanation of the illness of our mushroom gatherers is put forth:
all the mushroom they gathered were edible, but as they walked through
the woods, they were made the unwitting test subjects of an experimental
non-lethal weapon mounted on a CIA satellite. This weapon sends out a
strongly focused gravitational wave that, with probability p, causes sudden
movements in the digestive system that allow more gastric acid to enter the
duodenum than is normal. After a couple of hours, this leads to pains and
illness.
This explanation is highly unlikely. It is also quite lovely: if it were true,
it would be a good explanation of the illness of the mushroom gatherers.
But is there anything, anything at all except that it is non-zero, that we can
say about p once we have seen that this explanation is quite lovely? Does
the loveliness of the explanation allow us to draw any conclusions about the
success rate of a fictional CIA weapon? It is unlikely.
Thus, our examples cast doubt on the idea that there is a useful link
between loveliness and likelihood. This does not prove that there is no such
link; but since we have not been given any concrete arguments to believe
that there is, it casts the ball back to the defenders of IBE.
One final note. There are some cases in which likelihood and loveliness are
14Unless we define ‘poisonous’ in terms of the percentage of cases that lead to illness,
in which case it is not experience, but linguistic analysis or stipulation that gives us the
correct percentage.
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correlated: namely, those cases where we add detail to an explanation with
the express purpose of pointing out the scenario with the greatest likelihood.
For instance, we can simultaneously increase the loveliness and the likelihood
of the hypothesis in the mushroom example by adding that the mushrooms
weren’t just poisonous, they were in fact devil’s boletes, and that devil’s bo-
letes contain a poison called bolesatine which causes gastrointestinal distress.
But such cases are no comfort to the defenders of IBE. The probability of the
(more detailed) devil’s boletes hypothesis is necessarily less than the proba-
bility of the (less detailed) poisonous mushroom hypothesis. Thus, in these
cases loveliness, although positively correlated with likelihood, is negatively
correlated with probability – which defeats the purpose of the proposal.
A second place where explanatory considerations might play a role is in
the determination of priors. Lipton proposes one mechanism by which
this could take place: the prior probabilities of hypotheses might be decided
on the basis of explanatory virtues like simplicity. That brings us right back
to the argument from explanatory virtues, which we have already discussed
in section 3.5.
The third possibility is that explanatory considerations are used to deter-
mine the relevant evidence. Lipton (2004 [72], p. 116) writes: “Bayes’s
theorem . . . does not, however, say which evidence one ought to conditionalise
on. In principle, perhaps, non-demonstrative inference should be based on
‘total evidence’, indeed on everything that is believed. In practice, however,
investigators must think about which bits of what they know really bear on
their question, and they also need to decide which further observations would
be particularly relevant. . . . [T]his seems yet another area where the expla-
nationist may contribute. . . . [W]e sometimes come to see that a datum is
epistemically relevant to a hypothesis precisely by seeing that the hypothesis
would explain it.”
Lipton is onto something here – thinking about explanation does help us
when we decide which evidence to take into account and what further exper-
iments to perform. But notice two things. First, we are not talking about
explanatory loveliness, but about whether a hypothesis explains something
or not. This is an absolute rather than a comparative judgment. Second, on
this proposal explanatory considerations do not influence our judgments of
likeliness directly, but only by telling us what evidence we ought to gather
and consider. This role for explanation in scientific method is not the role
postulated by IBE; so I can (and do) grant Lipton’s claim here without
granting that it constitutes a defence of IBE.
What we have seen, then, is that the attempt to tack IBE onto Bayesian-
ism fails; or at least, that we do not at this moment have any reason to believe
that it succeeds. Since this was the final class of arguments to be considered,
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we can conclude that the current defence of IBE is not successful.
But I do not wish to end on such a negative note. In the next section, I
will give a more positive account of Lipton’s results; because although I do
not believe that they establish the validity of IBE, I do think that they allow
us to see that explanation plays a more important (if non-epistemic) role in
scientific method than the famous methodological systems – falsificationism,
hypothetico-deductivism, Bayesianism – have allowed us to see.
3.8 Modest explanationism
Not all methodological roles are epistemic roles. Thus, it is possible that
explanation plays an important role in scientific method even if IBE is wrong.
Lipton (2004 [72], p. 116) hints at one possible non-epistemic role explanation
could play when he says that “we sometimes come to see that a datum is
epistemically relevant to a hypothesis precisely by seeing that the hypothesis
would explain it.” Even more can be gleaned from his descriptions of the
Semmelweis case.
We saw that the very aim that Semmelweis had is to find an explanation
of the difference in mortality rate between the two maternity wards. (Why
does he look for an explanation? If we accept an interventionist theory,
such as that defended by Woodward 2003 [142], this is easy to understand:
explanations are precisely the kind of knowledge that allows us to intervene
successfully on a state of affairs.) Thus, we will understand his scientific
methodology better when we understand what an explanation is.
Following Lipton 2004 [72], Hitchcock 1996 [46] and Woodward 2003 [142],
we can say that explanations – at least explanations of the kind Semmelweis
is looking for – are causal stories that show us why A1 rather than the
incompatible A2 is the case, because (1) B1 rather than the incompatible
B2 is the case and (2) there is a causal law (mechanism, scenario) leading
from B1 to A1 and from B2 to A2. So what Semmelweis is looking for is
some causal factor that takes different values in the two maternity wards,
and which exhibits the relevant causal characteristics.
This observation helps us understand why Semmelweis discards some hy-
potheses that might well be true. Thus, when he considers the hypothesis
that childbed fever is caused by overcrowding, he discards it because both
wards are equally crowded. This is not an instance of falsification or discon-
firmation or having too low a probability after Bayesian updating: there is
no evidence at all that overcrowding is not a cause of childbed fever. For
all Semmelweis knows, it might account for all cases of childbed fever in the
second ward and a small number of cases in the first ward. But he rejects
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this hypothesis because it cannot give him the explanation he is looking for.
When it comes to testing the hypotheses that are deemed worthy of test-
ing, that is, the hypotheses that could explain the difference between the
wards if they were true, it is the structure of explanation that tells Semmel-
weis how to proceed. He changes the value of causal variable B in the first
ward, and observes whether the difference in mortality rates is removed. If
it is, B is a cause of childbed fever. Again, there is much more potential
evidence that is relevant for testing the hypothesis under consideration; but
by paying attention to the fact that Semmelweis formulates the hypothesis
in order to explain a specific phenomenon, we can understand why he tests
his hypothesis in the way he does.
When he finally finds a causal factor that makes the difference between
the two mortality rates, Semmelweis concludes that this factor must furnish
the explanation of the difference. This concludes his research.15
None of this is particularly surprising; it is methodological common sense.
But we do see that insights into the structure of explanations, and judgments
on whether a given hypothesis would explain a certain phenomenon if it were
true, inform science. We decide which hypotheses to test, and which exper-
iments to carry out, based on such considerations. This is not an epistemic
role for explanation; but it is an important methodological role nonetheless.
Seeing explanation at work in these common sense contexts gives us reason
to believe that developing a better, more detailed theory of explanation will
give us a better, more detailed understanding of scientific practice. Thus, my
attack on IBE notwithstanding, I believe that explanation is an important
topic in the philosophy of scientific methodology.
I do not agree, then, with Peter Lipton’s implicit suggestion that we are
forced to choose between IBE and a trivial role for explanation (2004 [72],
62): “I want to insist that [IBE] makes out explanatory considerations to be
an important guide to judgments of likeliness, that [it does] not reduce to
the true but very weak claim that scientists are in the habit of explaining
the phenomena they observe.” There is a middle course between the Scylla
of triviality and the Charybdis of making explanatory goodness an epistemic
category; and it is a virtue of Lipton’s own work that it shows us this course.
15What we see here is, more or less, what Bird 2007 [8] calls ‘Inference to the Only
Explanation’. I don’t think Bird’s insistence that all alternatives are actually falsified –
rather than just made unlikely – by the experiment is particularly helpful, though.
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3.9 Conclusion
We have seen three arguments for IBE: the first claims that there are ex-
planatory virtues which are also epistemic virtues, thus linking loveliness to
likeliness; the second claims that we can simply see IBE at work in specific
instances of scientific research; and the third claims that IBE has a role to
play within the framework of Bayesianism. We have also seen that all these
three arguments fail – or at least, that they have not yet been adequately
defended. From this, we can conclude that IBE itself has not been ade-
quately defended. The many doubts that have been raised in the course of
this chapter lend credence to the idea that a successful defence of IBE cannot
be found; but only the future can tell whether this assessment is correct.
This does not mean that explanation plays no role in scientific method.
Lipton’s case study on the research of Semmelweis does show that explana-
tory considerations play an essential role in the methodological decisions of
scientists. No theory of scientific method which does not take account of
both the importance of explanation and the structure of explanations will be
able to make sense of what scientists actually do. By bringing this fact out
in the open, the work of the defenders of IBE has borne fruit, even if it was
not the fruit they were after.
IBE is used in many areas of philosophy, as Day and Kincaid 1994 [20]
show. One notable example is the realism debate, where realists often pro-
pose arguments that are variants of the following: theory T makes excellent
predictions; the best explanation thereof is that T is (approximately) true;
therefore, T is (approximately) true. If we reject IBE, these arguments may
also have to be rejected – but this warrants a more detailed consideration
than we can give it here. Much research on the topic of IBE remains to be
done.
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Chapter 4
A General Interventionist
Theory of Explanation:
Extending Woodward’s
Account
4.1 Introduction
Recent efforts in the construction of theories of explanation have been di-
vided between general theories, which aim to capture the essence of all ex-
planations, and domain-restricted theories, which focus on specific kinds of
explanations. The dominant general theory is the unificationist theory, which
has been defended in Kitcher 1981 [55] and 1989 [57], Schurz & Lambert 1994
[120], and Schurz 1999 [119]. The most important domain-restricted theory
is the theory of causal explanation defended in Salmon 1984 [110] and 1998
[113], Woodward 2003 [142] and Strevens 2008 [132].
General theories are preferable to domain-restricted theories, since they
give us more information about what explanation actually is. On the other
hand, they are also more difficult to get right, since they have to be true
about a greater range of instances. If our general theories are not up to this
task, as Gijsbers 2007 [31] argues about the unificationist theory, we may
have to settle temporarily for the less ambitious domain-restricted theories.
But the philosopher’s task would nevertheless remain to search for a truly
general theory of explanation; and I hope to contribute to that search with
the present chapter.
One way to approach this task is by taking a successful domain-restricted
theory and generalising it so that it encompasses kinds of explanation that
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lie outside its original domain. In this chapter, I will attempt such a project.
Taking James Woodward’s interventionist theory of causal explanation, which
he has laid down in his book Making Things Happen [142], as a starting point,
I will attempt to show that its basic ideas can be generalised to encompass
non-causal explanations.
In section 4.2, I will give some examples of non-causal explanations, and
briefly comment on the way in which one could generalise a theory of causal
explanation to a theory of explanation simpliciter. Woodward’s theory is
discussed in section 4.3, and defended against the charge of circularity in
section 4.4.
After the domain-restricted theory has been elucidated, we will start ex-
tending it by applying it to a specific set of non-causal explanations: most
extensively to mathematical explanations in sections 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7. The
aim here is to show that in the example discussed, a Woodwardian analysis
yields the right judgments about mathematical explanation. We then tackle
the explanation of laws by more general laws in section 4.8. The lessons
learned in these sections are used in section 4.9 to formulate a generalised
interventionist theory of explanation.
4.2 Causality and explanation
Not all explanations are causal. To give some examples of non-causal expla-
nations:
1. Mathematical explanations that show how one mathematical fact fol-
lows from and is explained by others. According to most philosophies
of mathematics, mathematical facts cannot enter into causal relations.
2. Explanations of laws of nature by other laws of nature – for instance,
an explanation of Kepler’s Laws by showing that they follow from New-
ton’s Laws and certain initial conditions. Since laws are not events in
time and space, they cannot be said to cause each other.
3. Explanations of human actions by desires, beliefs and decisions of the
agent – elements which cannot enter into causal relations according to
some (though by no means all) philosophers.
4. Transcendental explanations of the kind proposed in Kant 1787 [54].
According to Kant, that we see chains of cause and effect in the world is
to be explained by the fact that cause is one of the categories inherent
in our mind. It would be meaningless to say that this category causes
the world to be causal.
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In what follows, I will discuss only the first two of these examples, since
they are the least controversial. Whether or not actions are part of the
network of cause and effect is a contentious topic in the philosophy of action;
and it has also been claimed that transcendental explanations only seem
to furnish understanding, and seem to do this because we cannot help but
interpret them as causal mechanisms.1 Discussing these topics would take us
too far afield.
However, although not all explanations are causal, there is nevertheless
a strong link between explanation and causality. This is immediately clear
when we read works that present theories of causal explanation. The ma-
jority of these works, and Woodward’s is no exception (though Strevens’s
is), spend much more time and effort defining causality than defining causal
explanation: the link between the two is taken to be so strong that once you
know what a cause is, explicating the concept of explanation becomes trivial,
something along the lines of “to explain X you must give a cause of X”. In
generalising a theory of causal explanation to non-causal explanations, we
must therefore generalise the notion of cause, for without that notion, there
is little to generalise.
One more remark before we go on to Woodward’s analysis of the no-
tions of cause and causal explanation. When it comes to giving a theory
of causality, philosophers can embark on two very different projects, which
Dowe (Dowe 2000, [25] pp. 1-13) calls conceptual and empirical theories of
causality. (An analogous distinction is discussed in a more general way in
Millikan 1989 [82] and Neander 1991 [88] under the names ‘conceptual anal-
ysis’ and ‘theoretical definition’.) By linking causation with explanation,
we are taking the path of a conceptual theory; and we will leave empirical
theories like Dowe’s conserved quantity theory to one side. That these two
projects are different can be easily seen: while it is obvious that the notion of
‘conserved quantity’ will not feature in a satisfactory analysis of our concept
of explanation, it may nevertheless be at the core of a satisfactory empirical
theory of causality (see Dowe 1992 [23], 1995 [24], 2000 [25]); and idem dito
for any other empirically discovered feature of the actual causal processes in
the world.
4.3 Woodward on causation and explanation
I will now present James Woodward’s interventionist theory of causal expla-
nation, starting with his analysis of causation.
1Rorty 1979 [106], p. 151; especially footnote 31.
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Woodward takes as primitives variables ranging over (type-level) events.
We might, for instance, have a variable W which ranges over {‘it rains’, ‘it
does not rain’}. In a system V of such variables Woodward defines direct
causes and contributing causes in terms of probabilities and interventions:
A necessary and sufficient condition for X to be a (type-level)
direct cause of Y with respect to a variable set V is that there be
a possible intervention on X [with respect to Y ] that will change
Y or the probability distribution of Y when one holds fixed at
some value all other variables Zi in V. A necessary and sufficient
condition for X to be a (type-level) contributing cause of Y with
respect to a variable set V is that (i) there be a directed path
from X to Y such that each link in this path is a directed causal
relationship; that is, a set of variables Z1 . . .Zn such that X is
a direct cause of Z1, which is in turn a direct cause of Z2, which
is a direct cause of . . .Zn, which is a direct cause of Y , and that
(ii) there be some intervention on X [with respect to Y ] that will
change Y when all other variables in V that are not on this path
are fixed at some value.2 ([142], p. 59.)
Because causes are defined relative to a variable set V, causation in Wood-
ward’s theory is description-dependent. Let us give an example. Sending
funds to third-world countries (M) tends to increase development (D), but
also to increase corruption (C), which in turn has a negative effect on de-
velopment. Suppose that the good and the bad cancel each other exactly if
there are no other interventions. Now, if V contains M , C and D, Wood-
ward’s theory will have us conclude that M is a direct cause of D, because if
we hold C fixed (perhaps by political reforms or pressure), changing M will
change D. But if, on the other hand, V contains only M and D, the theory
will have us conclude that M is not a direct (or even indirect) cause of D.
We turn now to the definition of ‘intervention’, which is obviously a cen-
tral term in the interventionist theory of causal explanation. Woodward
characterises intervention in two steps. First, the notion of ‘intervention
variable’ is defined. I is an intervention variable for X with respect to Y if
and only if I meets the following conditions:
I1. I causes X.
2A redundant part of the definition has been left out. The phrases between square
brackets have been added to clear up the relation of these definitions with the definition
of intervention below.
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I2. I acts as a switch for all the other variables that cause X.
That is, certain values of I are such that when I attains those
values, X ceases to depend on the values of other variables
that cause X and instead depends only on the value taken
by I.
I3. Any directed path from I to Y goes through X. [. . . ]
I4. I is (statistically) independent of any variable Z that causes
Y and that is on a directed path that does not go through
X.3 ([142], p. 98.)
(We will talk about the cause-intervention circularity established by these
definitions in the next section.) Then, intervention is defined as follows:
I’s assuming some value I = zi, is an intervention on X with
respect to Y if and only if I is an intervention variable for X
with respect to Y and I = zi is an actual cause of the value taken
by X. ([142], p. 98.)
Before discussing this any further, I will give Woodward’s definition of ex-
planation.
Suppose that M is an explanandum consisting in the statement
that some variable Y takes the particular value y. Then an ex-
planans E for M will consist of (a) a generalization G relating
changes in the value(s) of a variable X (where X may itself be
a vector or n-tuple of variables Xi) and changes in Y , and (b) a
statement (of initial or boundary conditions) that the variable X
takes the particular value x. A necessary and sufficient condition
for E to be (minimally) explanatory with respect to M is that
(i) E and M be true or approximately so; (ii) according to G,
Y takes the value y under an intervention in which X takes the
value x; (iii) there is some intervention that changes the value
of X from x to x′ where x 6= x′, with G correctly describing
the value y′ that Y would assume under this intervention, where
y′ 6= y. ([142], p. 203.)
Given the relation between causation and intervention, this is (give or
take a few niceties) equivalent to the following claim: an explanation of
Y = y consists of a statement X = x and a true story which shows that X
3A redundant part of the definition has been left out.
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is a (type-level) cause of Y , and how Y depends on X. As I said in section
4.2, once we have defined causation, it is easy to get to explanation.
One of the niceties that is worth commenting upon is the word ‘minimally’
in Woodward’s definition of explanation. According to Woodward, explana-
tion is not an all-or-nothing affair. We can have minimal explanations (which
give us relatively little understanding), and fuller explanations (which give us
more understanding). A good explanation doesn’t just conform to the above
definition, but will “involve a generalization G and explanans variable(s) X
such that G correctly describes how the value of Y would change under inter-
ventions that produce a range of different values of X in different background
circumstances” (Woodward 2003 [142], p. 203). As an example, let G1 be
“these balls A and B will both lie still after a collision if and only if they
have opposite velocities when they collide”, and let G2 be “two inelastic balls
will both lie still after a collision if and only if they have opposite momenta,
which is velocity times mass, when they collide”. The second of these gen-
eralisations allows for better explanations than the first, for it allows us to
predict what will happen in more circumstances. Common ground is touched
here with the unificationist theory, but note that while in Woodward’s theory
unificatory power helps to make an explanation a better explanation, it is
not a conditio sine qua non for being an explanation.
4.4 Is the interventionist theory circular?
I will not defend Woodward’s theory of causality and explanation here – the
reader is urged to consult his book – except in one respect, which is the
problem of circularity. Woodward’s theory is prima facie viciously circu-
lar: causality is defined using the notion of intervention, and intervention is
defined using the notion of causality. Of course Woodward anticipates this
criticism and offers two counterarguments (Woodward 2003 [142], pp. 104-
107). Some reviewers agree with these counterarguments (Weslake 2006 [138];
Menzies 2006 [81]), although sometimes with reservations (Markus 2007 [77];
Hiddleston 2005 [45]); but at least two reviewers are not convinced and ar-
gue that the circularity of Woodward’s theory makes it fail as an analysis
of causation (de Regt 2004b [101]; Glymour 2004 [33]). This problem is too
important for me to ignore. I will first give Woodward’s two arguments; then
I will summarise the counterarguments of De Regt and Glymour; and finally,
I will sketch the outline of a counter-counterargument.
In his first argument, Woodward casts doubt upon the possibility of a
reductive theory of causality, that is, a theory of causality that reduces causal
claims to claims formulated entirely in a non-causal vocabulary. Speaking of
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Humean and correlation-based theories, Woodward asserts that “the failure
of this sort of reduction has been a familiar theme in recent philosophical
discussion”. For instance, information about the correlations between X,
Y and Z underdetermines whether X is a common cause of Y and Z or
whether Y is a cause of X which in turn is a cause of Z. Causality, according
to Woodward, goes beyond the categories of a sparse empiricism, and a
reductive analysis is therefore not to be expected. If no reductive analysis is
possible, we will have to make do with a non-reductive one.
In his second argument, Woodward points out that on his definitions of
causation and intervention, we must have some causal knowledge in order to
decide whether X causes Y , but what we do not need to know in advance is
whether X causes Y . Therefore, although the theory is non-reductive, it is
not viciously circular: you don’t have to know something before you know
it.
These arguments do not convince Henk de Regt and Clark Glymour. De
Regt explicitly argues against them, writing:
MT [Woodward’s theory about the meaning of causal claim] does
not reduce causation to other concepts, because causal relations
are defined via the notion of intervention, which is itself a causal
notion. Woodward argues that this circularity is not vicious be-
cause the causal information required to characterize the inter-
vention is independent of the alleged causal relation between X
and Y [. . . ]. However, this argument holds water only if MT is
regarded as a theory of causal inference or testing. If MT is a
theory of the meaning of causal claims, then it is hard to see how
the circularity cannot be vicious. (De Regt 2004 [101].)
Glymour grants Woodward that his theory is not circular, but he is never-
theless in substantial agreement with De Regt:
Ok, the definition is ill-founded, not circular: it could never be
applied to determine direct causes ab initio. It could tell us
something fundamental about how our notions of cause and in-
tervention are often related, but it cannot be an analysis of the
very meanings – whatever those are – of ‘intervention’ and ‘direct
cause’. (Glymour 2004 [33], p. 785.)
In both cases, the argument is that Woodward’s theory can be used only if
we already know what causality is, or already have a bunch of things we know
are direct causes: Woodward’s theory cannot explain how causal discourse
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ever got going. Therefore, it cannot be a satisfactory theory of the meaning
of causality.
Both De Regt and Glymour presuppose that a satisfactory analysis of
the meaning of a term must tell us how we can introduce the predicate into
a language which does not already contain it; we must specify the meaning
of the new predicate entirely in terms of the old predicates. On such a
view, a predicate is either primitive and hence unanalysable, or non-primitive
and completely analysable into other (primitive or at least ‘more’ primitive)
concepts. If a satisfactory analysis of ‘cause’ exists at all, it cannot contain
the predicate ‘cause’; so something is wrong with Woodward’s analysis.
But is it true that the only ways to introduce a new predicate into a lan-
guage is either by introducing it as a primitive (however that may work), or
by giving a reductive analysis in terms of other predicates? Let us draw an
analogy between Woodward’s analysis of causality and Wilfrid Sellars’s clas-
sic defence of non-reductive analyses of mentalistic concepts in Empiricism
and the Philosophy of Mind (Sellars 1997 [122]). Suppose, Sellars says, that
it is clear how we acquire concepts that refer to publicly accessible states of
affairs; then there is still the problem of how we acquire concepts that refer
to ‘private’ states of affairs, such as mental states; for how would the criteria
of correct use be established? Of course, this problem would immediately
be solved if we could find a reductive analysis of mentalistic concepts, but
according to Sellars (pp. 86-117) this is not possible. So how did we get
mentalistic concepts in our language?
Sellars uses a thought experiment (the ‘myth of Jones’) to show that these
concepts may first have been introduced into our language as theoretical enti-
ties that helped explain and predict people’s overt behaviour. (In exactly the
same sense concepts like ‘electron’ are introduced into our language as theo-
retical entities that help explain and predict the overt behaviour of physical
systems.) But theoretical discourse can go on to lead a life of its own. In the
case of mental concepts, Sellars claims that “it now turns out – need it have?
– that Dick can be trained to give reasonably reliable self-descriptions, using
the language of the theory, without having to observe his overt behaviour.
[. . . ] What began as a language with a purely theoretical use has gained a re-
porting role.” (Sellars 1997 [122], pp. 106-107). What happens is that terms
like ‘thought’ and ‘angry’ are introduced in a reductive fashion. It then turns
out to be the case, empirically, that people can reliably tell that they are an-
gry even before this anger has manifested itself; which leads us to adopt
a new and wider meaning of ‘anger’ that can even apply in circumstances
when the anger does not manifest itself at all. “He is angry but he does not
show it” used to be a contradiction, but now becomes accepted usage. Once
this happens, talk of inner episodes is no longer reducible to that of overt
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behaviour.
What Sellars argues in the case of mentalistic concepts is that although
they could be introduced as theoretical terms useful for explaining overt
behaviour, it turned out to be the case that they could also be used to report
on inner episodes. This new role was irreducible to the kind of language
which was originally used to give them meaning; hence, mentalistic concepts
cannot be reductively analysed.
I would like to suggest that a similar history can be written for the notion
of ‘cause’, although here the problem is not to bridge the gap between the
public and the private, but between correlation and determination. It is
clear that causal notions could have been introduced as theoretical terms
that help us to predict and explain ‘overt’ concepts like constant conjunction
and correlation. It then turned out to be the case that they could also be used
to explain, plan and predict the success of our own interventions in nature.
In these instances, the experience of agency showed cause and effect to be
something other than mere correlation. After the concept of cause had been
given this new interpretation in instances of agency, it could be projected
back on the natural world. In its new role, it had become irreducible to a
sparse empiricist vocabulary.4
An analysis of the concept of cause could then consist of two steps: we
first introduce some instances of correct usage of ‘cause’ by appealing to the
experience of agency; and then we give the empirico-semantical rules that
allow us to generate more (and hopefully all) instances of correct usage from
the basis given in the first step. I take Woodward’s analysis of causality
to be precisely this second step: it shows us how to extend the notion of
cause beyond the immediately graspable experience of agency. Woodward
does not talk about the first step, presumably because he wishes to distance
himself from charges of subjectivism, but this leaves him open to the charges
of Glymour and De Regt. Without the first step, it remains mysterious how
we ever get causal talk going.
We do not need to be worried about appealing to subjective experience in
our analysis of ‘cause’. Any subjectivism that remains after the completion
of the second step, where the notion of ‘cause’ is embedded into an inter-
subjective language of public states of affairs, is harmless. So Woodward is
right that it is intervention rather than agency that should lie at the core
of analyses of causality; but Weslake (2006 [138]) is right that Woodward
should take the notion of agency more seriously than he currently does. We
need agency to get causal discourse starting; but once it has started, Wood-
4This understanding of causation through agency is closely related to Schopenhauer’s
use of the will to explain the notion of ground; see Schopenhauer 1813 [117].
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ward shows us how to objectivise the notion of cause so that we end up not
needing agency any more.
Much remains to be said about this topic, since there are many deep and
interesting questions both about what makes a good analysis and about the
experience of agency. But I hope that my sketchy treatment of the issue has
at least shown that there is ground on which Woodward can fight against
charges of circularity. I will now return to the main line of my argument.
4.5 Mathematical explanation introduced
Mathematical explanations are non-causal according to all but the most un-
conventional philosophies of mathematics, and they will therefore serve as
the prime example of this chapter.5 I wish to take an example of a mathe-
matical explanation and a mathematical non-explanation, and show that a
generalised version of Woodward’s theory correctly implies that the former
explains and the latter does not.
Now compared to the amount that has been written about explanation
in the sciences, very little has been written by philosophers on the subject
of mathematical explanation; important exceptions are Steiner 1978 [127],
Sandborg 1998 [116], Mancosu 2001 [76] and Hafner and Mancosu 2005 [36],
as well as parts of Kitcher 1989 [57]. This lack of attention means that there
are no standard examples of mathematical explanation (like the barometer,
the flagpole, the birth control pills or the double assassination in other areas
of the philosophy of explanation) with which my readers will be certainly
familiar. The examples to be used must therefore first be set out in some
detail; and I will do so in the rest of this section, using an example that has
received some discussion in the extant literature. In section 4.6, I will go on
to discuss Steiner’s theory of mathematical explanation, and his attempt to
make sense of the examples. Steiner’s theory serves as a natural prelude to
testing a generalised version of Woodward’s theory in section 4.7.
Mathematicians are in the business of proving theorems. But different
proofs of a theorem, although they all (by virtue of being proofs) give us
certainty that the theorem is true, may not give us equal understanding of
why the theorem is true. That is, some proofs explain the theorem they prove,
and others do not.6 Mathematicians find this distinction important, and will
5We will look only at mathematical explanations that take the form of proofs. There
are probably other kinds of mathematical explanation – such as explanations by pictures
– but even less work has been done on them.
6I will argue in section 4.7 that the proof cannot strictly speaking be identified with
the explanation.
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often continue to search for an explanatory proof even if a non-explanatory
proof is already available. (See Mancosu 2001 [76] and especially Hafner and
Mancosu 2005 [36] for evidence that this is indeed the case.)
Let us consider an elementary theorem and two proofs, one explanatory
and one not explanatory. This example is taken from Steiner 1978 [127].
Theorem: Let S(n) be 1 + 2 + . . .+ n. Then S(n) = n(n+1)
2
.
First proof: This is a proof by induction. We start by showing that
if the theorem holds for n, then it holds for n+ 1:
S(n+ 1) = S(n) + (n+ 1) =
n(n+ 1)
2
+
2(n+ 1)
2
=
(n+ 1)(n+ 2)
2
.
(4.1)
The theorem holds for n = 1: 1(1+1)
2
= 1. Therefore, by complete
induction over the natural numbers, the theorem follows.
Second proof: By the commutativity of addition, S(n) = 1+2+. . .+
n is equal to S(n) = n+ (n− 1) + . . .+ 1, the same sum but reversed.
We now add the rewritten to the original sequence term by term:
2S(n) = [1 + 2 + . . .+ n] + [n+ (n− 1) + . . .+ 1] (4.2)
= [1 + n] + [2 + (n− 1)] + . . .+ [n+ 1] (4.3)
= [n+ 1] + [n+ 1] + . . .+ [n+ 1] (4.4)
= n(n+ 1). (4.5)
The theorem follows immediately.
Steiner claims, and I agree, that unlike the first proof, the second proof
not merely proves, but also explains the result. We might almost be tempted
to say that in the second proof, we can see how the symmetry of the sequence
‘causes’ the sum to be what it is. Of course, there is no causation; but what
do we find in its place?
4.6 Steiner’s theory of mathematical
explanation
Steiner 1978 offers the following theory about the difference between explana-
tory and non-explanatory proofs:
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My proposal is that an explanatory proof makes reference to a
characterizing property of an entity or structure mentioned in the
theorem, such that from the proof it is evident that the result
depends on the property. It must be evident, that is, that if we
substitute in the proof a different object of the same domain,
the theorem collapses; more, we should be able to see as we vary
the object how the theorem changes in response. ([127], p. 143;
emphasis added.)
Steiner’s theory, especially the part I have emphasised, already appears to
be an interventionist account. Where he speaks of varying the mathematical
objects and seeing how the theorem changes in return, Woodward speaks of
varying a causal variable X and seeing how the variable Y changes in re-
sponse. Of course, we would like to know what it means to vary an object;
and what the ‘characterizing properties’ of an entity ‘mentioned in the the-
orem’ are. So let us listen to what Steiner says about the example from the
previous section.
[The explanatory proof] that the sum of the first n integers equals
n(n+1)
2
proceed[s] from characterizing properties: . . . by character-
izing the symmetry properties of the sum 1 + 2 + . . .+ n. . . . By
varying the symmetry . . . we obtain new results conforming to
our scheme. The proof by induction [on the other hand] does not
characterize anything mentioned in the theorem. Induction, it is
true, characterizes the set of all natural numbers; but this set is
not mentioned in the theorem. ([127], pp. 144-145.)
Steiner accurately captures why the second proof is explanatory: the
proof makes us aware of the symmetry of the S(n), and how this symmetry
is (in a certain sense) responsible for the theorem. What this proof does is to
point out a property of the sequence which we can vary to change the result;
and although it does not go into explicit detail about the effects of such
variation, the competent reader will be able to provide such details herself.
But Steiner’s reasons to dismiss the inductive proof as non-explanatory
are weak. Claiming that that proof does not explain because the set of all
natural numbers is not mentioned in the theorem is a dubious move, not
least because a fully formal version of the proof would have started with
“∀n ∈ N : . . .”. When written down formally, the set of natural numbers
would have been mentioned in the proof. So Steiner must be mistaken.
Another weakness in his account is the mysterious notion of a ‘charac-
terizing property’. Steiner does not define this notion in his paper, and it
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is not clear what we are to make of it. Is it obvious that having a certain
symmetry is a characterising property of the sequence S(n)? It is certainly
a property, but what makes it ‘characterising’? We could also wonder what
it means to ‘vary an object’. So although Steiner seems to be on the right
track when he gives an interventionist account of the explanatoriness of the
second proof, his theory nevertheless misses the strength and the rigour to
give a full account of mathematical explanation.7 We will now see whether
a Woodwardian theory can do better.
4.7 An interventionist theory of
mathematical explanation
In Woodward’s theory, explananda have the form Y = y, where Y is a
variable and y is one of its possible values. An explanans consists of a variable
X and its actual value x, plus a generalisation G which shows that X = x
implies Y = y (everything else being equal) and that interventions on X
change Y . Let us see whether we can cast our example into this mould.
Here is a reconstruction of the proof as a Woodwardian explanation. Let
X be the range of symmetry properties a sequence-scheme of natural numbers
7Hafner and Mancosu (2005 [36]) have an additional argument against Steiner’s theory:
they claim to possess a counterexample. This counterexample is worth discussing here
since (if truly a counterexample) it also refutes my Woodwardian theory of mathematical
explanation. Unfortunately, it is highly involved, and I cannot repeat all the details here.
Therefore, I will limit myself to a few remarks for those who already know the article.
Hafner and Mancosu argue that the arbitrary sequences of positive numbers which fea-
ture in Kummer’s convergence test have (because of their very arbitrariness) no character-
ising properties that could be varied. Therefore, Steiner cannot account for explanations
of the validity of Kummer’s convergence test.
I have two remarks to make. The first is that it is simply not true that Kummer’s
sequences have no characterising properties. What is true is that no varying of any single
number in a sequence would make a difference to its usability in Kummer’s convergence
test. But there is a property of the sequence which can be varied and which does make
a difference: the property of consisting (after a certain point) of only positive numbers.
Sequences that have this property can be used to test convergence, but other sequences,
like 1, -1, 1 -1, . . . , cannot. So the answer to “Why can we use 1, 2, 3, 4, . . . in Kummer’s
convergence test?” will mention that this sequence belongs to the class of sequences that,
after some arbitrary number of elements, consist of only positive numbers. Steiner’s theory
can capture this, and so can my generalised interventionist theory.
The second remark is that both Steiner and I are committed to the following: if the
question were to arise why all sequences share a certain property, the only possible ex-
planations of this would lie in the difference between sequences (as such) and some class
of non-sequences. But this seems reasonable enough, and the example of Hafner and
Mancosu is not a counterexample to our claim.
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(with n ∈ N the only unbound variable in the scheme) can have. X will
include such options as ‘no symmetry’, ‘adding the first to the final term,
and the second to the final-but-one, and so forth, always gives the answer
2n + 4’ and ‘adding the first to the final term, and the second to the final-
but-one, and so forth, always gives the answer n + 1’. We will call the last
option x. Let Y range over all theorems of the form ‘The sum of all the terms
of the (finite) instantiations of sequence-scheme α of natural numbers (with
n ∈ N the only unbound variable of the scheme) is β’. Let y be the particular
instantiation ‘The sum of all the terms of the (finite) instantiations of the
sequences 1, 2, 3, . . . , n is n(n+1)
2
.’ And let G be (an appropriate formalisation
of) the rule that if pairwise addition of the terms of a sequence always leads
to result γ, then the sum of the sequence is the number of terms times γ
2
.
G allows us to show that X = x implies Y = y, and it also allows us to
see that interventions on X – understood as substituting sequence-schemes
with different symmetry properties in the proof – will change the result of
the proof. What’s more, G allows us to see how certain interventions will
change the result; for instance, what will happen if we take a sequence with
the symmetry property that adding the terms pairwise always leads to the
result 2n+ 2, or n! + lnn. G helps us to see that by constructing sequences
with symmetry properties like x, we will arrive at results like y. I submit
that this is what makes the second proof explanatory.
However, two remarks. First, Steiner makes a mistake if he means to say
that proofs as such can be explanatory. An explanation is always more than
just a proof: it points beyond a proof of y by showing us that a generalisation
G was used in the proof, and that this generalisation can also be used to prove
alternatives to y. What makes it tempting to speak of an ‘explanatory proof’
in examples such as the one we have been discussing, is that these additional
steps are easily seen once the proof is given, so that the intelligent reader
will not need them to be pointed out. But strictly speaking, a proof does
not explain; it can only suggest or be part of an explanation.
Second, the Woodwardian reconstruction I have just given is not the only
possible one. Instead of G, one could have chosen a more or less general
statement, and one might still have a good explanation. This ambiguity
was already implied in the previous remark, where we saw that G had been
given only implicitly in the proof. And if you look for them, there are more
ambiguities: X and Y could be characterised in a slightly different way
as well while leaving the proof the same. None of this is a problem for
our theory; it merely reminds us how important it is to be clear about the
explanandum that a given candidate explanation is supposed to explain, and
it shows us that the proofs we discussed did not do this (and were thus not
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full explanations).
With these remarks out of the way, we can go on to the more essential
task of accounting for the non-explanatory nature of the first proof. Here, the
ambiguities we just noted are more malicious, for we can reconstruct the proof
in such a way that it does explain something. Suppose that someone asks the
following question: ‘I see that for any n you can prove that S(n) = n(n+1)
2
.
But what allows you to conclude that ∀n : S(n) = n(n+1)
2
?’8 In that case,
the first proof would be an explanation, at least once the implicit statements
that complete induction characterises the natural numbers and that changing
this property of the domain of our theorem would make the theorem invalid
had been made explicit. Of course the first proof does not explain Y = y
(as defined in the previous paragraphs), since varying whether or not the
principle of induction holds does not make a difference within Y . So the first
proof can be used in an explanation; it just cannot be used to explain what
most naturally puzzles us when we see the theorem, namely, that Y = y.
(Using a Woodwardian approach has thus already allowed us to see beyond
our first intuitions.)
All of this suggests that the formal structure of Woodward’s theory of
causal explanation can be transferred to the domain of mathematics, but we
have not yet said anything about the notions of ‘intervention’ and ‘cause’.
Before we can speak of an interventionist theory of mathematical explanation,
this defect must be remedied.
We will use the notion of ‘intervention’ as a general term not limited to
causal interventions. The notion of ‘cause’, also prominent in Woodward’s
theory, will be replaced by the more general notion of ‘ground’. It is to be
understood that a cause is a kind of ground; that a direct cause is a kind of
direct ground; and so on. Like Woodward, we will use ‘intervention’ in order
to (semi-circularly) define ‘ground’.
But why do we even need a notion of ‘ground’ in a theory of mathematical
explanation? For the same reason that we need the notion of ‘cause’ in a
theory about causal explanations: to generate asymmetries. The notion of
cause helps us to show why the length of the shadow is explained by but
does not explain the length of the flagpole. The more general notion of
ground will have to help us show why the fact that the natural numbers are
characterised by induction (let us call this A) helps us to explain the truth
of ∀n : S(n) = n(n+1)
2
(and let us call this B), but not the other way around.
We now formally define the notions of direct ground, indirect ground,
intervention variable and intervention in our interventionist theory of math-
8This is not a trivial question. The proof would, for instance, not be possible in Peano
arithmetic without the axiom of induction.
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ematical explanation by stipulating that they satisfy all Woodward’s defini-
tions of direct cause, indirect cause, intervention variable and intervention.
We also stipulate that the variables used in these definitions range not over
type-level events, but over mathematical objects9 and their properties.
So in part, A is a (direct or indirect) ground of B because changing A
will change B. But what does it mean to change whether or not A? And
what does it mean to say that changing A will change B? (What it does
not mean is that certain alternatives to A are inconsistent with B; for being
inconsistent with is a symmetrical relation, and grounding emphatically is
not.) Answering these questions is essential. We need to look at the practice
of mathematical reasoning and identify the kinds of intervention that actually
occur in it.
1. We often start doing mathematics by identifying the mathematical ob-
jects about which we wish to learn more. We choose to investigate
the natural numbers, say, or the geometry of Euclidean plane figures.
Depending on one’s philosophy of mathematics, one will describe this
choice differently: as choosing formal axioms, as choosing rules of con-
struction, as choosing properties by which to identify the mathematical
objects in a Platonic realm. Whatever the description, choosing these
axioms, rules or properties is the most basic intervention in mathe-
matical research, and these axioms, rules or properties are grounds for
everything that follows from them. Example: Choosing the axiom of
complete induction is part of choosing to investigate the natural num-
bers. Therefore, this axiom can be a ground for the fact that for all
natural numbers, S(n) = n(n+1)
2
, but not the other way around.
2. Within a mathematical realm thus delimited, we construct (identify)
mathematical entities and prove theorems about their properties. The
choices we make during the construction are interventions; and the
properties explicitly associated with these interventions are grounds
for the properties that follow from them. For example, let P be the
property that a sequence of numbers has if and only if, starting from the
beginning and the end, pairwise addition of the terms of the sequence
always gives 1+n, where n is the number of terms in the sequence. P is
a ‘constructive’ property in the sense that it is immediately clear, with-
out giving any further proofs or constructions, how we can construct
sequences with this property.10 The property P can then be proved
9If one believes that the type-token distinction makes sense for mathematical ojects,
we mean types here.
10The notion of ‘immediate clarity’ involves a certain subjectivity, or at least implies
mathematical non-omniscience. See page 186 for further discussion of this point.
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to imply the property S: that the sum of the terms of a sequence is
n(n+1)
2
. Hence, constructing an entity with P is a way to construct an
entity with S, and therefore, P is a ground of S.11
These two material characterisations of what intervention is in math-
ematics, when combined with the formal characterisation already laid out,
will suffice to start analysing mathematical explanations in terms of interven-
tions and grounds. Whether Woodward’s theory thus applied to mathematics
will lead to correct results, identifying all and only ‘explanatory proofs’ as
explanations, cannot be argued further in this place; only a multiplication
of successful instances and the absence of unsuccessful ones will produce
conviction. Instead, we will look at a second kind of non-causal explanation.
4.8 Law explanations
With the term ‘law explanations’, I wish to designate explanations of laws
of nature by other laws of nature. The classic example is the explanation
of Kepler’s laws by deriving them from the Newtonian laws of motion. This
kind of explanation is not causal: laws of nature are not events, and cannot
be each other’s causes or effects. Law explanations are thus a second case of
explanations which cannot be captured by Woodward’s original theory, but
should be captured by our generalised version of it.
Our general strategy will be the one we developed in the previous section:
we use the formal structure of Woodward’s theory in order to speak about
interventions on and relations of grounding between laws of nature; then, we
give a partial interpretation of these notions which is strong enough to get the
explanatory discourse going. Preferably, we then check the outcome against
many examples – but for reasons of space I will have to focus on the single
example of Kepler’s and Newton’s laws. In this section, though, I will forgo
spelling out the formal machinery. Instead, I will focus on the need to find a
notion of intervention that is applicable to laws of nature. This notion must
generate the asymmetry that Newton’s laws explain their consequences, but
that those consequences do not in turn explain Newton’s laws.
We cannot think of interventions on laws of nature in the same way we
think of interventions on states of affairs. One might even believe that it is a
11We are not just giving a new name to the notion of logical implication. Grounds
need not imply their consequences, and consequences may imply their grounds. A shadow
implies a source of light, but a source of light does not imply a shadow; and yet the source
of light is a ground of the shadow, because we can intervene on sources of light to create
shadows, but we cannot intervene on shadows to create sources of light.
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necessary (though not a sufficient) condition for lawhood that the regularity
in question can not be changed through the physical interventions that we
use to intervene on states of affairs; they are beyond our control. How then
are we to conceive of interventions on laws of nature? The answer will partly
depend on one’s theory of lawhood, but for our purposes, the metaphysical
questions can be skirted. All we need in order to show that our generalised
interventionist theory can handle law explanations, is a criterion for the truth
of statements describing the results of interventions on laws of nature. If we
know whether it is true or false that “An intervention changing law X to
law X ′ has the result that Y changes to Y ′”, for any X, X ′, Y and Y ′, we
will be able to use the interventionist theory of explanation to assess law
explanations. It is irrelevant for these purposes that we are not in fact in a
position to change any law whatsoever. Now I will suggest that we possess
strong intuitions about the truth of counterfactual statements involving laws;
and that we can use these intuitions to judge the truth of statements about
the results of interventions on laws.
This strategy will work only if there is a strong link between intervention
and counterfactuals – otherwise, linking up laws and counterfactuals will
not result in an interventionist theory of law explanations. This strong link
exists, and James Woodward has already done the hard work of spelling it
out. Since I lack the space to repeat his discussion here, I refer the reader to
his book, especially pp. 279-285.12
The link I want to forge between counterfactuals and interventions on laws
of nature is captured by the following meaning postulate: “An intervention
changing law X to law X ′ has the result that Y changes to Y ′.” means “If,
contrary to fact, X ′ rather than X were to be a law of nature, then Y ′ rather
than Y would hold.” Of course, this clears things up only if the truth or falsity
of the second kind of statement is easier to ascertain than that of of the first
kind; and this will only be the case if we have solid intuitions about the truth
values of this second kind of statement. Luckily, we do. We may not have a
satisfactory theory of counterfactuals, but that is an additional and separate
problem; our intuitions about the truth values of individual counterfactuals
12Perhaps the main reason that we believe Newton’s laws to be more fundamental than
Kepler’s laws is that the latter are a specialised version of the former, which we get by
putting in certain boundary conditions. Thus, to explain the explanatory asymmetry in
terms of counterfactuals may seem a terribly roundabout way of arriving at the point.
Yet this is not the case; for we need the notion of ‘counterfactuals’ in order to arrive at
the notion of ‘intervention’; neither ‘boundary condition’ nor ‘specialised version’ will take
us there. It is because the difference between Newton’s laws and Kepler’s laws can be
stated in terms of counterfactuals that it can be stated in terms of interventions, and thus
subsumed in our interventionist theory of explanation.
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are often quite clear. Let us look at the Newton-Kepler example.
In order to get the right conclusions about explanation, our theory would
have to say that under many interventions on Newton’s laws, Kepler’s laws
would change; but that, on the other hand, Newton’s laws remain invariant
under all interventions on Kepler’s laws. Well, how do the counterfactuals
come out in this case? Suppose, counterfactually, that Newton’s law of grav-
ity related gravitational force not to the inverse square of the distance, but to
the inverse cube of the distance. What kind of orbit would the planets then
make around the sun? We’d have to solve a non-trivial differential equation,
but the answer is surely that the planets would not be moving in ellipses.
On the other hand, suppose that contrary to fact the planets were moving
around the sun in equilateral triangles. What is the closest world in which
this counterfactual is true? Let me present four candidates. In world A, the
laws of motion and gravity in the Universe are such that all objects move
in a straight line until some condition is met, at which point they make a
60 degree turn and continue in the new direction until the condition is met
again, and so on. In world B, in addition to our force of gravity, there is
another force which influences the planets (but not much else); these forces
work together to determine a triangular orbit. In world C, huge jet engines
have been installed on the planets to change their course into triangles. In
world D, the planets do not go around in ellipses because they have been
tethered together with large chains.
We may not have clear intuitions about which one of these four scenarios
is closest to our actual world. But I do think we have clear intuitions that
of the four scenarios, A is farther from our actual world than B, C and D:
only in world A are the laws of nature substantially different, and only in
world A will most events in space-time be different (for it would be a miracle
if things worked out more or less the same while the fundamental laws of
motion were very different). That is all we need. We need to show that
we do not judge that a violation of Kepler’s laws counterfactually implies a
violation of Newton’s laws; and that is just to show that we judge worlds like
A to be farther from our actual world than worlds like B, C and D.
It may be objected to my example that I am relying excessively on in-
tuitions without making clear what the truth conditions of counterfactuals
are, and how they relate to laws. But I don’t need to do that. All I need
to show in this chapter is that our intuitive judgments about which laws
explain which line up with our intuitive judgments about interventions on
laws. What I do not need to show is that these intuitions are right. It is
of course possible that a successful theory of counterfactuals is thought up
which convinces us that the intuitions I used here are wrong; in that case, we
will have to reassess the interventionist theory (and see, particularly, if this
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theory of counterfactuals also changes our ideas about which laws explain
which). But it is unreasonable to ask us to do so in advance, before such a
theory has been accepted.
We will now return to the ambition laid out in the earlier part of this
chapter: to give a full generalisation of Woodward’s theory that is applicable
to all explanations, whether causal, mathematical, or of whatever other kind.
4.9 A general interventionist theory of
explanation
What we have seen in the previous three sections is that a theory structurally
equivalent to Woodward’s interventionist theory of causal explanation can
also be used to explain mathematical explanation and explanations by laws
of nature. We will now write down a formal generalisation of his theory, the
ambition of which is to cover all explanations. I will not attempt to give
a material characterisation of the notion of intervention in each and every
explanatory domain; but I will give a few constraints on such material char-
acterisations and assert that if the formal rules and the material constraints
are satisfied by any characterisation of intervention, then the characterisation
is valid and it applies to a domain of explanation.
First the formal part; most of it comes straight from Woodward. Let F be
a set of variables of appropriate generality.13 Let G be a set of generalisations
which state that certain values of certain of these variables imply certain
values of certain others. Let F∗ be the set of all the members of F which
appear on the left-hand side of the implication sign in members of G. (F∗
contains all the members of F which are candidates for being grounds.)
Now, we define grounds:
A necessary and sufficient condition for X ∈ F to be a direct
ground of Y ∈ F with respect to a variable set V ⊂ F is that
there be a possible intervention on X with respect to Y that will
change Y or the probability distribution of Y when one holds
fixed at some value all other variables Zi in V. A necessary and
13Woodward formulates his theory in terms of type-level events because causal general-
isation are (almost always) made on that level. I formulated the mathematical version of
the theory in terms of the properties of mathematical entities, because the mathematical
generalisations used to give explanations are made on that level; even so, a formalist and
a Platonist would differ in their semantic analysis of such explanations, and hence would
differ on what a mathematical property is. In general, the variables in F must be of the
sort that occur in the generalisations used to theorise about the explanatory domain.
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sufficient condition for X ∈ F to be a contributing ground of
Y ∈ F with respect to a variable set V ⊂ F is that (i) there be
a directed path from X to Y such that each link in this path is
a directed causal relationship; that is, a set of variables Z1 . . .Zn
such that X is a direct ground of Z1, which is in turn a direct
ground of Z2, which is a direct ground of . . .Zn, which is a direct
ground of Y , and that (ii) there be some intervention on X with
respect to Y that will change Y when all other variables in V
that are not on this path are fixed at some value.
Next, we give the formal characterisation of intervention variables
I ∈ F is an intervention variable for X ∈ F with respect to
Y ∈ F if and only if I meets the following conditions:
I1. I grounds (is a ground of) X.
I2. I acts as a switch for all the other variables that ground X.
That is, certain values of I are such that when I attains those
values, X ceases to depend on the values of other variables
that ground X and instead depends only on the value taken
by I.
I3. Any chain of direct grounds from I to Y goes through X.
I4. I is (statistically) independent of any variable Z that grounds
Y and that is on a directed path that does not go through
X.
and of intervention
I’s assuming some value I = zi, is an intervention on X with
respect to Y if and only if I is an intervention variable for X with
respect to Y and I = zi is an actual ground of the value taken by
X.
Given these preliminaries, the formal notion of explanation becomes:
Suppose that M is an explanandum consisting in the statement
that some variable Y ∈ F takes the particular value y. Then an
explanans E for M will consist of (a) a generalization G ∈ G
relating changes in the value(s) of a variable X (where X may
itself be a vector or n-tuple of variables Xi ∈ F) and changes in Y ,
and (b) a statement that the variable X takes the particular value
78 CHAPTER 4. GENERAL INTERVENTIONIST THEORY
x. A necessary and sufficient condition for E to be (minimally)
explanatory with respect to M is that (i) E and M be true
or approximately so; (ii) according to G, Y takes the value y
under an intervention in which X takes the value x; (iii) there is
some intervention that changes the value of X from x to x′ where
x 6= x′, with G correctly describing the value y′ that Y would
assume under this intervention, where y′ 6= y.
We then turn to the material constraints on intervention. The interpre-
tations of intervention in a certain domain must (i) be consistent with all the
claims of the formal theory given above, (ii) be consistent with our counter-
factual intuitions (or our accepted theories of counterfactuals) about changes
on members of F∗ and the results of these changes, (iii) be such that for every
member of F∗ it makes sense (that is, it is not meaningless or nonsensical)
to speak of intervening on that variable, and (iv) not be a gerrymandered
notion. If no such interpretation of intervention can be found, explanations
are not possible within the explanatory domain specified by F∗ and G.
This is the generalised interventionist theory of explanation. Both Wood-
ward’s theory and the theories of mathematical explanation and explanation
by laws of nature I have given are instantiations of it, as the reader can verify.
Will it also work for other forms of explanation? Only attempts to actually
apply it to them will show.
4.10 Conclusion
In this chapter I have discussed Woodward’s interventionist theory of causal
explanation, adapted it to mathematical explanation and explanations by
laws of nature, and shown how it might be generalised to cover all explana-
tions. These efforts fall far short of actually demonstrating this generalised
theory to be correct; but they open the possibility of further research in this
direction. If the generalised theory expounded here will be found successful,
we will have made an important step forward in understanding explanation.
If it will be found lacking, we will at least gain insight into what makes causal
explanation special.
In the context of this thesis, the generalised interventionist theory should
be seen as a preliminary version of the determination theory expounded in
chapter 6. The notion of intervention used in that chapter will be exactly
as defined above. However, the determination theory will drop the idea that
explanations must use generalisations; rather than demand that there be
some intervention turning x to x′ that changes the value of Y from y to y′,
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it will demand only that this intervention reduces the probability of Y being
y to less than 1; rather than demand that there be some such intervention
for some x′ 6= x, it will demand that some such intervention exists for all
x′ 6= x (but it will simultaneously introduce a formalism that allows us to
coarse-grain variables); and it will more clearly contain and embrace the idea
that all explanations can be given in the form of deductions.
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Chapter 5
Explanation’s Many Contrasts
5.1 Two types of contrast in explananda
It is now commonly accepted that most or all explanations involve contrasts
(see, for example, Van Fraassen 1980 [28]; Hitchcock 1996 [46], 1999 [47];
Woodward 2003 [142]; Lipton 2004 [72]). These contrasts appear in the form
of a ‘rather than’ clause in the explanatory request, sometimes explicitly,
often implicitly. Thus, Van Fraassen 1980 ([28], p. 127) gives us the example:
(1) Why did Adam eat the apple?
He then notes that this explanatory request remains ambiguous until we
make explicit the intended contrast class. For instance, the questioner might
have meant any of the following:
(1a) Why did Adam eat the apple, rather than throwing it away?
(1b) Why did Adam eat the apple, rather than doing something else with
it?
(1c) Why did Adam eat the apple, rather than any of the other fruits?
(1d) Why did Adam, rather than Satan, eat the apple?
What counts as a satisfactory answer to (1) depends on which of the more
explicit questions (1a)–(1d) is meant. “Because he was hungry” may be a
good answer to (1a) and (1b), but certainly not to (1c). Technically, we can
say (with Van Fraassen) that an explanandum consists of a fact embedded
in a contrast class, that is, a set of alternative possibilities that did not
come true. We call these alternative possibilities the “foils” of the fact. Very
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roughly, giving an explanation is showing what picked out the actual fact
from among all the possibilities in the contrast class.
It may be thought that not all explananda have a contrastive form. Per-
haps the following question is a case in point:
(1e) Why did Adam eat the apple?
but note that even this can rephrased, without any apparent change in mean-
ing, as the contrastive question:
(1f) Why did Adam eat the apple, rather than not eating it?
which might well be synonymous with (1b). Quite in general, if no more
specific contrast is discernible, the question “Why P?” can always be in-
terpreted as “Why P rather than ¬P?”. Admittedly, in such cases we are
no longer forced to postulate a contrastive form in order to avoid ambigui-
ties; but postulating such a form makes possible a unified treatment of all
explananda, which itself is a strong enough reason. (There is, of course,
the alternative of reducing all explanations to a non-contrastive form. I will
show that this leads to a more awkward theory of explanation later in this
chapter.)
But not all contrasts in explananda can be understood as contrast classes.
This has not been appreciated well enough, and many authors have treated
all explanatory contrasts as if they were of one kind. Here is an example of
an explanatory question that is well-known from the literature:
(2) Why did Smith, rather than Jones, get paresis?
where we are to understand that Smith and Jones could both have been
unlucky enough to get paresis; Smith’s not getting paresis and Jones’s getting
paresis are independent events. This example is discussed as if the fact were
“Smith got paresis” and the foil were “Jones did not get paresis” by Lipton
2004 ([72], p. 34) and Carroll 1997 ([13], p. 175), and they are far from alone.
I will argue that (2) is not to be understood in this way, and that failing to
see this leads to confusion about contrastive explanation.
Note the following curious fact about (2). Without any change in mean-
ing, we can write it thus:
(2a) Why did Smith, rather than Jones, get paresis (instead of not getting
paresis)?
thus giving us two contrasts in one explanandum. Indeed, (2) is synonymous
with the following:
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(2b) Why did Smith get paresis, rather than not getting paresis; and why
did Jones not get paresis, rather than getting paresis?
and what this formulation of (2) makes clear is that we are to furnish two
explanations, one about Smith and one about Jones, explanations that will
presumably use the same generalisations, but that, apart from this, will
proceed independently. Contrast this with (1a). We might perhaps rewrite
(1a) as:
(1g) Why did Adam eat the apple, rather than not eating it; and why did
Adam not throw away the apple, rather than throwing it away?
but this sounds strangely redundant; and it is clear that answering the first
half of the question is also automatically answering the second half.
There is, in the literature, a distinction between compatible contrasts and
incompatible contrasts; and that distinction is applicable here. Smith and
Jones can both get paresis; but Adam cannot both eat the apple and throw
it away. But this distinction has been interpreted as a distinction at work
within the concept of contrast class: facts and foils can be either compatible
or incompatible. This seems to me a misinterpretation.
At this point I want to introduce (in an informal fashion) the notion of
a contrast of parallels. I will say that an explanatory question introduces
a contrast of parallels if (a) it introduces two or more regular explananda
which have formally identical contrast classes; (b) where it is not the same
member of these contrast classes that is the case each time; and (c) where the
explanations can proceed by applying the same explanatory generalisation
each time.
Let us clarify this with an example. We analyse (2) as posing two ex-
plananda: why did Smith get paresis (instead of not getting it); why did
Jones not get paresis (instead of getting it)? These explananda form a con-
trast of parallels, for (a) they have formally identical contrast classes: X gets
paresis, X does not get paresis; (b) different facts are picked out from the
contrast classes in these two cases: Smith did get paresis, and Jones did not
get paresis; and (c) both cases can be explained using the same generalisa-
tion, namely, a generalisation linking paresis to syphilis.
Why would we be interested in contrasts of parallels as defined thus? We
often want to know why two apparently similar cases turned out differently;
and when we are after that kind of understanding, we need contrasts of
parallels. In a contrast of parallels, the cases are similar: the same regularities
led to the same kind of outcomes; but they are also different, for the outcomes
are different.
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Two kinds of contrast are at work in such understanding. First, the con-
trast between the actual outcome of either case and the possible alternative
outcomes of that same case. (Smith got paresis, but he could also not have
got paresis.) And second, the contrast between the two cases. (Smith did
get paresis, but Jones did not.) The first is captured by the contrast class,
the second is a contrast of parallels.
Confusing these two kinds of contrast is easy, particularly since both can
be expressed by the same words “rather than” (although this may sound a
little strained when used for some contrasts of parallels); but it is a confusion,
and not a harmless one. Contrast classes and contrasts of parallels are very
different things.
First, every explanatory request involves a contrast class, but not every
explanatory request involves a contrast of parallels. The basic explanatory
question is why, among a set of possibilities X, a specific one x is actual.
The more complicated question why in one case S it was x among X that
became actual, while in another case S ′ it was x′ (where x′ 6= x) among X
that became actual, is built up out of two basic explanatory questions. We
can ask the first kind of question without asking the second.
Second, to answer an explanatory request that contains a contrast of
parallels, we must always use a single explanatory generalisation at least
twice. So, to answer (2) using the generalisation “People with untreated
syphilis (and no others) get paresis”,1 we have to use this generalisation
twice: once to argue that Smith got paresis because he had untreated syphilis;
and once to argue that Jones did not get paresis because he did not have
untreated syphilis. But to answer (1a) using the generalisation “When you
are sufficiently hungry, you eat the first edible thing you see”, we need to use
this generalisation only once. Why this is so is obvious from the previous
point.
Third, the distinction between contrast classes and contrasts of parallels
corresponds to the distinction between incompatible and compatible con-
trasts. An explanatory request with a contrast class that contains compat-
ible options makes no sense. For instance, “Why did Adam eat the apple
rather than wear a red sweater?” makes sense only if we assume that these
two options are somehow incompatible. Indeed, because of this, an explana-
tory request invites us to assume that the members of the contrast class are
incompatible. Thus, “Why did Adam eat the apple, rather than the pear?”
invites us to assume that Adam would not have eaten both. If this assump-
tion is false, i.e., if Adam was very hungry and seriously contemplated eating
both fruits, then a correct answer to the question starts by correcting this
1For now we ignore the fact that this example is also famously indeterministic.
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false assumption. “In fact, he was planning to eat both, and he started with
the apple because it was nearer to him. Of course, after he had eaten it he
suddenly became aware of his own nakedness, and continuing with the pear
was the last thing on his mind.” Note that we have here actually answered
the question “Why did Adam eat only the apple, rather than only the pear or
both the apple and the pear?” – which has, once again, a set of incompatible
elements as its contrast class.
A contrast of parallels, on the other hand, always involves contrasting
two compatible options. Jones and Smith could have both got syphilis. In
situations where the options are not compatible, we cannot set up a contrast
of parallels. Thus, “Why did Jones, rather than Smith, win first prize in the
essay competition?” is not a contrast of parallels, but a simple explanatory
request. We can check this by seeing that it can be answered by a single
application of the generalisation “Whoever writes the best essay wins first
prize”, which we have to apply to the fact that “Jones wrote a better essay
than Smith”. But a contrast of parallels can be answered only by applying
the same generalisation twice (or more).
I hope that it is clear at this point what the differences are between
a contrast class and a contrast of parallels. Both can be introduced by
the locution “rather than”, but they are very different beasts. In the next
section, I will show why it is important to make this distinction: failing to
do so has led to confusion in the literature. In particular, I will show that
the debate between supporters of contrastive explanation and supporters of
the conjunctive theory (which claims that contrastive explanations can be
reduced to non-contrastive explanations) results from failing to make the
distinction between contrast class and contrast of parallels.
5.2 The conjunctive theory
As we have seen in the previous section, the dominant view is that some
explanations involve contrast classes. Since all explanations can be written
down in terms of contrast classes, I argued that in the name of theoretical
unity we should say that all explanations involve contrast classes. Some
philosophers, however, argue the opposite. According to them, all talk of
contrast classes can be reduced to non-contrastive explanations. Temple
1988 [134], Carroll 1997 [13] and Carroll 1999 [14] offer a reductive analysis
of contrastive explanations, which we will call the “conjunctive theory”, as
opposed to the “contrastive theory”. According to the conjunctive theory,
the explanatory request “Why P rather than Q?” is simply equal to the two
separate explanatory requests “Why P?” and “Why ¬Q?”. Thus, an answer
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to the former question must also be an answer to both of the latter questions,
and vice versa. If the conjunctive theory is true, contrastive explanations are
only a combination of non-contrastive explanations.
Lipton (1991 [69]; 2004 [72]) argues against the conjunctive theory by
claiming that explaining a contrast is sometimes harder, and sometimes eas-
ier, than explaining the corresponding non-contrastive facts; and that the
two therefore cannot be the same. In arguing for this claim, and indeed
in stating it, Lipton speaks as if non-contrastive facts could be explained
in isolation, which is of course exactly what the contrastive theory denies.
However, this is a sound strategy: we must for a moment speak the language
of non-contrastive explanation in order to assess the conjunctive theory on
its own ground.
I will first discuss Lipton’s argument that contrastive explanation is some-
times easier than non-contrastive explanation. I think it succeeds admirably,
and if it does, it is a great threat to the conjunctive theory. Lipton’s claim
that contrastive explanation is also sometimes harder than non-contrastive
explanation is discussed at the end of this section: I will claim that this ar-
gument does not work, and that if it did, it would threaten the contrastive
theory as much as the conjunctive theory.
Let us look at an example given in Lipton 2004 ([72], p. 36):
My preference for contemporary plays may not explain why I
went to see Jumpers last night, since it does not explain why I
went out, but it does explain why I went to see Jumpers rather
than Candide.
If Lipton is right, the conjunctive theory must be wrong, because we here
have an example where an explanation of “P rather than Q” is not at the
same time an explanation of “P” simpliciter.
Two possibilities are thus open to Carroll. He can either deny that Lip-
ton’s preference explains why he went to see Jumpers rather than Candide,
or he can claim that this preference also explains why Lipton went to see
Jumpers. The first option is very implausible; this is the kind of explana-
tion we give all the time. Carroll agrees with this and chooses the second
option: he claims that it would be “implausible” to say that Lipton’s pref-
erence for contemporary plays does not explain why he went to see Jumpers
([13], p. 176). In other words, according to Carroll, the preference does ex-
plain the non-contrastive fact that Lipton went to see Jumpers (and also the
non-contrastive fact that he did not go to see Candide).
But it seems strange that a preference – and keep in mind that a pref-
erence is a contrastive ranking of alternatives that does not imply absolute
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values – can explain a non-contrastive fact. Suppose that although I hate
contemporary plays, I really loathe older ones, thus preferring the former
over the latter. In such a case, it would be bizarre to claim that my pref-
erence explains why I went to see Jumpers, although it does explain why I
went to see Jumpers rather than Candide (even if we are left wondering why
I went to a play).
We can reformulate the problem as follows. Suppose you know I hate
plays, and I know that you know I hate plays. Whenever you ask me the
question “Why did you go to Jumpers?”, an answer of mine which does not
address the question of why I went to a play at all (rather than doing some-
thing else) fails to be a satisfactory answer to your question. But when,
in the very same circumstances, you ask me “Why did you go to Jumpers
rather than to Candide?”, an explanation in terms of my preference for con-
temporary plays may be completely satisfactory, even though it in no way
addresses the question of why (or reduce your puzzlement about that fact
that) I went to a play at all. The contrastive question has licensed me to
take for granted the fact that I went to either Jumpers or Candide – to take
it for granted not so much that this fact is true (that much is implied also by
the non-contrastive question) but that this fact can be taken as a given in
the current explanation. The contrastive question tells me that I can simply
use the fact that I went to one of the two plays when I give my explanation
– it licenses me to use this fact as a presupposition. The non-contrastive
question does not give me this license, and that makes it harder to answer.
If this analysis is correct, than a defender of the conjunctive theory must
amend his theory as follows: the question “Why P rather than Q?” is not
equal to the two separate explanatory requests “Why P?” and “Why ¬Q?”,
but it is equal to those two requests plus the statement “You can use ‘either P
or Q’ in your explanations.”. But this leads to two problems for the conjunc-
tive theory. First, it has failed to deliver on its original promise that it could
reduce contrastive explanations to non-contrastive explanations. It turns out
that a contrastive explanation has something that a non-contrastive expla-
nation has not, namely, the licence to use a certain fact as something that
needs not be explained. Why this is so remains a mystery on the conjunctive
theory. Second, the very claim that a contrastive explanation is really two
explanations breaks down: for if we start from the fact that either P or Q,
then explaining why P is automatically also explaining why ¬Q, and vice
versa. We do not have to give two separate explanations in order to answer a
contrastive question; we have to give only one; and this is ensured by the very
structure of the contrastive explanatory request. To speak of a conjunction
here is at best unnecessary, at worst misleading. This seems to me a decisive
argument against the conjunctive theory.
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We have already indicated how the situation discussed here is to be anal-
ysed in terms of the contrastive theory of explanation. We must interpret
“Why P?” as “Why P rather than ¬P?”. This explanatory request can be
understood on the same principles as other contrastive explanatory requests:
in particular, it licenses us to use “P or ¬P” in our explanations – but of
course, we already were so licensed, by the rules of propositional logic. Thus,
“Why P?” gives us a weaker licence than “Why P rather than Q?”, which
explains why it is harder to answer. In general, “Why P rather than Q?” is
at least as easy to answer as “Why P ′ rather than Q′?” if and only if both
the following conditions hold:
• P ′ → P , and
• Q→ Q′.
This can be easily seen: an explanation of the more specific fact (“I went to
Candide, rather than reading a book.”) is automatically also an explanation
of the less specific fact (“I went to a play, rather than reading a book.”);
and conversely, an explanation of the less specific foil (“I went to Jumpers,
rather than reading a book.”) is automatically also an explanation of the
more specific foil (“I went to Jumpers, rather than reading Gravity’s Rainbow
for the twenty-second time.”).
But this insight leads to a counterargument to the contrastive theory. For
the scheme I just gave implies that a contrastive explanatory request (“Why
P rather than Q?”) cannot be harder to answer than my interpretation of
the (purportedly) non-contrastive alternative (“Why P rather than ¬P?”).2
However, Lipton argues that contrastive explanatory requests can be harder
to answer than non-contrastive ones. If he is right, the contrastive theory is
wrong. Let’s see his examples (Lipton 2004 [72], p. 36):
My final observation is that explaining a contrast is also some-
times harder than explaining the fact alone. An explanation of P
is not always an explanation of ‘P rather than Q’. This is obvious
in the case of compatible contrasts: we cannot explain why Jones
rather than Smith contracted paresis without saying something
about Smith. But it also applies to incompatible contrasts. To
explain why I went to Jumpers rather than Candide, it is not
enough for me to say that I was in the mood for a philosophical
2In order to be harder to answer, one of the statements given above must be false. But
P → P is certainly true, and Q→ ¬P is also true, since a foil must always be incompatible
with the fact.
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play. To explain why Kate rather than Frank won the prize, it is
not enough that she wrote a good essay; it must have been better
than Frank’s.
We will address the question of compatible contrasts later in this section,
so for now we limit ourselves to the incompatible contrasts. If the contrastive
theory is right, then it must either be true that “I was in the mood for a philo-
sophical play.” does explain why I went to Jumpers rather than Candide; or
we must say that it is false that “I was in the mood for a philosophical play.”
explains why I went to see Jumpers.
The second option is the correct one. Lipton is right to think that you
cannot explain why you went to Jumpers rather than Candide by saying
that you were in the mood for a philosophical play; after all, both are philo-
sophical plays. But given the background information that more than one
philosophical play was (or might have been) staged that evening, neither can
you explain why you went to Jumpers by saying that you were in the mood
for a philosophical play. Again, given the background information that Frank
has written (or might have written) a good essay, you cannot explain why
Kate won the prize by saying that she wrote a good essay. In both cases,
we can make a legitimate complaint: “Yes, but Candide is a philosophical
play as well.”, and “Yes, but Frank wrote a good essay as well.”. These com-
plaints are not requests for further explanations; they show that the original
explanation did not establish what it set out to establish.3
The same answer will not work in the case of compatible contrasts. It
really is the case that we explain why Jones has paresis without explaining
why Jones rather than Smith has paresis. Carroll also relies on examples
with compatible contrasts when he argues for the conjunctive theory. Does
that mean that explanations with compatible contrasts pose a problem for
the contrastive theory?
3Lipton’s claims are correct when we speak of giving explanatorily relevant information,
rather than of explaining. That I went to a philosophical play is explanatorily relevant
information if I want to explain why I went to Jumpers rather than doing anything else;
but not relevant when I want to explain why I went to Jumpers rather than to Candide.
It may seem paradoxical that when it becomes harder to explain, it becomes easier to
give explanatorily relevant information. But in fact, this is to be expected: as I have to
differentiate between more possibilities, more information becomes relevant. If we do not
keep this seeming paradox firmly in mind, we might believe it harmless to say that giving
relevant information is already a low-level form of explanation. This would lead us to
the truly paradoxical conclusion that an explanation that leaves open more possibilities is
both easier and harder to give than one that leaves open only two. For the sake of clarity,
it is better to keep the terms “giving explanatorily relevant information” and “giving an
explanation” strictly apart.
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No, because the contrastive contrasts appealed to in these examples are
not contrasts within a single explanation. Here, the distinction between
contrast classes and contrasts of parallels comes into play. Lipton’s and
Carroll’s examples are not simple explanations involving contrast classes,
they are contrasts of parallels. In the Smith and Jones examples, we do not
simply explain why Jones rather than Smith got paresis; we explain why
Jones got paresis rather than not getting it, and why Smith did not get
paresis rather than getting it. The structure of contrasts of parallels has
already been discussed. We noted that explaining a contrast of parallels
comes down to giving two separate contrastive explanations using the same
explanatory generalisation. So, yes, explaining why Jones rather than Smith
got paresis is harder than explaining why Jones got paresis, because in the
first case, we are asked to give an additional explanation.
There is one subtle point that must be discussed here, and in order to
see it, we now take into account the fact that syphilis and paresis are only
probabilistically related. Very few people who get syphilis also get paresis.
On some theories of explanation, this means that Smith’s having syphilis
(rather than not having it) does not explain Smith’s having paresis (rather
than not having it). On the other hand, it may seem intuitive that Smith’s
having syphilis and Jones’s not having syphilis does explain why Smith rather
than Jones got paresis, since Jones simply could not get paresis. If this were
the case, then here explaining the contrast of parallels would be easier than
explaining its components, which is inconsistent with my analysis (but also
with the conjunctive theory). I don’t believe this is the correct assessment of
these two cases (I believe that they are both good explanations), but I would
like to point out how my analysis would have to be changed if it were.
The change is simple. Instead of claiming that a satisfactory answer to
a contrast of parallels consists of satisfactory answers to both the contrasted
explanatory requests, one must claim that it consists of a satisfactory answer
to one of them that leaves open the possibility of giving a satisfactory answer
to the other. Thus, when we say that Jones doesn’t have syphilis and that
syphilis is a necessary condition of paresis, we give a satisfactory explanation
of one part of the contrast of parallels; while applying the same generalisa-
tion to Smith leaves open the possibility of giving an explanation of Smith’s
paresis, since having syphilis is consistent with having paresis. Alternatively,
we could have given an explanation why Smith did get paresis, while leaving
open the possibility of explaining why Jones did not get it.
Depending on our explanatory intuitions, then, we may come to a differ-
ent analysis of what it means to give a satisfactory answer to a request for
explanation of a contrast of parallels. However, the choice between the two
options will not affect any of the arguments in the rest of this chapter.
5.3. THE DOUBLE-CONTRAST THEORY 91
Because Lipton and Carroll have failed to perceive the distinction between
the “rather than” locution as it is used to indicate a contrast class and as it
is used to indicate a contrast of parallels, they have mistakenly assumed that
all appearances of this locution have to be analysed in the same way. Carroll
uses several contrasts of parallels as canonical examples of explanation, which
leads him to adopt the conjunctive theory (because in all those cases, he can
split the explanation into two conjuncts); but in order to do so, he must
do violence to our intuitions in cases where “rather than” serves to indicate
a contrast class. Lipton, on the other hand, chooses to do justice to all
our intuitions; but he is then forced to accept that there are two entirely
distinct classes of explanations, one contrastive, one not. With the distinction
between the two uses of “rather than” clear in mind, we can do justice to
all our intuitions while at the same time holding on to a unified view of
explanation: the contrastive view. We can make sense of all the examples
discussed by Lipton and Carroll, provided we don’t forget that there are two
different kinds of contrast in explanatory requests.
5.3 The double-contrast theory
We have analysed the words “rather than” as they appear in explanatory
requests, and we have seen that they can serve two different purposes: they
can make the contrast class of the explanation explicit, or they can introduce
a contrast of parallels. We have also seen how recognition of this fact helps
us to see that all explanations are contrastive, that is, that all explanations
ought to be analysed in terms of fact and foil.
I will now argue that this structure – a fact embedded in a contrast class
– appears not only in the explanatory request itself, but also in the answer
to that explanatory request. This can be easily seen in specific examples.
Consider the following exchange:
(3) “Why did Adam eat the apple?” “Because he was hungry.”
If the contrastive view theory is right, we must understand the explanatory
request as having an implicit contrast class.
(3a) “Why did Adam eat the apple (rather than not eating it)?” “Because
he was hungry.”
(3b) “Why did Adam (rather than someone else) eat the apple?” “Because
he was hungry.”
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If you read these two exchanges out loud, you will find yourself stressing the
word “hungry” in the explanans in (3a), but the word “he” in the explanans
in (3b). It is easy to see an analogy with how stress is used in explanatory
requests to indicate intended contrast. To make the analogy more explicit,
consider the following four exchanges:
(3c) “Why did Adam eat the apple (rather than not eating it)?” “Because
he was hungry (rather than not hungry).”
(3d) “Why did Adam (rather than someone else) eat the apple?” “Because
he (rather than someone else) was hungry.”
(3e) “Why did Adam eat the apple (rather than not eating it)?” “Because
he (rather than someone else) was hungry.”
(3f) “Why did Adam (rather than someone else) eat the apple?” “Because
he was hungry (rather than not hungry).”
Of these four options, only the first two are satisfactory. In the latter
two, the question is not answered; they are not examples of successful expla-
nations. Exchange (3a) seems natural only because we implicitly read it as
(3c); and (3b) seems natural only because we implicitly read it as (3d). If
this is right, the answer to an explanatory request has to exhibit a contrast,
and the right contrast, in order to be satisfactory.
Let us call the view that we need a contrast class in both the explanatory
request and the answer (or, alternatively, in both the explanandum and the
explanans) the double-contrast theory of explanation. It has a lot of
intuitive appeal in case (3), and indeed – as far as I can see – in all cases.
There are also theoretical reasons to think it is true: if the explanatory
request involves a contrast between A and B, then the explanation must
specify a difference between A and B – and a difference implies a contrast.
Thus, Lipton went to Jumpers rather than to Candide not because he likes
contemporary plays, but because he prefers contemporary plays to older
ones. The explanans introduces a contrast (between contemporary and older
plays) that made the difference between the fact and the foil.
The double-contrast theory of explanation is thus that all explanations
have the following form: “A rather than B, because C rather than D”. This
is a very general position. It does not attempt to answer the question which
contrasts in the explanans are right contrasts; that is, the double-contrast
theory does not tell us why (3c) is a good explanation while (3e) is not.
This will be the task of more specific theories of explanation, such as the
causal theory, the DN model, the unificationist theory, or the determination
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theory developed in chapter 6. In the rest of this section, I want to argue
that the double-contrast theory is compatible with, although not required
by, the first three theories. This means, a fortiori, that these three theories
are compatible with the contrastive theory. (The connection between the
double-contrast theory and the determination theory will be stronger: the
former is an essential ingredient of the latter.)
1. Is causation a two-place relation between facts, or a four-place relation
between two facts and two contrast classes? The latter view has re-
cently been defended by Robert Northcott (2008 [89]), who also claims
– rightly, I suspect – that almost all recent theories of causation either
imply this view or are compatible with it. There is thus a growing
consensus that causation is a four-place relation that has to be anal-
ysed in contrastive terms. If this idea is right, then causal theories of
explanation (for example, Salmon 1984 [110], 1998 [113]; Woodward
2003 [142]) will not just be compatible with, but will actually imply
the double-contrast theory of explanation. If explaining Adam’s eating
the apple involves giving a cause of this act; and if causal claims have
the form “Adam’s being hungry (rather than not being hungry) was
a cause of Adam’s eating the apple (rather than not eating it)”; then
it naturally follows that both the explanandum and the explanans are
contrastive.
2. According to the Deductive-Nomological (DN) model , one explains a
fact by deriving it from a set of other facts and a law of nature (where
the law is necessary for the deduction). A typical DN explanation
would state that X is an unsupported mass near the Earth with a
greater density than its surroundings, would state some relevant laws
(the Newtonian laws of motion and that of gravity, for instance), and
would deduce that X falls. We can write this explanation in double-
contrastive form: it is because X is unsupported, a mass, near the
Earth and with a greater density than its surroundings (rather than
missing any of these four properties), that X falls (rather than staying
stationary or exhibiting some other movement). The DN model is
compatible with double-contrastive explanations given that the laws
used support contrastive judgments – for instance, that an unsupported
mass will fall and a supported mass will not.
And laws do support contrastive judgments of this sort, since they
imply counterfactuals. And even without counterfactuals – in a purely
extensional theory – laws support contrastive judgments: for if it is a
law that all As are Bs, then plausibly it must be the case that some
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not-As are not-Bs; and therefore it is being an A rather than a not-A
that ensures that something is a B rather than a not-B. Contrastive
judgments like these are exactly the ones that appear in explanations.
So irrespective of one’s theory of lawhood, the DN model can easily be
made compatible with the double-contrast theory.
3. Finally, unificationist theories of explanation (for example, Kitcher
1989 [57]; Schurz and Lambert 1994 [120]; Schurz 1999 [119]) are struc-
turally equivalent to the DN model with the difference that they use the
most unifying argument schemes (Kitcher) or “arguments in the broad
sense” (Schurz & Lambert) instead of deductive arguments essentially
involving a law of nature. If these arguments generate contrastive judg-
ments, unificationist theories are compatible with the double-contrast
theory. Do they? This may not be so easy to see for particular pro-
posals of a unificationist theory, but (given our analysis of causation)
it is something that the true unificationist theory would have to do, for
unificationists are unanimous in claiming that they must be able to re-
produce causal claims. (Kitcher 1989 [57] claims that causation can be
derived from unification; Schurz and Lambert 1994 [120] believe that
it must be put in by hand; but both believe that causation is central
to their theories.) If causal claims are double-contrastive, this implies
that explanatory argument patterns that generate them are double-
contrastive as well. So a unificationist theory can be made compatible
with the double-contrast theory at least in the case of causal explana-
tions. (Evaluating whether this is also true for non-causal explanations
would take us too far afield.)
The major theories of explanation, then, are compatible with the double-
contrast theory, even if they do not actively imply it. Each allows us to
write our explanations in the form of two contrastive (sets of) facts that
have a certain relationship to each other. It is very tempting, at this point,
to inquire into the nature of this relationship – but this is a topic all by itself,
and indeed the central topic in the philosophy of explanation, so I will not be
able to go into it here. In the next section, I want to show that the double-
contrast theory is already useful on its own. In particular, I will show that
the double-contrast theory helps us understand when irrelevant information
is harmful to explanations and when it is not.
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5.4 Contrasts and irrelevance
There are famous counterexamples to the DN model which show that adding
irrelevant information to an otherwise good explanation can ruin it. One
example is found in Kyburg 1965 ([64], p. 147):
(4a) This sample of table salt dissolves in water, for it has had a dissolving
spell cast on it, and all samples of table salt that have had dissolving
spells cast on them dissolve in water.4
Another example, due to Salmon 1971 ([108], p. 34), states that:
(5a) John Jones did not get pregnant because males who take birth control
pills do not get pregnant, and John Jones was male and took birth
control pills.
In both these cases, it is argued that an explanation with less information
(one that did not mention hexing, one that did not mention birth control
pills) would have been a satisfactory explanation, but that adding the irrel-
evant information (about hexing or birth control pills) makes the purported
explanation non-explanatory. These arguments have been widely accepted,
and I accept them as well.
However, it is not always the case that adding irrelevant information to
an explanation ruins it. Consider first this explanation:
(5b) John Jones does not have a uterus. If you don’t have a uterus, you
can’t get pregnant. Therefore, John Jones did not get pregnant.
This is surely a perfectly good explanation. But now, we are going to add
irrelevant information – specifically, we are going to restrict the explanation
to a subclass of those who do not have a uterus, namely, males.
4It is not clear that the term ‘irrelevance’ has been well chosen to describe what is
wrong with this explanation. Let (4b) be the standard explanation of salt dissolving:
(4b) This sample of table salt dissolves in water, because all table salt dissolves in water.
On the one hand, (4a) contains more information than (4b), namely, that the salt is
hexed. This information is ‘irrelevant’ in the sense that we do not need it to explain the
explanandum. On the other hand, (4b) also contains information that (4a) does not con-
tain, namely that non-hexed table salt dissolves in water. We do not need that information
to explain the explanandum either. Hence, both (4a) and (4b) contain information that
is, in a technical sense, irrelevant to the explanation. The problem with (4a) doesn’t seem
to be that it contains irrelevant information, but that it contains misleading information.
I will ignore this misgiving for now; I hope to have explained the phenomenon fully by
the end of this section, at which point whether to speak about ‘irrelevant’ or ‘misleading’
information will be a purely terminological question.
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(5c) John Jones is male. If you are male, you can’t get pregnant. Therefore,
John Jones does not get pregnant.
Given that no male has a uterus, but that many non-males (including fe-
male birds and fish, female mammals who have had their uterus surgically
removed, and non-living objects like tables and tickets for Candide) do not
have a uterus either, restricting the explanation to males adds irrelevant in-
formation: we do not need to know that John Jones is male, all we need
to know is that he doesn’t have an uterus. And yet (5c) seems to be a fine
explanation.
Here is an example of a different kind:
(3g) “Why did Adam eat the apple?” “Well, as he was walking away from
home, he suddenly got hungry. So he went back, and Eve was standing
there conversing with the snake, and she showed him the apple. Being
hungry, he didn’t hesitate, and just ate it.”
Again, we see that adding information to a good explanation (“Adam
was hungry.”) does not harm the explanation. In fact in this case, it seems
to help us understand more about the situation. So why isn’t that the case
in the hexed salt example?
It is not the case that a problem of irrelevance is created when we add an
adjective (like “hexed”) where it is not strictly necessary, as a final example
(of a perfectly good explanation about dissolving and hexed salt) will show:
(4c) The sorcerer’s inept apprentice tries to cast a simple spell which in-
volves taking a bowl of water, putting a lump of silicon dioxide in it,
and speaking words of power. However, the apprentice mistakes the
blue jar that contains the hexed salt for the blue jar that contains the
silicon dioxide. “Master, why does this lump dissolve?”, he asks in
amazement. Wearily, the old wizard answers: “Because it is hexed
salt.”.
The double-contrast theory of explanation suggests that we will be able
to understand the difference between harmful and harmless irrelevancies once
we stop writing them in abbreviated form, and start writing out the contrasts
explicitly. We will then see that additional details are harmful when they
suggest a contrast that is in fact irrelevant to the explanandum, but are
harmless when they do not suggest such a contrast.
Thus, a natural reading of (4a) is:
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(4a)∗ This sample of table salt dissolves in water (rather than not dissolving),
for it has had a dissolving spell cast on it (rather than not having such
a spell cast on it), and all samples of table salt that have had dissolving
spells cast on them (rather than not having such a spell cast on them)
dissolve in water.
and of course this fails as an explanation, because varying whether or not a
dissolving spell has been cast makes absolutely no difference to whether the
salt dissolves or not. On the other hand, a natural reading of (4c) is:
(4c)∗ “Master, why does this lump dissolve (rather than not dissolving)?”
“Because it is hexed salt (rather than silicon dioxide).”.
and this explanation is perfectly all right, because being hexed salt rather
than silicon dioxide is very relevant indeed to whether or not the lump dis-
solves. Similarly, (5a) invites the reading that there are two intended con-
trasts in the explanans: one between males and non-males, and one between
those who take birth-control pills and those who do not. But given the first
contrast, the second makes no difference for the case of John Jones, so (5a)
makes a misleading suggestion and the explanation is ruined. On the other
hand, although (5c) gives more information than is strictly needed to derive
the explanandum, it does not suggest inappropriate contrasts: the only con-
trast it suggests is that between being male and being non-male, and this is
certainly relevant, since being male precludes one from becoming pregnant
and being non-male does not.
This leads us to the following theory, which gives the right answer in all
the cases we discussed: irrelevancies are harmful if and only if they are (or
suggest) irrelevant contrasts. Irrelevant information that does not imply (or
suggest) an irrelevant contrast is not harmful.
Note that in all these cases we needed a contrast class in both the ex-
planans and the explanandum, because we needed to show that the contrast
in the explanandum did not make a difference to the contrast in the ex-
planans, and was thus irrelevant. Hence, it seems that we can understand the
difference between good explanations like (4c) and (5c) and bad explanations
like (4a) and (5a) only by adopting the double-contrast theory of explana-
tion and writing both the explanans and the explanandum in double-contrast
form.
Any theory of explanation that incorporates the double-contrast theory
can thus make itself immune to the kind of irrelevancy counterexamples given
above. Perhaps surprisingly, this is no less true for the DN model than for
causal theories of explanation.
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5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we have seen, first, that the phrase “rather than” can be used
in two different ways within explanatory requests: it can be used either to
specify a contrast class, or to set up a contrast of parallels. Making a sharp
distinction between contrast classes and contrasts of parallels allowed us to
show that the apparent counterexamples to the theory that all explanations
are contrastive – in the sense that they all involve a contrast class in the ex-
planandum – were in fact no counterexamples at all. I have argued that with
these counterexamples removed, the contrastive theory must be preferred to
the conjunctive theory.
In the second half of the chapter, we have seen that not only the explanan-
dum, but also the explanans must be understood as containing a contrast
class. I argued that the resulting double-contrast theory should be accept-
able to theorists favouring a variety of approaches to explanation; they can
all agree that an explanation consists of a contrastive explanans and a con-
trastive explanandum, while disagreeing about the nature of the relation that
holds between them. A discussion of this relation has not been attempted
here, except in the vaguest of terms. However, I have shown that at least
one puzzle of explanation – why irrelevant information sometimes (and only
sometimes) invalidates explanations – can already be solved by the double-
contrast theory alone.
Chapter 6
The Determination Theory
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I wish to present a new theory of explanation which I call the
determination theory of explanation. The aim of the theory is to give
necessary and sufficient conditions for something to be an explanation of a
certain (contrastive) fact. It is thus supposed to be a full-fledged alternative
to other theories proposed in the literature, e.g., those of Kitcher, Schurz
& Lambert, Salmon, Woodward, Strevens, and others. It will come as no
surprise after chapter 4 that the determination theory is close both in spirit
and in some of the technical details to Woodward’s theory. However, the
differences are great enough to make my theory more than merely a variant
of his.
I currently know of no counterexamples to the determination theory.
Thus, I propose the theory here as being true and in no need of amend-
ment. However, this proposal is made with all the modesty felt by someone
who has performed a pessimistic induction over the history of theories of
explanation.
In formulating this theory, I will of course draw heavily on the previous
chapters: both the double-contrast theory of explanation and the generalised
theory of intervention will be important ingredients of my proposal. But
rather than start with the technical results obtained there, I would like to
begin by stressing the intuitive basis of the theory, and especially the idea
that determination is the essence of explanation. This is the burden of section
6.2. The determination theory is stated in section 6.3, and some of its clauses
will be justified in more detail in section 6.4.
The most obvious and most important purported counterexamples to the
theory, explanations of undetermined events and indeterministic explanations
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of determined events, will be discussed and rejected in chapters 7 and 8.
6.2 Explanation as determination
Explanations give us understanding of why something or other is the case.
This understanding is the grasping of a specific kind of connection, a connec-
tion that can, at the most general level, be captured with the term deter-
mination. We understand why something is the case, because after having
heard the explanation we can see why it had to be the case given that some-
thing else was the case. For instance, we explain why the vase broke by
pointing out that it fell: it was its falling that determined that it would
break; had it not fallen, it would not have broken. Graphically, we can
represent the situation as follows:1
{breaks, doesn't break}
{falls, doesn't fall}
The idea that determination is an essential part of explanation is some-
thing of a commonplace in discussions of explanation and understanding,
even though it is not always made explicit. It will nevertheless be useful to
illustrate the idea with some examples, so we can better see its ubiquity.
1. Reductive explanations in which large-scale processes (such as the be-
haviour of a gas) are explained by small-scale processes (in this case,
the movements of the particles in the gas) are highly esteemed. They
are highly esteemed because we generally believe that the behaviour of
the system on larger scales is completely determined by its behaviour
on smaller scales. Robert Klee formulates the point thus:
We find micro-explanation to be a powerful and impressive
form of explanation. Micro-explanation is powerful in virtue
of the fact that when a level of organization within a system
can be explained in terms of lower-levels of organization this
must be because the lower-levels (i.e. micro-properties) de-
termine the higher-levels (i.e. the macro-properties). This
is why micro-explanation makes sense – the direction of ex-
planation recapitulates the direction of determination. (Klee
1984 [58], pp. 59-60.)
1The arrow diagrams presented here and later in the chapter are merely a notational
device adopted to easily convey information.
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The opposite, explaining small-scale processes in terms of the large-
scale processes, isn’t used nearly as often, because it is in general hard
to make sense of the idea that the large-scale processes determine the
small-scale processes: for instance, Boyle’s law does not influence the
trajectories of the particles of a classical ideal gas. But in cases where
we can make sense of this idea, e.g., in functional explanations of com-
plex artifacts, such top-down explanations are accepted.
2. In fundamental physics, scientists looking to explain why the laws of
nature are as they are want to have theories with a maximum of theo-
retical rigidity:
[W]e hope for a theory that rigidly will allow us to describe
only those forces – gravitational, electroweak, and strong –
that actually as it happens do exist. (Weinberg 1993 [137],
p. 117.)
A theory is more rigid if it leaves open fewer possibilities, if there are
fewer ways to tweak it in order to accommodate the empirical evidence.
Although precisely defining the concept of rigidity is hard, all we need
to see for our present purposes is that physicists consider it an explana-
tory success when they find theories that show that the actual laws are
the only ones (or among the only ones) allowed, given certain sym-
metry principles. The stronger the links of determination between the
symmetry principles and the physical laws and constants, the better
the explanation, and the more insight we have into the fundamental
structure of reality. According to Steven Weinberg the use of rigid the-
ories is indeed “part of what we mean by an explanation” (Weinberg
1993 [137], p. 118, italics in the original).
3. Enumerative inductions, which do not claim anything about what de-
termines the instances, are not explanations. From the fact that Mr. Jo-
nes went to bed at nine in the evening on Monday, on Tuesday and on
Wednesday, we may be able to predict that he will go to bed at nine
on Thursday, but we cannot explain it without adding further princi-
ples. Suppose we add to our previous statements that (1) Mr. Jones is a
creature of habit who never breaks his routines unless something highly
unexpected happens to him, and that (2) nothing unexpected happened
to him on Thursday. We then have an explanation of why Mr. Jones
went to bed at nine on Thursday. It is an explanation by virtue of our
having introduced a theory which claims that in the absence of certain
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causal factors, a person’s behaviour is completely determined by his
habits.
Again and again, then, we see that explaining why something is the case is
showing by what it was determined to be the case; and that “[u]nderstanding
. . . is the grasping of the connections between ideas” (Kosso 2002 [59], p. 40).2
This idea of determination can be recognised in all the major theories of
explanation. In the causal theories, the connection needed for explanation
is that of cause and effect. In the DN model and the unificationist theories,
the connection needed is that of deductive implication. Even though these
relations relate ontologically different entities (events or states in the first
case, sentences or propositions in the second), they are not all that different
from each other: causal explanations can be written down in argument form,
and the deductive theories generally add restrictions that ensure that the
propositions admitted in the salient parts of the arguments are descriptions
of states or events.
In both cases, “restriction” is the important word. Not every deduction
is an explanation. Not every cause – in the broader and more easily defined
sense of causal influence, which is the sense in which Mars having a certain
weight is a cause for everything that happens on Earth – explains its effects.
“The problem of explanatory relevance is the problem of picking out, from
among all the causal influences on an event, those that genuinely explain the
event.” (Strevens 2008 [132], p. 49). Where the theories of explanation differ
is thus mostly on how to restrict the plethora of determination relations.
Often, this restriction is ontological in nature. The causal theories ad-
mit only determination through causal influence. The DN model effectively
admits only determination of one state of affairs by another through laws of
nature. In both cases, explanation is restricted to a single domain of reality.
In general, the reason for the restriction is not that one has determined that
this domain is “the domain of understanding”, but rather mere expediency.
Asked why all explanations must be causal, most causal theorists would say
that there might be other kinds of explanation as well, but that the problem
of defining causal relevance is complicated enough as it stands. I imagine
that, asked why all explanations must involve a law of nature, Hempel would
have said that this is merely a feature of scientific explanations. From a
theoretical point of view, this way of approaching the problem of explana-
tion is not very satisfactory. Rather than restrict oneself ab initio to special
cases, one would prefer to have a general theory of explanation from which
the special cases follow.
2I argue that understanding is broader than explanation in section 9.5.
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This theoretically more pleasing way is followed by the unificationists,
who start from the supposed insight that all explanations are unifying, and
use this to give general criteria for the restriction of determinations. This
supposed insight is in fact false, as I have attempted to show in chapter 2.
But their way of proceeding is excellent: we take the most general notion of
determination, which is deduction; we add an insight into the special kind of
determination that explanations make use of; and we thus arrive at a theory
of explanation. This is the way that I will follow as well.
Thus, we start with deduction, because it is the most general notion of
determination. What this means is that any other notion of determination
can be given expression by a deductive argument. For instance, if A causally
determined B, we can set up a deduction like this: “A happened. If A were
to happen, it would cause B to happen. Anything that is caused to happen
happens. Therefore, B happened.”. I take it that all actual relations of deter-
mination can be expressed by deductive arguments with only true premises
(which I will call ‘true deductive arguments’), so we lose nothing by starting
with the set of all deductive arguments. Our first statement of the theory,
then, is that an explanation of E is a true deductive argument with E
as its conclusion. But we know that this is as yet highly unsatisfactory.
An explanation is not just any deduction, it is a deduction that tells us
that B is the case rather than B′, because A is the case rather than A′. This
is essential to the notion of determination: we can say that A determines B
only against a background of other possibilities, including the possibility that
B is not the case and the possibility that A is not the case. We have already
seen this in chapter 5, where I analysed the doubly contrastive structure
of explanation: both the explanandum and the explanans have the form of
a fact embedded in a contrast class. (In the case of the explanans, there
can be several facts embedded in several contrast classes.) In that chapter,
I proposed the double-contrast theory as the most economical theory about
contrasts in explanations. We now see that it also follows from the most
general intuitions we have about what an explanation is.
An explanation, then, is a true deductive argument where both the con-
clusion and at least one of the (non-redundant) premises have the form of
a fact embedded in a contrast class of alternatives. But this is not enough,
because merely having such contrast classes does not yet involve the idea
of determination, the idea that fiddling with the determining contrast class
changes which fact is picked out from the determined contrast class. This is
of course exactly what many of the causal theorists have tried to capture in
their idea of causal relevance. In chapter 4 we adopted a generalised version
of Woodward’s concept of intervention, which allowed us to test whether
or not fiddling with the value of one variable would make a difference to
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the value of another variable. A determines B just in case intervening on A
makes a difference to the value of B. Thus, adopting an interventionist test
is exactly what we need to flesh out the intuitive notion of determination.
An explanation is a true deductive argument where both the conclusion
and at least one of the (non-redundant) premises have the form of a fact
embedded in a contrast class of alternatives, and intervening on those facts
in the premises changes the fact in the conclusion. This is the determination
theory in a nutshell. It is completely general, metaphysically neutral, and
entirely built on the intuition that to explain something is to show how it
was determined.
In the next section we will extend this short intuitive statement of the
theory into a full technical one, adding some clarifications.
6.3 The determination theory
Without further ado, then, I wish to state the determination theory of
explanation in its technical form.
An explanatory request is a question of the form: “Why E rather than
any other element of DE?”, where E is a proposition and DE (the determined
set) is a set of propositions including E and at least one other element. The
propositions in DE must be mutually exclusive.
3
An explanation of why E rather than any other element of DE,
is a set of propositions that:
1. contains one or more proposition of the form “F rather than
any other element of DF is true”, where F is a proposition
and DF is a set of mutually exclusive propositions including
F and at least one other element (each of these sets is called
a “determining set”);
2. contains the disjunction of the elements of DE;
3. deductively implies E;
4. deductively implies that in all of the determining setsDF , for
all of the false propositions F ′ in that set, the following holds:
there is at least one intervention on DF with respect to E
that would make F ′ true and would change the probability
3We will see in chapter 9 that the explanatory request will generally also contain an
implicit specification of the determining basis.
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distribution over DE such that E no longer has probability
one;4
5. and has only true elements;
and where the notion of intervention is the generalised version of
Woodward’s notion, as defined in section 4.9 of this thesis.
That is all. The five numbered conditions are intended to be both neces-
sary and sufficient for explanation.5
Several parts of the determination theory have been discussed sufficiently
in previous chapters. Thus, chapter 5 argued that all explanations have a
doubly contrastive form. This insight is here captured in the definition of an
explanatory request, in condition 1, and in condition 2. Chapter 4 argued for
the interventionist condition, which is here given (more or less) as condition
4. Condition 5 is the uncontroversial truth condition. But what certainly
remains to be shown is that the idea of determination, here captured in
condition 3 and condition 4, is (a) adequately captured by those conditions,
and (b) truly as essential for explanation as it intuitively seems to be.
In section 6.4, I wish to show that the conditions of the theory do indeed
capture the notion of determination; we will discuss several examples, and
see how they motivate the inclusion of condition 2 and the precise form of
condition 4.
Then we move on to a defence of condition 3, which is at the same time
a defence of the claim that determination is necessary for explanation. My
theory states that we understand something only when we have seen why it
was necessary, given certain other facts. Many, perhaps most, philosophers
have not accepted this claim. In chapters 7 and 8, we will discuss explanations
that have been thought not to involve determination.
In chapter 9, I turn to further questions about and consequences of the
determination theory. We also talk about the role of laws and regularities in
4Sets are turned into variables in the obvious way: we vary which of the propositions in
the set is true. Condition 1 ensures that the propositions are mutually exclusive, which is
why we can see them as values of a single variable. In actual explanations, the implications
about intervention will usually be implicit, for instance in causal vocabulary; or will even
have to be rationally reconstructed, as we did for mathematical explanations. The claim
is that such reconstructions will always be possible, not that people always phrase their
explanations in the hyper-correct form we are aiming for here.
5In particular, we do not need an extra condition stating that only the propositions
mentioned in conditions 1 and 2 are allowed in the explanation. The explanation may con-
tain as many other propositions as are needed to fulfill condition 3 and 4; and indeed, more
as well. Deductions cannot be invalidated by adding more premises; only the pragmatic
virtue of clarity can suffer.
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explanation, whether explanations are arguments, the plurality of explana-
tions, and the relation between explanation and understanding.
6.4 Capturing determination
In this section we will look at the notion of determination somewhat further,
and motivate two of the conditions of the determination theory. We will use
the simple graphical way of representing explanations in terms of contrast
classes and arrows to easily communicate our intuitions. In these pictures,
the bottom set of terms is the determining basis, the upper set of terms is
the determined basis, and the arrows are relations of determination.
Such pictures can be used to illustrate several constraints on explanation.
For instance, irrelevant explanations, such as the explanation that a lump of
salt dissolved because it was hexed, are easily recognisable:
{dissolves, doesn't dissolve}
{hexed, not hexed}
What has gone wrong here is that picking a different element from the de-
termining set does not result in a different element from the determined set.
Hence, we have not shown why the lump of salt dissolves, rather than not
dissolving.
Different elements of the determining set must thus pick out different
elements of the determined set. But must all elements of the determining
set pick out the non-actual element of the determined set, or is it good enough
if some elements do so? Consider the situation in which Adam ate the apple
because it was green and he likes green fruit; in which he would also have
eaten it if it had been yellow, because he likes yellow fruit as well; and in
which he would not have eaten it if it had been orange, because he detests
orange fruit. We can represent the situation as follows:
{eats, doesn't eat}
{green, yellow, orange}
In this case it would be weird to say that Adam ate the apple because it
was green rather than yellow or orange. Had it been yellow, he would also
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have eaten it. Thus, what we need for a good explanation is that none of
the non-actual elements of the determining set uniquely picks out the actual
element of the determined set. That is why we demand, in condition 4, that
for all (rather than some) F ′ there is an intervention that makes F ′ true and
ensures that E is no longer determined.
This means that the following explanations are correct :
1. The apple was green, rather than having some other colour.
Adam eats every fruit that is green, but not every fruit that
has another colour.
Adam eats the apple, rather than not eating it.
2. The apple was green, rather than having some other colour.
Adam eats every fruit that is green, but he never eats red
fruit.
Adam eats the apple, rather than not eating it.
3. The apple was green, rather than red.
Adam eats every fruit that is green, but he never eats red
fruit.
Adam eats the apple, rather than not eating it.
But the following explanations are incorrect :
4. The apple was green, rather than red.
Adam eats every fruit that is green, but not every fruit that
has another colour.
Adam eats the apple, rather than not eating it.
5. The apple was green, rather than yellow or red.
Adam eats every fruit that is green, but he never eats red
fruit.
Adam eats the apple, rather than not eating it.
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Explanation 4 fails because it fails to conform to condition 4. It must not only
be the case that intervening on a determining basis changes the probability
of the explanandum to less than 1, but this must also be deducable from the
propositions in the explanans. Explanation 4 leaves open the possibility that
Adam eats every red fruit as well as every green fruit. Explanation 5 fails for
the related reason that it does not imply that there are interventions that
change the fruit’s colour to yellow and also make Adam not eat it.
It does not detract from the explanation if an element of the determining
set picks out several elements of the determined set. It could well be the case
that (1) Adam ate the apple because he was hungry, while (2) had he not
been hungry, he might or might not have eaten the apple (perhaps depending
on the value of some other variable, such as whether he thought it would be
healthy). So the following also represents a good explanation:
{eats, doesn't eat}
{hungry, not hungry}
What is needed for an explanation is that the actual element of the determin-
ing set is a sufficient condition for the actual element of the determined set,
while the other elements of the determining set are not sufficient conditions
for the actual element of the determined set. This example shows why we
demand only that some (rather than all) interventions that make F ′ true
change the probability of E to something less than 1.
Why do we demand only that the probability of E be changed to less
than 1 (rather than it being changed to 0)? This matters only in cases with
true indeterminism.6 Suppose that a screen can be set in two positions, a
and b. If the screen is in position a, the photon that is shot at it will have a
probability 1 of passing the screen. If the screen is in position b, the photon
will have a probability 0.9 of passing the screen. Is the following a good
explanation?
The screen was in position a, rather than being in position b.
The probability of a photon passing the screen is 1 in position a,
0.9 in position b.
6If we have determinism, an intervention will always have either the result that E
happens or the result that E does not happen – there are no probabilities other than
0 or 1. An intervention is a fully determinate change in the fully determinate actual
situation: there are no probabilities generated by ignorance or abstraction, only by true
indeterminism.
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The photon passes the screen, rather than not passing it.
I think it is a good explanation, but if it turns out that most people’s in-
tuition is that it is not, I would be more than willing to change the deter-
mination theory accordingly. The only change that is needed is that instead
of demanding that there is an intervention that changes the probability of
E to something less than 1, there must be an intervention that changes the
probability of E to 0 – i.e., that determines E not to happen.
Is it the case that we always explain by giving sufficient conditions? Yes,
but this sufficiency need only exist relative to the determined set. Suppose
that if Adam is hungry, he will either eat the apple immediately or put it in
his pocket for later consumption; whereas, if he is not hungry, he will feed the
apple to the snake. Then we cannot answer the explanatory question “Why
did Adam eat the apple, rather than store it or feed it to the snake?” by
saying that Adam was hungry. Thus, this is not a valid explanation scheme:
{eats, stores, feeds}
{hungry, not hungry}
After all, Adam’s hunger does not make the difference between eating and
storing. But if we restrict the determined set to the two options of eating the
apple and feeding it to the snake, that is, if we ask “Why did Adam eat the
apple, rather than feed it to the snake?”, an explanation in terms of hunger
does work.
{eats, feeds}
{hungry, not hungry}
Hunger does make the difference between eating and feeding, even though it
does not make the difference between eating and storing. What we need for
an explanation is that the actual element from the determining set makes the
difference between the actual element from the determined set and the other
elements from the determined set; not that it makes the difference between
the actual element and every other possible contrast. This motivates the
adoption of condition 2.
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With these comments, I hope to have explicated the conditions of the
determination theory well enough. We now turn to the much more involved
project of defending it against the claim that not all explanation involves
determination.
Chapter 7
Indeterministic Explanation I
In this chapter and the next we look at apparently non-deterministic expla-
nations of events that are produced by deterministic processes. In the current
chapter, I show how explanations that would traditionally be interpreted as
examples of the inductive-statistical (IS) model or of the statistical relevance
model can be interpreted as examples of the determination theory. For this
purpose I construct a model, the non-specific deductive or ND model, that
describes the form seemingly inductive-statistical explanation take within
the determination theory. I argue that my theory and the ND model cannot
only handle such explanations, but can solve important philosophical prob-
lems concerning the role of probability in explanation – this is the burden
of sections 7.2 and 7.3. The ND model naturally leads to the question of
degrees of explanatory strength, which I discuss as an aside in section 7.4.
In sections 7.5 and 7.6, I turn to the explanation of truly indeterministic
events. On my theory, such explanations do not exist; but I hope to show
that this does not violate our intuitions (although some people have thought
it does), and that it is not an affront to modern physics.
In chapter 8, we will go over some of the same ground. There I tackle the
recent argument of Michael Strevens that determined events are often best
explained in a non-deterministic way. Because of the length and technicality
of this discussion, it seemed better to split it off into its own chapter. Neither
chapter presupposes the other.
7.1 The non-specific deductive model
The determination theory claims that all explanation is a matter of determi-
nation, and this immediately raises the problem of how to deal with putative
examples of non-deterministic explanation. These examples can be split into
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two classes: explanations of events that were produced by truly indeter-
ministic processes, and non-deterministic explanations of deterministically
produced events. I will discuss the first class in sections 7.5 and 7.6, and
focus on the second class now (and again in chapter 8).
Throughout this discussion, some of the things that the determination
theory considers a necessary part of all explanations will remain implicit.
In particular, we will often not write down the contrast classes if they are
obvious, we will silently assume that the interventionist condition 4 has been
met, and we will never spell out that the proposition in the explanandum is
true. Not doing so would prove very tedious.
Let us look at the following famous example of an explanation (Scriven
1959 [121]):
(1) Jones got paresis because he had untreated syphilis.
This explanation has been much discussed because, although untreated sy-
philis can lead to paresis, it does so only in a minority of cases. There are
presumably causal factors that determine whether or not any given person
who has untreated syphilis will also get paresis; but these factors are unknown
to current medical science. Thus, explanation (1) is the best explanation
we can give of Jones’s paresis, even though the explanans does not imply
the explanandum with certainty (and perhaps not even with a probability
larger than 0.5). According to Salmon 1998 [113] (pp. 39-40), explanation (1)
gives “some understanding of what happened and why”; it is an example of
“inductive explanation” using a “statistical law”, rather than of “deductive
explanation” using a “universal law”.
Salmon (1998 [113], p. 40) suggests that explanation (1) is to be under-
stood as an instance of what is essentially Hempel’s inductive-statistical
model (Hempel 1965 [41]; Salmon 1989 [112], pp. 53-58):
F (a).
F (a) =⇒ P (G(a)) = p.
[p]
G(a).
If this is the correct reconstruction of (1), and if explanation (1) gives us
some understanding of the explanandum, then it cannot be the case that
determination is a necessary component of all explanation. The IS model is
not compatible with my theory.
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I would now like to suggest that it is not the correct reconstruction of
(1). In this section, I will give an alternative reconstruction that is com-
patible with the determination theory; in the two sections that follow, I will
argue that my alternative allows us to answer some of the pressing questions
concerning explanation and probability, and is therefore preferable to the IS
model.
Remember that we assume that Jones’s paresis has been deterministically
produced. This assumption can be formalised as follows, where a is Jones, F
is the property of having untreated syphilis and G is the property of having
paresis:
∃H : (F (a) ∧H(a) =⇒ G(a)) ∧H(a).1
That is, there is some property H such that H and the untreated syphilis
together always lead to paresis, and a has this property.
Now, in the case of paresis the exact nature of H is unknown; but insofar
as we are justified to believe that the paresis is the result of a deterministic
process, we are justified to believe that there is such an H and that it ob-
tained in the case of Jones. This means we can see (1) as an instantiation
of what I will call the non-specific deductive model, or the ND model,
which gives the logical form of a certain class of explanations allowed by the
determination theory:2
F (a).
∃H : (F (a) ∧H(a) =⇒ G(a)) ∧H(a).
G(a).
The logical form defined here is deductive: the fact that the unfortunate
Jones has both untreated syphilis and property H makes it certain that he
develops paresis. And again, although we may not know what H is, we
can have good evidence that such a property H exists (namely, the evidence
we have that the process in question is deterministic) and that Jones has
this property (because he develops paresis). Thus, we may be justified in
believing both premises of the argument – and indeed, anyone who believes
that paresis is deterministically produced, and that syphilis is a necessary
1We need something like second-order logic here, in order for the quantifier to range
over properties; but going into more logical detail is not worth the trouble.
2As indicated above, we leave unsaid everything about contrast classes, interventions,
and so on.
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cause of paresis, must believe them. There is no epistemic argument against
using the ND model.
Thus, we can accommodate the paresis example within the determina-
tion theory. This counters the counterexample, but it is not yet a positive
argument in favour of the theory. For that, I will now spell out an intriguing
(and tempting) result of my proposal: it dispenses with the discussion be-
tween what Strevens (2008 [132], p. 347) calls elitism and egalitarianism. Let
us review this debate and see how the determination theory coupled with the
ND model manages not just to avoid the problems, but even reconciles the
conflicting intuitions in this debate. This is certainly a positive argument in
its favour.
7.2 Probability: the debate
Strevens (2008 [132], p. 347) distinguishes two related debates about expla-
nation and probability. The first debate is the size debate, and it is about the
relation between explanatory power and the value of p in the IS model. Must
p be bigger than some threshold, perhaps 0.5, for an instance of the inductive-
statistical model to be a real explanation? If there is no such threshold, is
it the case that all probabilities explain equally well, or do high probabilities
explain better than low probabilities?
The second debate is the change debate, and it is about the explanatory
power of probability-increasing and (especially) probability-decreasing causal
factors. Is the explanatory power of a causal factor a function of the change
in probability of the outcome due to this factor? Can causal factors that
decrease the probability of the outcome be explanatory, or are only factors
that increase the probability explanatory?
The distinction between the two debates has not always been made in
the literature, but it will nevertheless be useful to discuss them separately.
We will review the size debate first. Hempel 1962 [40] and 1965 [41],
where the IS model was first worked out, requires that p is high, so that the
explanandum is “almost certain”. However, Hempel 1977 [43] relinquished
this requirement in order to cope with counterexamples.3 One of these coun-
terexamples (originally from Jeffrey 1969 [53], p. 110) is described in Salmon
1984 [111]:
If two heterozygous brown-eyed parents produce a brown-eyed
child, that fact can presumably be explained statistically on the
3Hempel 1977 [43] is out of print and hard to track down; I base myself on remarks in
Salmon (1984 [111], p. 140; 1998 [113], p. 294) and Smith (1990 [126]).
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basis of the 0.75 probability of such an occurrence. If these same
parents produce a blue-eyed child, that fact seems unexplainable
because of its low probability. Nevertheless, as Richard Jeffrey
(1969) and others have argued persuasively, we understand each
of these occurrences equally well. To say that we can explain the
one, but not the other, is strangely asymmetrical. (p. 294.)
According to Salmon’s, Jeffrey’s and Hempel’s egalitarianism, then, the value
of p is irrelevant to how good a statistical-inductive explanation is. This view
has been dominant ever since, but there have been a few detractors. Mellor
1976 [80] urges that p must be high, although he rejects Hempel’s original
argument, which was based on the idea that explanation is a kind of inference.
Instead, Mellor argues that explanations are meant to close or at least narrow
the gap between what is and what must be: we ask for an explanation of
E only when we know that E is the case, but do not see why it had to be
the case. Obviously, an inductive-statistical explanation with a low p fails
to show why E had to be the case. Mellor goes on to say that Jeffrey and
Salmon have:
. . . a rather startling view of explanation. Smoking hardly seems
to explain not getting cancer as well as getting it; still less does
it seem to explain not getting it just because it would explain
getting it. (Mellor 1976 [80], p. 238.)
Strevens 2000 [128] notes that egalitarianism implies that statistical me-
chanics gives equally good explanations of those cases where gas released
from a small container expands to fill the entire room and of those cases
where the gas remains in a tiny portion of the space accessible to it. He
argues that we cannot accept this, since statistical mechanics was deemed a
successful scientific theory because it ascribed high probability to those pro-
cesses that we actually observe (the entropy-increasing ones). Egalitarianism
thus “amounts to the claim that Maxwell and Boltzmann enhanced SM’s ex-
planatory power not one degree” (p. 374). Or suppose that heat always flows
from cold to hot objects; then the egalitarianist has to claim that statistical
mechanics furnishes a good explanation of this fact, even though it assigns a
ridiculously low probability to it. Strevens concludes by arguing that higher
probabilities explain better:
The paresis case shows that high probabilities are not necessary
for explanation. But the nature of probabilistic explanation in
statistical mechanics shows that high probabilities explain better
than low probabilities. (p. 389.)
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Thus, we have two conflicting intuitions about whether or not (and how
well) we can explain events that have only a low probability given the causal
factors we put into our explanation. In the next subsection, I will show how
my theory deals with these examples and manages to reconcile the intuitions.
The change debate was started by Salmon 1971 [108], which claimed
that even probability-decreasing factors could be used to explain events.
Cartwright 1979 [15] disagreed:
It is true that spraying with defoliant causes death in plants,
but it is not true that spraying also causes survival. Holding
fixed other causes of death, spraying with my defoliant will in-
crease the probability of the plant’s dying; but holding fixed other
causes of survival, spraying with that defoliant will decrease, not
increase the chances of the plant’s surviving. (Cartwright 1979
[15], pp. 425-426.)
Cartwright concludes that spraying cannot explain survival. If the plant
survives it is despite the spraying, not because of it.
Rogers 1981 [105] attempts to defend Salmon by making the surprising
claim that although the spraying is not a cause of the survival, it is never-
theless part of the causal explanation:
The defoliant may not cause an individual poison ivy plant to
survive, but the causal explanation of its survival, given treatment
with defoliant, is that it was sprayed and its probability of survival
was .1. (Rogers 1981 [105], p. 216.)
Humphreys 1981 [50], Salmon 1984 ([110], p. 46) and Humphreys 1989
([51], p. 100-101) clarify Rogers’s idea. They claim that there are two kinds of
causes – contributing causes, which increase the probability of the explanan-
dum, and counteracting causes, which decrease the probability – and that
both can feature in a good explanation, as long as at least one contributing
cause gets mentioned.
According to Strevens 2008 [132] p. 352, “Humphrey’s bold thesis” is
that counteracting causes have explanatory relevance “due to their decreas-
ing, rather than increasing, the probability of the explanandum.”. Strevens
disagrees with this bold thesis. But it is perhaps an overstatement of Hum-
phrey’s ideas, since he writes that (p. 101): “[The list of counteracting causes]
is not a part of the explanation of Y proper. The role it plays is to give us a
clearer notion of how the members of [the list of contributing causes] brought
about Y – whether they did so unopposed, or whether they had to overcome
causal opposition in doing so.”
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It is not entirely clear, then, whether Humphreys and Strevens disagree;
and we do not need to decide the issue here. The moral I wish to take
from the change debate is that, on the one hand, counteracting causes can
hardly be said to explain the event in question (Cartwright, Strevens); but
on the other hand, we often do mention them in explanations, and we may
even believe that we understand what happened better when we do (Salmon,
Humphreys). It is desirable that a theory of explanation makes sense of both
these intuitions.
7.3 Probability: answers
What can we say about the size debate and the change debate from the
perspective of the determination theory? Let us first notice that the questions
as asked do not arise in my theory: unlike the inductive-statistical model, the
non-specific deductive model does not feature a variable probability p. If my
ND reconstruction of the syphilis explanation is correct, it does not matter
whether untreated syphilis causes paresis in 99 percent or in 1 percent of the
cases: what matters is whether it caused paresis in the case of Jones.
This result is, I think, intuitively right. Suppose that syphilis causes
paresis if and only if the patient smokes, and that Jones had syphilis and
smoked. Does it matter for our understanding of Jones’s case how many of
the other people who have syphilis also smoke, and thus, what the probability
p is? No; that fact is surely irrelevant to our understanding of this particular
case. The exact same reasoning holds if we substitute an unknown property
H for smoking.
There is of course the question of how justified we are to believe that
untreated syphilis caused paresis in the case of Jones. But our degree of
justification is not at all related to the value of p, at least not if we are justified
in believing that untreated syphilis is a necessary condition for paresis. If
there are different possible causes of paresis, then the value of p may become
relevant to our epistemic state: if Jones smoked and has syphilis, and smoking
causes paresis with a 40 percent chance while syphilis causes it with a 1
percent chance (very low p), we are not justified in believing that the syphilis
was the cause of the paresis. But this is clearly not what the size debate was
about.
Let us now look at Jeffrey’s and Salmon’s example of the child born of two
heterozygous brown-eyed parents. I already quoted Salmon as saying that
the birth of a brown-eyed child “can presumably be explained statistically
on the basis of the 0.75 probability of such an occurrence.” On my theory,
the explanation of the birth of a brown-eyed child would be something like
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this (we are still assuming that the underlying processes are deterministic):
The father and the mother are heterozygous.
∃H: person a is heterozygous ∧ H(a) =⇒ the ‘blue allele’ is
inherited.
¬(H(father) ∧ H(mother)) (rather than this not being the case).
If and only if the child inherits two ‘blue alleles’, it has blue eyes;
otherwise it has brown eyes.
The child has brown eyes (rather than blue eyes).
Here, H is a (perhaps bewilderingly complex) statement about causal factors
determining how meiosis in the gametes works and which gametes finally fuse.
We do not know H, but in so far as we are justified to believe that the process
is deterministic, we are justified to believe that such an H exists. Notice that
probabilities do not play a part in this explanation. It doesn’t matter that
the probability of ¬(H(father) ∧ H(mother)) is 0.75; all that matters is that
it is true.4
But of course, that means that we can as easily explain the birth of a
blue-eyed child, and that we will understand that event just as well. The
explanation is simply:
The father and the mother are heterozygous.
∃Ha : person a is heterozygous ∧ Ha =⇒ the ‘blue allele’ is
inherited.
Hfather ∧Hmother (rather than this not being the case).
If and only if the child inherits two ‘blue alleles’, it has blue eyes;
otherwise it has brown eyes.
The child has blue eyes (rather than brown eyes).
The only difference is that the third premise has turned into its negation;
apart from that, the explanations are identical. There is thus, on the deter-
mination theory, no serious difference between explaining that the child has
4We could also explain the brown eyes without using probabilities, by simply stating
that the child has at least one brown allele, and that this is a sufficient condition for having
brown eyes. That would be a good explanation as well, but less useful for the purposes of
the current chapter.
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blue eyes and explaining that the child has brown eyes. Thus, the determi-
nation theory can explain and vindicate the intuitions of Salmon, Jeffrey and
the later Hempel.
But what about the intuitions of Mellor, Strevens and the earlier Hempel?
Their basic idea is that if explanation X explains why A rather than A′, that
very same explanation cannot possibly also explain why A′ rather than A.
And indeed, it seems to be entirely rational to claim that we cannot explain
a contrast by something that does not make a difference.
This is a problem for the SI model (and other models, such as the sta-
tistical relevance model). The explanation of “brown rather than blue” and
the explanation of “blue rather than brown” are, in the SI model, exactly
the same (except for the value of p) – and this is problematic. But in the
ND model, these explanations are different: one of the premises turns into
its negation, and it is exactly this premise that makes the difference. Thus,
Mellor could accept my account where he could not accept that of Salmon;
we have saved his intuition.
The answer to Strevens’s claims is perhaps somewhat different. Strevens
asks us not whether the same explanation could explain both that heat always
flows from hot to cold objects and that heat always flows from cold to hot
objects; he asks whether the same theory can do so. This does not seem to be
problematic. If, contrary to our expectations, heat always flowed from cold
to hot objects (and we were nevertheless justified to believe that statistical
mechanics is true), we could explain this fact in something like the following
way:
According to statistical mechanics, if the actual state of the Uni-
verse is in this very small part P of the Universe’s phase space,
heat will always flow from cold to hot objects.
Statistical mechanics is true.5
The actual state of the Universe is in P .
Heat always flows from cold to hot objects.
And rather than this being a fanciful kind of explanation that nobody would
ever accept, an explanation exactly analogous to this is frequently given to
explain the second law of thermodynamics. See, for instance, Albert 2000
[2] on the Past Hypothesis. The idea here is that in order to explain the
5Or empirically adequate, for those so inclined, although it’s hard to see how it could
be empirically adequate in the present example, even if it were true!
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fact that we have time-symmetric laws of nature but a constantly increasing
entropy, we must posit an extremely unlikely low-entropy state in the past
– just as we would have to posit an extremely unlikely state to explain the
opposite.6
My conclusion is that the ND model satisfies all the intuitions in the size
debate.
Concerning the change debate, I claimed that its moral was that although
counteracting causes can hardly be said to explain the event in question,
we nevertheless often mention them in explanations, and believe that we
understand what happened better when we do. Can we explain this feature
of explanation using the ND model?
Let us give an explanation of the survival of a plant that has been sprayed
with defoliant:
This plant was sprayed with defoliant.
∃H : (x is sprayed with defoliant ∧ H(x) =⇒ x survives) ∧ (x
is sprayed with defoliant ∧ ¬H(x) =⇒ ¬x survives).
H(this plant) (rather than this not being the case).
This plant survived (rather than not surviving).
(Normally, we might want to say something more about H, since we know
that among other things it involves getting enough sunlight, water and min-
erals, not being eaten by goats, and so on. But let us ignore this for the
moment.)
Cartwright’s complaint that we cannot give an explanation merely by
citing counteracting causes is immediately understandable given this con-
struction. Giving only the first premise of this argument would not be a
good explanation. Why not? The answer cannot be that giving only the
6Also note that the increased status of statistical mechanics after the work of Maxwell
and Boltzmann – which Strevens cites as evidence for size elitism – can be explained in
many ways. One explanation could be that the fact that Maxwell and Boltzmann could
deduce high probabilities for processes actually seen increased the (epistemic) probability
of their premises being true, which made people less reluctant to accept them. Strevens
rejects this view, because he considers it absurd to claim that Maxwell and Boltzmann
did not increase the explanatory power of statistical mechanics. So perhaps a better
explanation of the higher status of statistical mechanics is that Maxwell and Boltzmann
indeed increased the theory’s explanatory power, not by deducing high probabilities (as
the elitist would have it), but by developing the concepts we need to characterise the
difference between those initial conditions that do, and those that do not lead to the
observed behaviour. But this is not the place for a full treatment of this issue.
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first premise is an abbreviation that leaves some of the explanation implicit,
because we abbreviate explanations all the time. No, what is going wrong
is that even an abbreviated explanation must always mention at least one
of the contrastive premises; one of the things that made a difference. In
this case, if we mention only the first premise, we do not mention the con-
trastive premise, which is the third premise; and thus we do not give a good
explanation.
But why is giving a counteracting cause explanatory useful at all? Be-
cause it allows us to make the non-specific premise more specific, and the
more specific it is, the better we understand what happened. The H that
is a necessary and sufficient condition for a plant to survive if it has been
sprayed with defoliant is much more specific than the G that is a necessary
and sufficient condition for a plant to survive. We can see this by noticing
that G could be written as “sprayed with defoliant and H, or not sprayed
with defoliant and H ′”, for some H ′.
What we have seen in this section, then, is that the determination the-
ory and the ND model automatically save the intuitions of both sides in the
size debate. We can also make excellent sense of the conflicting intuitions in
the change debate if we assume that (a) even abbreviated explanations must
mention one of the contrastive premises, and (b) making the non-specific
premise in an explanation more specific increases understanding. Both these
assumptions are plausible. I conclude that the determination theory can
successfully account for the role of probability in explanations of determinis-
tically produced events. (But we will return to this topic at length in chapter
8.)
7.4 Totally unspecific explanation
The ND model gives rise to an obvious problem, though. Assuming that E
is a deterministically produced event, we could use the ND model to trivially
answer the question why E happened by constructing what one could call
the totally unspecific deductive explanation or TUDE:
∃H : (H =⇒ E) ∧ (¬H =⇒ ¬E).
H (rather than this not being the case).
E (rather than this not being the case).
In words, this would come down to saying that E happened because some-
thing determined it to happen. This is a very unsatisfying explanation,
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because it gives us no understanding at all.
Different explanations of the same explanandum can give us different
amounts of understanding; some may give a lot of understanding, while others
give only a little. A TUDE is the limit case of an explanation which gives zero
understanding. If we believe this means that a TUDE is not an explanation
at all, we must add to the determination theory a condition number 6 stating
that the explanation is not allowed to be a TUDE; alternatively, we can say
that a TUDE is an explanation, albeit the worst possible explanation. This
is a decision of vocabulary; nothing hinges on it. For reasons of simplicity, I
will adopt the latter option.
The idea of explanations giving different amounts of understanding will
be discussed in more detail in chapter 9.
7.5 Indeterminism: biting the bullet
Until now we have spoken of non-deterministic explanations of deterministi-
cally produced events. In such cases, we can apply the ND model. But of
course there are – or at the very least there might be – cases of true indeter-
minism, cases where something simply happens without being determined by
any factor. The least controversial examples of true indeterminism are quan-
tum events such as the decay of a radioactive atom, and it is that example
which I will use in this section.
Suppose we are looking at a 229Np atom, an unstable isotope of Neptu-
nium with a half-life of 4 minutes. After 6 minutes and 22 seconds, the atom
decays. Can we explain that the atom decayed after precisely this interval?
Can we explain that the atom decayed within an hour? That it decayed
within one hundred years?
The determination theory implies that we cannot explain any of these
facts. Since there is no factor that determined that the atom would decay
at this rather than at another moment, there is nothing we can give as an
explanation for the exact moment of the decay, or even for the decay taking
place within three million years. This is hardly a novel position, and similar
sentiments have been expressed by, among others, Mellor 1976 [80], who
writes:
Sometimes, however, suitable causal explanation is not to be had.
An event may lack sufficient causes, as radioactive decay does.
(p. 235.)
and Van Fraassen 1980 [28], who says that the precise moment of radioactive
decay is “the sort of fact that atomic physics leaves unexplained” (p. 108).
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Does this mean we cannot explain anything about radioactive decay at
all? Is quantum mechanics without explanatory power? No, of course not,
for there are other explananda that we can explain using quantum mechanics.
For instance:
Why was the probability that this 229Np atom would decay within
8 minutes approximately 75% (rather than some other percent-
age)?
is exactly the kind of thing that quantum mechanical atomic theory sets out
to explain and does explain. The following three facts are explained as well:
Why was the probability that this 229Np atom would decay after
approximately 6 minutes and 22 seconds greater than zero (rather
than zero)?
Why was it possible (rather than impossible) for this 229Np atom
to decay after exactly 6 minutes and 22 seconds?
Why is it likely (rather than unlikely) that the emission rate of
this sample of 229Np will decrease by about 50% in 4 minutes?
The explananda in all of these explanatory requests are strictly determined
by (can be deduced from) the laws of quantum mechanics (and appropriate
other facts).
According to the determination theory, then, where true indeterminism
reigns we can explain probabilities and possibilities (if we have an appropriate
theory), but not the actual events themselves. This holds true even for
statistical amalgams of individual events, such as:
Why did approximately half of these 1014 229Np atoms decay in
four minutes?
for that is, after all, only one more actual event that, although very likely,
was not necessary.
With respect to indeterministic explanation I simply bite the bullet and
say that we do not understand why the atom decayed at a specific time,
and we do not even understand why it decayed within one thousand times
its half-life. When faced with an explanatory request concerning such an
event, we ought to reject them. In practice, we generally explain something
else – we explain why the event was possible, for instance, or why the event
was probable. Once we have done that, we may in a loose sense say that
we “understand something” about the event; but strictly speaking, we do
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not understand the explanandum; we merely understand some facts modally
relevant to the explanandum.
I thus agree with Jeffrey (1969) [53] that the probability we can deduce for
the explanandum is not a measure of how well we understand it. Suppose an
atom has a 0.99 probability of decaying within an hour, and a 0.01 probability
of not doing so. Will we have a better understanding of what happened when
it does decay then when it does not decay? No, says Jeffrey (and we have
already seen in section 7.2 that Salmon and the later Hempel agree with
him):
The strength of a statistical explanation . . . is not given by the de-
gree of confirmation that the premises bestow on the conclusion in
the corresponding Hempelian inductive inference. . . . The knowl-
edge that the process was random answers the question, ‘Why?’
– the answer is, ‘By chance’. . . . the explanation is basically the
same no matter what the outcome: it consists of a statement that
the process was a stochastic one, following such-and-such a law.
(One may gloss this statement by pointing out that the actual
outcome had such-and-such a probability, given the law of the
process; but this gloss is not the heart of the explanation.) ([53],
p. 109.)
I only add to this that “By chance” is not an explanation at all, but rather
an admission of explanatory defeat.7
7.6 Indeterminism: is it a bullet?
The claim that non-determined explananda cannot be explained has been
vigorously rejected by some philosophers. For instance, Salmon 1984 [110]
argues against “holding that events are explainable only to the extent that
they are fully determined”. His argument is that quantum mechanics “must
be admitted to provide genuine scientific explanations of a wide variety of
phenomena” (p. 53). But of course the two claims are not contradictory,
as my previous examples have shown. To explain why the probability of an
229Np atom decaying within 8 minutes is approximately 75%, is to provide
a genuine scientific explanation of an interesting phenomenon. The determi-
nation theory does not belittle quantum mechanics.
7To say that something happened “by chance” is to say that it “just happened”, which
is to say that it cannot be explained. It gives us more information – we now know that
there was no deterministic process that led to the event – but it does not give us more
understanding .
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A related argument given by Salmon is that the advent of quantum me-
chanics has made it imperative to change our idea of what a good explanation
is:
If we embrace indeterminism, we must adopt a suitable concep-
tion of explanation to go along with it. (Salmon 1998 [113], p. 42.)
But this is a non sequitur. A general theory of explanation must be able to
answer the question “If E is the result of an indeterministic process, can it
be explained?”; it is neither allowed to tell us that such processes exist, nor
allowed to suppose that they do not. Whether or not we believe our world to
be indeterministic is irrelevant to judging the success of a theory of explana-
tion. This doesn’t mean that changes in science cannot cause changes in the
philosophy of explanation; it is just hard to see how they could enter as argu-
ments into the debates. There is no logical connection between determinism
and the claim that only determined events can be explained. We can be-
lieve that the world is deterministic while also believing that indeterministic
events could be explained; and we can believe that the world is indetermin-
istic while believing that only determined events can be explained. A logical
link could be forged only by something like the claim that everything that
actually happens can be explained, i.e., something like the Principle of Suf-
ficient Reason – which Salmon would not wish to defend. There is no reason
to change the notion of explanation such that anything that is described by
modern science can be explained.
Hitchcock 1999 [47] goes as far as to claim that the idea that indetermin-
istically produced events can be explained “has become close to orthodoxy in
the philosophy of science to believe that indeterministic explanation is possi-
ble” (p. 585). As evidence for his claim he produces an impressive sequence
of articles that give “powerful arguments” that have helped us to repress our
deterministic intuitions: Hempel 1965 [41]; Jeffrey 1969, [53]; Salmon 1971
[108], 1984 [110]; Railton 1978 [97], 1981 [98]; Lewis 1986a [67], 1986b [68];
and Humphreys 1989 [51].
I do not believe there is an indeterminist orthodoxy here. It would, for
instance, be non-trivial to argue that Lewis 1986a (which does not talk about
determinism at all) and Lewis 1986b (which defends only indeterministic
causation) are meant to be combined into an account where explanation is
possible in situations were indeterminism is true. Indeed, Lewis 1986b claims
that there can be no explanation of why the particle decayed within an hour
rather than not:
[W]e are right to explain chance events, yet we are right also to
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deny that we can ever explain why a chance process yields one
outcome rather than another. (p. 230.)
Railton 1981 does defend the possibility of explanation by probabilistic
laws. Railton identifies an explanation with an “ideal explanatory text”,
which is, more or less, a list of all the events and laws relevant to deducing
the probability of a certain event. However, he writes:
[I]n cases of genuine probabilistic explanation there are certain
why-questions that simply do not have answers – questions as
to why one probability rather than another was realized in a
given case. We now are in a position to say what this comes to:
such why-questions are requests for information that is simply not
available – no part of even the ideal explanatory text contains a
sufficient reason why one probability was realized rather than
another. That is, this request for further explanation is refused,
not because we do not know enough, but because there is simply
nothing more to be known. (p. 248.)
Thus, Railton claims that explanatory requests like “Why did the atom decay
now, rather than at some other moment?” have no answer and are to be
refused – which is exactly what I claim when I say that there is no explanation
of the fact that the atom decayed now rather than at some other moment.
Lewis and Railton both believe that chance events can be explained, but
that contrastive why-questions that ask why the event happened rather than
not cannot be answered. Thus, there can be non-contrastive explanations
of events that were not determined, but no contrastive explanations of why
those events happened rather than not. Since I have argued earlier that all
explanations are contrastive explanations, Lewis’s and Railton’s theses on
indeterminism agree with mine. (We disagree about the existence of non-
contrastive explanations, but this topic has been discussed in chapter 5.)
Hitchcock 1999 [47] sets out to show that Lewis and Railton are wrong in
thinking that contrastive explanation is any different from non-contrastive
explanation, and that in both cases non-determined events can be explained.
His account, then, is particularly important for our discussion, and I wish to
focus on his arguments for the rest of this section. However, one problem of
coming to grips with it is that Hitchcock assumes that his readers already
accept that indeterministic non-contrastive explanation is possible – but I
do not accept this, since I do not believe that non-contrastive explanation
exists. Nevertheless, he gives four counterexamples to my thesis that inde-
terministically produced (contrastive) events cannot be explained, and it will
be instructive to look at these.
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Hitchcock’s first counterexample concerns the explanatory question “Why
did Jones, rather than Smith, get paresis?”. The answers is that Jones
had untreated syphilis, and thus a small chance of getting paresis; while
Smith did not have untreated syphilis, and thus no chance at all of getting
paresis. Hitchcock believes this to be a satisfactory answer to the question.
Hitchcock’s second counterexample is a variant of the first, but more clearly
indeterministic. The question is “Why did this photon, rather than that
other one, go through the screen?”, and the answer is that the first had
(because of its polarisation) a small probability of going through the screen
while the second had no chance at all.
Such examples were discussed in section 5.1, where I argued that rather
than normal contrastive explananda, the why-questions in these cases involve
a contrast of parallels. I also argued that a contrast of parallels probably
involves giving a satisfactory answer to both of the contrasted parallels. In
this case, that would involve giving an explanation of why the second photon
did not go through the screen (rather than going through it), which is easy;
but also giving an explanation of why the first photon did go through the
screen (rather than not going through it), which is, on my account impossible.
Hence, there is no good answer to this why-question.
I am perfectly happy with this conclusion, but in section 5.2 I offered
an alternative for those who believe that Hitchcock’s examples are good
explanations. The alternative consists in saying that answering a contrast of
parallels involves only giving a satisfactory answer to one of the contrasted
parallels. This alternative can be used to reconcile the Hitchcockian intuition
with the determination theory, since there were causes that determined that
the second photon would not go through the screen.
Hitchcock’s third and fourth counterexamples do not involve a contrast of
parallels. In the third example, we explain why Lewis went to Monash rather
than to Uppsala by pointing out that he had an invitation for Monash, but
not an invitation for Uppsala, and that he never goes anywhere if he doesn’t
have an invitation. We accept this explanation, says Hitchcock, even though
we do not know whether the invitation determined Lewis to go to Monash
– the possibility of his staying in Princeton is left wide open. This does not
invalidate the explanation, hence, determination is not necessary.
According to condition 2 of the determination theory, we are entitled to
assume that only the elements in the contrast class are possibilities. The
explanatory request “Why did Lewis go to Monash rather than to Uppsala?”
presupposes that he would go to either, and we are allowed to use this as a
premise in our explanation. Given the premises of our explanation, then, it
was indeed determined that Lewis would not stay in Princeton; hence, the
counterexample is not a counterexample at all. (Hitchcock might actually
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agree with my criticism of this third example. A large part of his own article
is devoted to developing the idea of explanatory presuppositions, including
those of contrastive explanations, and everything he says there is compatible
with what I say in this paragraph. What is more, in the example he discusses
on page 604 he makes an argument almost identical to the one I make here.)
The fourth counterexample involves a photon polarised in the vertical di-
rection. The probability of transmission of this photon is zero if the polariser
is aligned horizontally, and increases to one as the polariser is turned towards
the vertical. Now, suppose I believe that the polariser is aligned horizontally;
the photon, however, passes through, and I am very surprised. “Why did the
photon pass the polariser, rather than being absorbed?”, I ask.
I tell you that the polarizer was in fact extremely close to the
vertical, making it vastly more likely that the photon would be
transmitted than that it would be absorbed. Have I not answered
your question? (Hitchcock 1999 [47], p. 592.)
The only way in which this example differs from the example of the decaying
atom is that in this case, I believe that E is impossible, and E nevertheless
happens. I am puzzled about the very possibility of the event – and of course
this possibility can be explained, since the actual position of the polariser de-
termines the event to be possible (and indeed likely) rather than impossible.
Perhaps that is why the answer in the example may seem, at first glance,
satisfactory: because it explains the possibility of the event. But the explicit
question which I ask, why the photon passed rather than being absorbed, is
not answered and cannot be answered. If this has been granted to us in the
case of the decaying atom, it will also be granted here.
It seems then that the four counterexamples given by Hitchcock do not
pose a problem to the determination theory. Of course, this does not prove
that the determination theory is correct. All I have been trying to show in
this section is that it is possible to hold that non-determined events cannot
be explained; not that it is necessary to hold this thesis. This is, I think,
enough: if the determination theory can handle all cases of explanation, it
can be judged a success. There is no additional need to prove that no other
theory can do so.
But let us spend a few moments looking at Hitchcock’s own alternative:
To provide a contrastive explanation is to provide information
that is explanatorily relevant to the explanandum, given the pre-
supposition that is expressed by the contrast. The notion of ex-
planatory relevance given a presupposition can be modeled by,
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although probably not reduced to, probabilistic relevance condi-
tional upon the presupposition. (Hitchcock 1999 [47], p. 608.)
I accept everything Hitchcock says here as a necessary condition for explana-
tion. If X rather than X ′ determines that E rather than E ′, the occurrence of
X must be probabilistically relevant to the occurrence of E given the presup-
positions that E∨E ′ and X∨X ′. (The probability of E given X is 1, whereas
this same probability given X ′ must be lower than 1.) I do not accept that
Hitchcock’s analysis is sufficient. In addition, we need a relation between X
and E that allows for manipulation of E through X, and (more relevant in
the present section) the probability of E given X (and the further elements
of the explanans) must be 1. Until convincing examples are brought forward
that show this final clause to be unnecessary, the determination theory can
be accepted.
7.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have defended the determination theory against the charge
that there are non-deterministic explanations. I will continue to do so in
chapter 8, where I discuss Michael Strevens’s claim that many determined
events are best explained probabilistically even when a deterministic expla-
nation is available.
In chapter 9 we will turn to several further elucidations of the determi-
nation theory. There we discuss whether all explanations are arguments, the
role of laws and regularities in explanation, the plurality of explanations, and
the distinction between explanation and understanding.
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Chapter 8
Indeterministic Explanation II
8.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we will be looking at indeterministic explanations of de-
terministically produced events. (A deterministically produced event is an
event that is the outcome of a deterministic process. An indeterministic ex-
planation is an explanation where the explanans does not deductively imply
the explanandum, but implies a high probability of the explanandum.) The
question is not whether such explanations exist : it seems clear that they do,
and that they are in fact widely used. We know that birth-control pills do
not work in all cases; we also strongly suspect that there is an underlying de-
terministic mechanism that is responsible for their working in some cases and
not in others. Nevertheless, when asked “Why did Mary not get pregnant?”,
we may answer “Because she used birth-control pills, and the probability
of getting pregnant when you use birth control pills is very low.” This is
an indeterministic explanation for what we believe to be a deterministically
produced event.
What we want to know is how good these explanations are, and specifi-
cally, whether it is possible that the best explanation of a deterministically
produced event E is indeterministic. Presumably, most philosophers would
say that if we were to find out exactly why the pills did work for Mary (even
though they did not work for some others), then the deterministic explana-
tion which incorporated these details would be more explanatory, would give
us more total understanding of the situation, than would the indeterminis-
tic explanation. That is, most philosophers would say that indeterministic
explanations of determined events are, qua how much they explain, second-
rate explanations, although we can have excellent pragmatic reasons to prefer
them.
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However, Michael Strevens has argued in his recent book Depth: An
Account of Scientific Explanation [132] that in some circumstances indeter-
ministic explanations are strictly better than deterministic ones; that we
should prefer them even if a deterministic explanation is available. “Often
the objectively best explanation of a phenomenon is a nonsimple probabilis-
tic explanation. In particular, a complex probabilistic explanation is often
better than a deterministic explanation, regardless of the epistemic, practi-
cal, and other circumstances.” (Strevens 2008 [132], p. 365.) In this chapter
I will consider his claims and argue that, to the contrary, deterministic ex-
planations of determined events should always be preferred.
8.2 Preliminary argument: Galápagos finches
Before we start our discussion of Strevens’s main argument – which will turn
out to be a long and often technical journey into the realm of microconstant
processes and macroperiodic distributions of initial conditions – I wish to
present and criticise a much simpler argument that Strevens gives in support
of his thesis that indeterministic explanations are often to be preferred to
deterministic ones. This argument consists in pointing out that scientists
often do prefer them because they fit better into the most celebrated scientific
theories. Let us consider Strevens’s example.
Why was a drought on Daphne Major (one of the Galápagos islands)
in 1976 followed by an increase of the average beak size of finches on that
island? The explanation given by Grant 1986 [35] is that during a drought
the only food left on the island is large, tough-to-crack nuts. Finches with
large beaks have a much easier time cracking these nuts, which means that
they have a greater chance of survival. A standard evolutionary argument
allows us to conclude that the average beak size will increase in the next
generation. This completes the explanation. It is obviously indeterministic.
All the large-beaked finches could have died, either through starvation or
through other causes. Greater fitness does not guarantee a higher survival
rate, it merely makes it more probable.
The important question for our purposes is whether it would be better or
worse to give a deterministic explanation of the same event, an explanation
that in this case would detail all the events that determined the survival
of each of the individual finches, and the production and survival of their
offspring. Strevens claims that such an explanation would be worse:
A fitter variant’s replacing a less fit variant is to be explained,
then, by citing the factors in virtue of which the strike ratios for
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survival and reproduction are higher for the victorious than for
the vanquished variant. Any more detail degrades the explana-
tion. Darwinian explanation is not probabilistic because of our
laziness or ignorance [...] [but] will always be, and should always
be, probabilistic. ([132], p. 390)
In this example the explanandum E is: “The average beak size of finches
on Daphne Major increased after the 1976 drought”. This fact can be ex-
plained both by an indeterministic explanation involving fitness, and by a
deterministic explanation that follows the actual adventures of all the birds
on Daphne Major in 1976. Is it true, as Strevens claims, that the indeter-
ministic explanation (which I will call IE) is better than the deterministic
one (which I will call DE)?
Strevens would certainly have been right had he claimed that IE can be
published in an academic journal, while DE would never be accepted; or that
IE will make it into standard biology text books, whereas DE will not. But
in these cases, IE is preferred not because it better explains E. IE elucidates
and supports the theory of Darwinian selection, and can be easily generalised
to yield predictions about what will happen to the finches on Daphne Major
when the next drought strikes. DE, on the other hand, does not contain the
central terms of the Darwinian theory (such as fitness), does not (necessarily)
allow us to predict what will happen in future droughts, and does not serve
to elucidate and support Darwin’s theory. These differences are certainly
enough to explain why biologists are more interested in IE than in DE, and
why they might not even consider DE part of biological science. After all,
specific biological events are of interest to scientists only when they can be
put within a theoretical framework and related to other biological event.
But – and this is crucial – elucidating Darwin’s theory, predicting what
will happen in future droughts, interrelating distant biological events, and
so on, although activities of great scientific value and importance, are not
part of explaining E, the specific fact that the average beak size of finches
on Daphne Major increased after the 1976 drought.
It is all too easy to be misled by our preference for general explanations.
Especially in science, we are rarely interested in particular facts. Biologists
try to understand the change in beak size on a particular island in a partic-
ular year not because this is an event that they find inherently interesting,
but because they hope to generalise that understanding into a broader un-
derstanding of the processes that have shaped and continue to shape life.
After all, what is the biologist trying to understand when he (or she) investi-
gates the Galápagos finches? He is trying to understand the mechanisms of
Darwinian evolution; and in order to understand these, he creates and tests
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an explanation that mentions these mechanisms. Given that this is what
interests him, it is natural that he seeks to gain only that understanding of
the Galápagos finches which can be generalised. Therefore, the biologist will
vastly prefer IE over DE, quite apart from the question which of the two
gives more understanding of the particular fact under consideration.
Someone who is not interested in Darwinian selection as such, but really
wants to understand the particular fact that the average beak size of finches
on Daphne Major increased between 1976 and 1977, would be interested in
more aspects of the situation than the biologist. For this person, it is relevant
to know that if the large-beaked finches 3, 16, 35 and 121 had not escaped
from nearly fatal encounters with predators, the average beak size would
have decreased rather than increased. This fact, although uninteresting to
the biologist, is nevertheless a bona fide difference maker. Knowing about this
difference maker increases my understanding of why the beak size increased
on this particular island in this particular year. DE gives us these facts;
IE does not. Therefore, DE is the better explanation of the explanandum in
Strevens’s example. (The presuppositions of this argument will be considered
at length in the rest of the chapter.)
An interesting corollary of this discussion is that science rarely aims to
find the best explanations of individual events; it aims to find the best expla-
nations of general patterns (or general patterns of explanation, the difference
between the two being often only metaphysical). It then evaluates particu-
lar explanations on the basis of whether they can be generalised to explain
general patterns (or become general patterns of explanation). In so far as
the patterns are indeterministic (and they will often be, perhaps even always
in the special sciences), science will prefer indeterministic explanations. So
Strevens is right when he claims that “Darwinian explanation ... will always
be, and should always be, probabilistic”; but he is right not because indi-
vidual biological events are best explained indeterministically, but because
an explanation is not Darwinian unless it uses probabilistic terms such as
‘fitness’.
8.3 Strevens’s theory of explanation
We have seen that Strevens’s thesis cannot be established by showing that
scientists prefer indeterministic explanations. After all, the scientist is often
more interested in constructing and testing general theories than in explain-
ing certain particular facts. But the empirical argument is not Strevens’s
most important one. Before we go to the main argument, though, it will be
useful to give a quick summary of his ‘kairetic’ theory of explanation. We
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will first talk about deterministic explanations.
An attempt at a deterministic kairetic explanation of an event
e begins with a veridical, deterministic atomic causal model for
e. That the model is deterministic and causal means that (a)
the setup of the model entails the target e, and (b) this entail-
ment mirrors a real-world relation of causal production. Such
a model is subjected to the optimizing procedure; the result is
an explanatory kernel, a model containing only factors relevant
to the explanandum. A standalone explanation is built from ex-
planatory kernels. (Strevens 2008 [132], p. 358)
Explaining e starts by constructing a veridical, atomistic, causal model.
An atomistic model consists of (propositions affirming the existence of) two
or more states of affairs or events, one of which is the explanandum e, and
at least one generalisation, where this generalisation and the non-e states of
affairs together deductively entail e. In addition, the model must be veridical
(which means that all statements occurring in it are true), and the entailment
must be causal.
To define causal entailment, Strevens takes the relation of ‘causal influ-
ence’ as primitive. Causal influence is the relation that holds between any
cause and its effects, and it is specifically not a relation of causal relevance.
The planet Mars has some gravitational effect (albeit a very small one) on
a ball thrown on earth; this effect varies with Mars’s exact position; and
therefore the exact position of Mars stands in the relation of causal influence
to the shattering of a window hit by the ball. By contrast, the exact position
of Mars makes no difference to the shattering of the window (had Mars been
at any other position near its actual one, the ball would still have shattered
the window), and is therefore not causally relevant to the shattering.
A causal entailment is an entailment every step of which “corresponds” to
an actual relation of causal influence, which means that the (states of affairs
whose existence is affirmed in the) premises are causal influences on the
conclusion by virtue of the (law given in the) generalisation. An entailment
from the throwing of the ball, the position of Mars, and Newton’s laws, to
a shattering of the window is a causal entailment. An entailment in the
other direction would not be a causal entailment, since the shattering of the
window is not a causal influence on the throwing of the ball. (Strevens treats
the topic in much more detail: Strevens 2008 [132], pp. 74-83.)
This first step leaves us with a model that causally entails the explanan-
dum, but which may contain an immense amount of irrelevant information
(like the position of Mars, or the fact that the ball was orange, neither of
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which makes a difference to the shattering). We get rid of these irrelevancies
in the optimising procedure, where everything that is irrelevant to the actual
obtaining of e is removed. Each premise that isn’t necessary for deriving
the explanandum must be removed and all the premises must be made as
abstract as possible – as abstract, that is, as is compatible with the model
remaining veridical, causal and deterministic. Abstraction here means loss
of (logical) content: a proposition p is more abstract than a proposition q
just in case q implies p but not vice versa. The idea is that everything that
remains in the model after removal and abstraction is a real difference maker
for, and therefore an explainer of, the explanandum.
In our example the gravitational influence of Mars and the colour of the
ball would be removed from the model, since they are irrelevant to the break-
ing of the window. (In order to maintain entailment, it might be necessary
to add a single, very abstract proposition saying that all unmentioned in-
fluences are negligible.) In addition, the optimising procedure will abstract
away from the precise mass and speed of the ball, leaving only the proposi-
tion that the ball’s momentum is greater than some threshold value needed
to shatter the window. (The optimising procedure, which does most of the
work in Strevens’s account of explanation, faces grave problems – see Gijsbers
2009 [32]. However, these problems are not relevant for this chapter.)
When we have optimised a veridical, atomistic, causal model of e, we
have what Strevens calls an explanatory kernel for e. Such a kernel is an
explanation of e; and more complex explanations of e can be constructed by
stringing such kernels together.
The indeterministic case is almost equivalent. The major difference is
that the premises of a probabilistic causal entailment do not entail the con-
clusion, but only entail a certain probability for the conclusion. All things
being equal, the higher this probability, the better the explanation, with the
deterministic case being the optimum. However, Strevens will argue that all
things are not equal, and that under certain circumstances, a loss in proba-
bility is more than compensated for by an increase in relevance. We will see
this argument unfold in the next section.
8.4 Microconstancy and macroperiodicity
According to Strevens, there are three types of explanation of deterministi-
cally produced events: low-level deterministic explanations, high-level deter-
ministic explanations and indeterministic explanations. (Not all events can
be explained using all three types.) In order to discuss these types with clar-
ity, he introduces the concepts of microconstancy and macroperiodicity, and
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elucidates these using the example of a wheel of fortune (Strevens 2008 [132],
p. 370 ff; see also Strevens 2003 [129], 2005 [131].). We will follow Strevens.
Imagine a wheel of fortune that has alternating red and black sections,
and assume that the section in which the pointer will come to rest is a
function of nothing but the wheel’s initial spin speed v (the wheel is reset to
the same starting position after every spin). Assume furthermore that there
is a probability distribution over v that gives the probability that a spin will
have a speed between any two values of v. Strevens then argues that if the
wheel is ‘microconstant’ with strike ratio p, and if the probability distribution
is ‘macroperiodic’, it logically follows that there is a high probability that
the long-run frequency of red outcomes will be approximately p after a large
number of trials.
What are microconstancy and macroperiodicity? Strevens most rigor-
ously defines these notions in Strevens 2003 [129]. Since one of the main
questions in what follows will be when macroperiodicity is well-defined, it is
crucial to follow this more rigorous discussion. I will shorten and rephrase
it; the curious reader should check out pp. 127-132 of Strevens 2003 [129].
Microconstancy: Let S be a function from a metric space I of initial con-
ditions to a space of two possible outcomes (which we will call ‘red’
and ‘black’). We will call all points in I which are mapped onto the
outcome ‘red’ ‘red points’; and all points in I which are mapped onto
the outcome ‘black’ ‘black points’.
S is microconstant with respect to a partition U of I into measurable
subsets of non-zero measure if:
1. Every set U in U is contiguous.
2. Every set U in U has the same strike ratio, where the strike ratio
is the measure of the set that contains all red points in U divided
by the total measure of U .1
Informally, a function S is microconstant just in case we can carve up the
space of initial conditions such that each part has the same ratio of red to
black points. In the case of the wheel of fortune, we may expect that as
v increases, we will have alternating red and black sections which are the
same size as their neighbours. Here S (the map from v to the outcome space
{red, black}) would be microconstant, since we can cut up I into pieces that
1I have written “if” instead of “if and only if” because our current definition is some-
what too restrictive to capture Strevens’s pre-mathematical idea. For the purposes of this
chapter, however, we can continue as if the conditions we have given are necessary as well
as sufficient.
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comprise one neighbouring red and black section. For each such piece of I,
the strike ratio would be 0.5: red is exactly as likely as black.
The reader may notice that the definition of microconstancy we have just
given is trivial (as long as I is contiguous and measurable, and the sets of
red and black points are measurable as well). We can always cut up I into
exactly one piece, namely I; and in that case all pieces of I will of course
have the same strike ratio. This problem will be solved when we define
macroperiodicity, so without further ado:
Macroperiodicity: Let P be a probability distribution on a metric space
I of initial conditions. Then P is (approximately) macroperiodic with
respect to a microconstant function S on I if (and only if) there is a
partition U of I such that:
1. S is microconstant with respect to U.
2. For all U in U, P is (approximately) constant over U .
Informally, a probability distribution is macroperiodic with respect to a mi-
croconstant function just in case it changes slowly compared to the size of
red and black regions. A macroperiodic distribution does not have significant
peaks or dips that lie solely within a red or a black region. This means that
the relative probability of two neighbouring regions will be roughly equal to
their relative size: in whatever general area of I we are, the chance of getting
a red outcome is p.
I will not prove it here, but if the probability distribution over the initial
conditions of an experiment is macroperiodic with respect to the outcome
function, we can deduce that the probability of getting red is equal to the
strike ratio. We will shortly see that Strevens also claims that we can explain
the probability by citing the microconstancy and the macroperiodicity.
In most realistic systems, we will have approximate rather than full
macroperiodicity. How this is to be defined exactly will not concern us here;
throughout this chapter, we will make no difference between full and approx-
imate macroperiodicity.
8.5 Three types of explanation
We now return to Strevens’s example of the wheel of fortune. We will assume
that the probability distribution over the initial spin speeds is macroperiodic,
and we will also assume that the laws that determine the motion of the wheel
and the paint scheme are such that the map from the space of initial spin
speeds to the space of outcomes is microconstant with strike ratio p = 0.5.
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Imagine that the wheel is spun 500 times. Let E be the event that, of
these 500 spins, between 200 and 300 end up pointing to a red section of the
wheel. E is of course an extremely likely outcome of the experiment, and
we will suppose that it actually takes place. What explanations of E can we
give in this situation? Why does the number of red outcomes lie between 200
and 300? According to Strevens, there are three general types of explanation
that can be given:
1. A low-level deterministic explanation. We detail the initial spin
speed of all of the trials with just the precision necessary to entail in
which section the pointer will end. We also give a precise description
of the causal mechanisms which determine how quickly the wheel slows
down, and we describe where the boundaries of the red and black sec-
tions are. Together, this information entails the outcome of each spin
of the wheel; and therefore it entails E.
2. A statistical deterministic explanation. We first state the macrope-
riodicity of the actual initial velocities (the set of actually chosen initial
velocities, not the probability distribution over them – we will say much
more about this later), and we then state the physical properties by
virtue of which the wheel of fortune is microconstant with p = 0.5. To-
gether these facts entail E. We do not specify the causal mechanisms
by which the wheel spins down, the actual physical places of the red
and black boundaries, or any other details of the physical situations –
nor do we need to in order to deduce and explain E.
3. An indeterministic explanation (which Strevens calls a “microcon-
stant explanation”). We first state that the set of outcomes are the
outcomes of a wheel of fortune. We then state that outcomes of a
wheel of fortune have a high probability of being macroperiodically dis-
tributed. Finally, we state the physical properties by virtue of which
the wheel of fortune is microconstant with p = 0.5. From this, we can
deduce that with high probability, E.
According to Strevens, there is a hierarchy of explanatory goodness among
these explanations: the indeterministic explanation is slightly better than
the statistical deterministic one; and both are far superior to the low-level
deterministic explanation. This, of course, is the claim that I want to examine
and dispute.
We will first focus on Strevens’s claim that the statistical deterministic
explanation is better than the low-level deterministic explanation. It does in
fact follow from his theory of explanation that this is the case. The first thing
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we must see is that the premises of the statistical deterministic explanation
are entailed by the premises of the low-level deterministic explanation. That
the actual distribution of initial velocities is macroperiodic must be implied
by the full characterisation of the initial velocities; and the physics of the
wheel plus the paint scheme will entail that the wheel of fortune is microcon-
stant with p = 0.5. Thus, the low-level deterministic explanation contains
strictly more information than the statistical deterministic explanation; and
yet they lead to the same conclusion, namely, E. But we have seen that ac-
cording to Strevens, explanation involves an optimising procedure that takes
away as much information as possible while leaving the entailment intact.
Consequently, the low-level deterministic explanation must be defective: if it
had been optimised thoroughly, its irrelevancies would have been removed,
and the statistical deterministic explanation would have resulted.
My counterargument will be technically involved, but simple in intent:
I wish to show that the statistical deterministic explanation does not exist.
And not only is there no statistical deterministic explanation of E, there
are no statistical deterministic explanations at all. If these do not exist, the
argument that shows that low-level deterministic explanations are defective
immediately disappears.
8.6 The statistical deterministic explanation
does not exist
8.6.1 The problem
We must now notice a problem that besets the statistical deterministic and
the indeterministic explanation. The statistical deterministic explanation has
as one of its premises that the actual initial velocities are macroperiodically
distributed. The indeterministic explanation has as one of its premises that
the set of actual initial velocities of a wheel of fortune have a high probability
of being macroperiodically distributed. But, and this is the problem, the set
of actual initial velocities is not a probability distribution, and therefore
cannot be macroperiodic in the way that Strevens and I have defined it.2
I will argue that this problem is fatal for the statistical deterministic
explanation: there is no redefinition of macroperiodicity that will allow us to
successfully apply the concept to sets of actual initial conditions. (This is not
fatal for the indeterministic explanation, since it can easily be rephrased to
2Strevens’s ideas of microconstancy and macroperiodicity have been discussed by other
authors; see, for instance, Kronz 2005 [61] and Sklar 2006 [125]. These discussions do not
bear on our current problem.
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mention the macroperiodicity of the probability distribution P rather than
the macroperiodicity of the set of actual initial conditions.) In order to show
this, I wish to consider some prima facie promising ways of extending the
definition of macroperiodicity to sets of outcomes.
What are the minimal requirements for a definition of the macroperiod-
icity of a set of actual initial conditions? At least the following three:
1. The definition must be strong enough to support the entailment in
the statistical deterministic explanation. Macroperiodicity plus micro-
constancy must entail E, otherwise we do not have a deterministic
explanation.
2. The definition must be such that the resulting entailment is an expla-
nation. (We cannot have the conclusion as one of the premises, for
instance.)
3. The definition must be fulfilled by all (or at least most) ‘typical’ sets of
initial conditions generated by a macroperiodic experiment. Otherwise,
we are not giving a definition of macroperiodicity.
Can we find such a definition?
8.6.2 Attempts to define macroperiodicity
It is perhaps most promising to start with the set of actual initial conditions,
give an algorithm to generate a probability distribution from it, then check
whether this probability distribution is macroperiodic. Let {O1, O2, . . . , ON}
be a set of N points in I. Let P ′(x) be some function that maps all points
x ∈ I to probability distributions over I that peak at x and monotonically
decrease as the distance from x becomes greater. We can then create a
probability distribution P from the set O through the following definition:
P (x) =
N∑
n=1
P ′(On)
N
. (8.1)
Informally, what we have done is taken every actual initial condition and
replaced it by a little probability bump. This means that in areas where many
of the actual initial conditions were found, the probability in our distribution
will be high; and in areas were few of the actual initial conditions were found,
the probability in our distribution will be low. We now define that the set O is
macroperiodic if and only if P (x) is a macroperiodic probability distribution
with respect to the outcome function S.
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Is there a P ′(x) for which this definition meets both the requirements
given above? For simplicity, we will discuss only the example of the wheel
of fortune. Suppose first that P ′(x) is a wide distribution compared to the
average distance from a red point to the nearest black point, or from a black
point to the nearest red point. In that case, it is easy to get a macroperiodic
distribution P (x), since the value of P (x) will tend not to vary much between
neighbouring black and red areas. Indeed, it is too easy to get a macroperi-
odic distribution: even if all the actual initial conditions lie in red areas, we
would still have a macroperiodic P (x). Thus, there would be no entailment
from macroperiodicity to getting the expected number of red outcomes.
Suppose then that P ′(x) is a narrow distribution compared to the aver-
age distance from a red point to the nearest black point. (We will look at
distributions that are tailor-made to distribute probability only over the red
or black section in which the point falls later.) Now the problem is that it is
much too difficult to generate a macroperiodic distribution P (x). Remember
that a macroperiodic distribution does not vary appreciably over any mem-
ber U of U. If our P ′(x) is narrow, this means that each neighbouring pair of
red and black sections must contain points in the ratio p
1−p . This will almost
never happen. It cannot happen if N is small compared to the number of
sections, and we still do no expect it to happen if N is large (but not very
large) compared to the number of sections.
This is a problem for three reasons. First, it would make the statistical
deterministic explanation unavailable in many real-world situations. Second,
it would fail to meet requirement 3 mentioned above. And third, there must
be something wrong with a definition of macroperiodicity that can be instan-
tiated only when the number of sections is small compared to the number
of trials, because it is obvious from our initial discussion of macroperiodic
probability distributions that macroperiodicity is easier to achieve when the
number of sections is larger.3 We must be on the wrong track entirely.
Instead of generating a probability distribution from O, we might want to
check whether O is a probable distribution given P . (I will assume that we
already know what P is; if we do not, even fewer strategies are open to us.)
But if the number of points in I is large compared to the number of trials
– and this will always be the case if our initial conditions are real-valued
– almost all sets will be equally likely. This problem can be circumvented
3But isn’t it the case that statistical explanations will work only when the number of
trials is large compared to the number of outcomes? Yes, but outcomes and sections are
not the same. In our example, whatever the number of sections, there are exactly two
outcomes: “red” and “black”. We can thus give a statistical explanation of the (expected)
result of a set of five hundred wheel of fortune spins because five hundred is much bigger
than two. The number of sections is irrelevant to this.
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only by cutting I up into pieces, and counting the number of actual initial
conditions that fall into each of the pieces. However, that is merely a variant
of the previous method, with all the same problems associated with it.
A third possibility would be to check whether O is likely to have been
generated from a macroperiodic distribution, that is, whether it is probable
given O that the probability distribution that generated O is macroperiodic.
The step from outcomes to the probability of the underlying distribution is
not trivial, but might be made with a kind of Bayesian updating. Now the
probability distributions that most increase in probability, given O, will not
be macroperiodic probability distributions but distributions that are sharply
peaked at the values found in O. So looking at the greatest increase in proba-
bility will never give a macroperiodic distribution. Alternatively, we may look
at the most likely distribution. But either the macroperiodic distributions
did not start out with a higher initial probability than the non-macroperiodic
ones, in which case the greatest increase in probability equals the greatest
final probability, and a non-macroperiodic distribution will always win; or
the macroperiodic distributions did start out with an advantage, in which
case small sets of trials will always come out as being macroperiodic, even
when all of them lead to red outcomes.4
Looking at specific proposals has given us more insight in the difficulties
that we encounter when we try to speak about a macroperiodic set of initial
conditions. But we can also give a general argument against all these ap-
proaches, namely, that no distribution of points can imply that the expected
ratio of black and red outcomes has been achieved unless detailed knowledge
about S is added. For even if the points are perfectly distributed over I,
and even if they are perfectly distributed within each member of U, there is
nothing to stop them from all being red points or all being black points. S,
after all, can be any distribution of black and red as long as these colours
appear in the same ratio within each member of U. So it is impossible to get
the entailment we need without using detailed knowledge of how S divides
I into red and black regions. Let us look at definitions of macroperiodicity
that use such detailed knowledge of S next.
8.6.3 Further attempts
No finite set of points in I, no matter how randomly distributed, is guaranteed
to lead to the expected ratio of red to black outcomes. We must have detailed
4Yet another alternative is to check whether the total probability of macroperiodic
distributions exceeds the total probability of non-macroperiodic distributions. Evaluating
this proposal would be technically more involved, and is unnecessary given the more general
arguments to which we will now proceed.
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knowledge of S in order to define a property that does guarantee this ratio.
The most straightforward approach would be to say that a set of points
is macroperiodically distributed if and only if for all U ∈ U, the ratio of red
points to black points is approximately p
1−p , with p the strike ratio. But of
course this does not work. That I can be cut up into many parts that all
have the expected ratio of red to black points implies that the total ratio is
the expected ratio, but it does not explain it. The explanation is not exactly
circular, but it is utterly unenlightening. Hearing that there are more red
cars than black cars in each European country does not make us understand
why there are more red cars than black cars in Europe.
Can we give a general argument that shows that any definition of macro-
periodicity that involves a precise knowledge of S is bound to be unexplana-
tory? I think we can.
Remember that Strevens’s theory is a theory of causal explanation. Both
he and I believe that any good explanation of the outcomes of a wheel of
fortune must be a causal explanation, and in Strevens’s terminology this
means that the entailment that forms the core of the explanation must be a
causal entailment. This more or less means that we deduce an effect from its
causes.
Let us think of the indeterministic explanation for a moment. Here, we
talk about the macroperiodicity of a probability function. In the case of a
physical process like spinning a wheel of fortune, this macroperiodicity is a
physical property of those things that spin the wheel – properties of me and
my muscles and my brain, for instance. Stating that the probability function
over the initial spin speeds is macroperiodic is stating a high-level physical
fact about me and my interaction with the wheel of fortune. In the same way,
the microconstancy of the wheel of fortune is a high-level physical fact about
the wheel. These two high-level physical facts will with high probability
cause a set of outcomes where red occurs in a fraction p of the cases. Thus,
there is causal entailment.
But now return to the deterministic statistical explanation. Here the
macroperiodicity of a set of initial conditions is not a high-level physical
property of the process that produced them, just as the fact that a die came
up 6 is not a physical property of the process of rolling a die. Instead, it is
a functional property of this instantiation of the process, but Strevens and I
agree (Strevens 2008 [132], pp. 386-388) that functional properties like these
do not explain the outcomes of wheel spins or die tosses. The fact that a
die toss had “initial conditions which led to the die coming up 6” does not
explain why the die came up 6. Why not? Because here we have a purely
logical, not a causal entailment. Strevens writes:
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Now, in order for the model to be a causal model, the entailment
must be a causal entailment, which is to say that the properties
figuring in the premises must play a part in the entailment that
reflects their role in the causal production of the outcome. It
is this condition that is not satisfied in the fully functionalized
model. The course of the causal events is as follows: the spin
speed, in virtue of its magnitude and various physical properties
of the wheel, determines a final resting place for the wheel. The
final resting place, in virtue of the position of the pointer and
the wheel’s paint scheme, determines the outcome, red or black.
The paint scheme enters into the causal story only once the final
resting place is determined, then, so it should not enter into the
deduction of the outcome until the final resting place is deduced.
(Strevens 2008 p. 387.)
Strevens is absolutely right: the paint scheme cannot enter into our ex-
planation before the resting place of the wheel is determined. If it does, we
can be sure that a causal entailment has been turned into a logical entailment
through functional properties. But of course the paint scheme is S, and we
have already shown that S must enter the definition of the macroperiodicity
of a set of initial conditions – if it does not, we cannot get entailment of the
explanandum.
On Strevens’s own theory of explanation, then, the statistical determin-
istic explanation must fail either because it does not entail the explanandum
(and is therefore not a deterministic explanation), or because it is a functional
pseudo-explanation. In other words, statistical deterministic explanation is
impossible. Such explanations do not exist.
8.7 The low-level deterministic explanation
is not irrelevant
If the statistical deterministic explanation does not exist, it no longer follows
that the low-level deterministic explanation contains irrelevant information.
Perhaps all the information it contains is needed to causally entail the fact
that approximately 500 of the 1000 trials with the wheel of fortune ended up
red. Strevens does not believe this to be the case:
[The low-level model] contains far more detail than is neces-
sary to entail the frequency; it is therefore, unlike the [indeter-
ministic] model, bloated with causal irrelevancies. For example,
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whereas the low-level model must concern itself with the mag-
nitudes of. . . the frictional forces acting on the wheel, the [in-
deterministic] model needs state just the physical properties of
the wheel in virtue of which the forces have a circular symme-
try. . . . The frictional details are therefore causally irrelevant to
the frequency – only the physical basis of the frictional symmetry
matters – yet the low-level model cites the details all the same.
([132], pp. 380-381)
Before we attempt to decide whether the low-level model contains irrele-
vancies, we must do two things. First, we must use Strevens’s own theory of
explanation to construct the best possible low-level explanation. Second, we
must say what we mean by irrelevancies.
Remember that this was our initial characterisation of the low-level ex-
planation: “We detail the initial spin speed of all of the trials with just the
precision necessary to entail in which section the pointer will end. We also
give a precise description of the causal mechanisms which determine how
quickly the wheel slows down, and we describe where the boundaries of the
red and black sections are. Together, this information entails the outcome of
each spin of the wheel; and therefore it entails E.”
Is this the best low-level deterministic explanation that is available? In
Strevens’s book, a good explanation is one that is as abstract as possible.
Have we gone far enough in our abstraction of the low-level explanation, or
can we make it more abstract without invalidating the causal entailment of
E?
Further abstraction is indeed possible. We do not need to give a precise
description of the causal mechanism that make the wheel slow down: all we
need to provide is a mapping of ranges of initial spin speeds to ranges of
points on the wheel. The facts we need for the causal entailment of a single
outcome have the following form:
1. The initial spin speed in this trial lay between vn and vn+1.
2. When the wheel spins with an initial speed between vn and vn+1, it will
come to rest between φn and φn+1.
3. All points on the wheel between φn and φn+1 are red (or black).
Maximum simplicity is attained when the two speeds vn and vn+1 map pre-
cisely on the beginning and the end of a single red (or black) section.
The full explanation will not be an ordered list of such small explanations,
since the order in which the different initial speeds are realised is irrelevant to
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the outcome. Instead, the full explanation will say that N1 of the initial spin
speeds lay between v1 and v2, that N2 of the initial spin speeds lay between
v2 and v3, and so on. We still have a low-level deterministic explanation of
E, but it is much more abstract that Strevens’s characterisation implied. For
further reference, I will call this explanation LLD.
Can we abstract even further, to get an even better explanation? This is
a difficult question, because although it is clear that we can abstract further,
it is not clear whether the explanation becomes better. Indeed, one of the
main problems of Strevens’s theory is that it does not make clear when further
abstraction no longer leads to increased explanatory power (Gijsbers 2009,
[32]).
For instance, LLD implies a precise number of red outcomes; but in order
to imply E, we need only show that the number of red outcomes falls within
certain limits. Suppose that we actually 503 red outcomes, and E states that
we had between 450 and 550 red outcomes. In that case, we can construct
more abstract versions of LLD by taking any 953 spins of the wheel, showing
how many red outcomes they lead to, and point out that it is impossible for
the remaining 47 spins to make a difference. This procedure may give us
up to
(
1000
953
)
explanations, all of which imply E and all of which contain less
information than LLD.
But are these explanations really better? Does the existence of such
explanations show that LLD contains many irrelevancies? It is far from clear
that additional information is always perceived as being irrelevant. Consider
the following two explanations of why John cannot drink alcohol: “You must
be at least 16 to drink alcohol. John is not yet 16.” “You must be at least 16
to drink alcohol. John is 14.” Is the first explanation better than the second,
because it contains less irrelevancies? I submit that both explanations are
equally good, and that information that is not strictly necessary for the
entailment does not have to be an explanation-degrading irrelevance.
This topic merits more discussion than we can give it here. Fortunately,
for our purposes nothing hinges on whether the best low-level deterministic
explanation is LLD or some more abstract variant. Let us call the best
low-level deterministic explanation LLD∗.
Aren’t we begging the question, by assuming that such an LLD∗ (a low-
level deterministic model without irrelevancies) exists? After all, Strevens
writes that:
The rationale for the low-level model’s irrelevancies is its concern
with predicting individual outcomes. As the [indeterministic] ex-
planation shows, in order to predict an approximate frequency,
it is unnecessary to predict the outcomes. (Strevens 2008 [132],
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p. 381.)
The suggestion is that any low-level deterministic explanation of E must
contain irrelevancies, since we can get the same goods while bypassing the
low level entirely.
It is clear that the argument cannot work as written. It is certainly true
that we can predict the approximate frequency without predicting any of
the individual outcomes; but we are trying to explain the fact that in this
particular set of trials, the expected frequency was actually attained. And
even if we grant that this can be explained while bypassing the individual
outcomes, we may still add that a deterministic explanation that does not
bypass the individual outcomes is the better explanation. After all, we do
not get the same goods: LLD∗ entails E with certainty, and thus contains all
of the difference makers for E; the indeterministic explanation, to be called
ID, entails E only with high probability, and misses some of the difference
makers.
Given that we have followed Strevens’s own procedure of abstraction,
no irrelevancies can remain in LLD∗. An irrelevance is something that we
should abstract away, and by hypothesis, there is nothing further to abstract
away in LLD∗. The only worry might be that LLD∗ is no longer a low-
level deterministic explanation. But this worry is unfounded: one element of
the abstraction procedure is that the causal entailment of E remains intact,
and we have already seen in our discussion of the statistical deterministic
explanation that only a low-level deterministic explanation can causally entail
E.
LLD∗, then, contains no real irrelevancies. But perhaps something can
be a difference maker, and hence explanatorily relevant, without its inclusion
making the explanation better? This indeed seems to be Strevens’s position.
He explicitly denies that all difference makers are explanatory, and claims
that there can be trade-offs between accuracy and generality (Strevens 2008
[132], pp. 146-148), where accuracy is a measure both of the probability
and the precision with which the explanandum is entailed. If dropping a
difference maker from a deterministic explanation decreases the accuracy
only a little, but increases the generality a lot, then including the difference
maker degrades the explanation.
The point of contest, then, is whether there is a trade-off between accu-
racy and generality when we want to maximise explanatory power. I submit
that there isn’t: all difference makers are explanatory, and the more differ-
ence makers we know about, the better we understand the explanandum.
(There is of course trade-off between explanatory power and pragmatic fac-
tors: if a small increase in explanatory power comes at the cost of making
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the explanation much more involved and harder for a finite intelligence to
grasp, we will generally forgo it. But this is a completely different point.) If
Strevens is right, IC is a better explanation of E than LLD∗, since ID is
only a little less accurate, but vastly more general; if I am right, LLD∗ is the
better explanation.
In the next section, I will discuss Strevens’s explicit example of a differ-
ence maker that has no explanatory power. In section 8.9, I will then give
an argument that shows that his theory has undesirable consequences.
8.8 Non-explanatory critical events
Strevens writes:
[I]n cases where an event e is best explained probabilistically, a
critical event e is explanatorily relevant to e only if it makes a
positive contribution to the probabilification of e [...]. It is true, I
will contend, even when e is deterministically produced; the thesis
is therefore in direct opposition to both the counterfactual and
the manipulation approaches to causal explanation. (Strevens
2008 [132], p. 448.)
Strevens uses an example to prove that there are cases where the counter-
factual and manipulation approaches give the wrong answer and his theory
gives the right answer. Suppose that as I leave a party, I suddenly remember
that I haven’t thanked the host. I turn back inside, and thank him. Because
of this slight delay, on my way home I get involved in an accident with a
unicyclist. If I hadn’t thanked the host, I would have been at the fateful
location five minutes earlier, and I would not have hit the unicyclist.
Thanking the host is a difference maker to the collision. But Strevens’s
suggestion is that it depends on the context whether thanking the host is
explanatorily relevant to the collision.
Context I The probability of an accident of this type was low.
Context II The probability of an accident of this type was high. I was
drunk, I am a bad driver, the weather was terrible, and there was a
huge unicyclist convention going on. (Still, my thanking the host was
a difference maker – had I not thanked him, I would have had the good
luck to avoid all unicyclists.)
150 CHAPTER 8. DETERMINED EVENTS
According to Strevens, in the first context the best explanation is determin-
istic, and any critical event (any difference-making event) will appear in the
deterministic model. Thus, in the first context, the thanking of the host is
explanatory. But in the second context, the best explanation is an indeter-
ministic model, and this model will not mention the thanking, since it will
not mention the exact time that I left. Strevens continues:
[T]his doctrine accords with practice. It would be strange [in the
second context] to explain the accident by noting that I stopped
to thank my host. [...] In the case where there are no probability-
raising factors, by contrast, it is not strange to cite my stopping
to thank the host [...]. The explanation goes as follows: it was
just a matter of unfortunate timing, the unlucky combination
of events such as my stopping to thank the host, my getting
temporarily trapped in the guest bathroom, and so on. What
makes the citation of these events relevant is the truth of the
preamble: it was just a matter of unfortunate timing. When this
claim is false – when there are significant probability-raisers such
as the unicyclists’ convention – the little matters of timing are no
longer a legitimate part of the explanation. (Strevens 2008 [132],
p. 450)
Strevens emphasised the word just, and he should. For the accident is,
after all, a matter of unfortunate timing, even in the second context – it’s
just not just a matter of unfortunate timing. Surely it is legitimate to say in
one’s explanation that the accident is a matter of unfortunate timing when
it is in fact a matter of unfortunate timing, even if it is also a matter of many
other things, such as my driving skills and the number of unicyclists in town?
Suppose I am telling you about my evening, and I produce a chart that
shows which departure times lead to a collision with a unicyclist and which
do not. Assume that most of the chart is coloured the red of ‘collision’ –
we are in context II here. Now I am telling you about my evening, and I
point to a white portion of the chart and say: “And that’s when I got into
my car.” “Lucky chap! That was exactly the right time to leave!”, you
exclaim. “Well,” I say, “it would have been. But then I remembered that
I had forgotten to thank my host, so I went back inside...”. And my finger
moves to a big red area five minutes further on.
This exchange will give you understanding of why I collided with a unicy-
clist. I show you that the chance of a collision were very high, but that I had
nevertheless almost escaped by a feat of incredible timing. Unfortunately,
my remembering to thank my host made the difference to the occurrence of
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this difference-making feat of good timing; so I tell you about the thanking
of my host, and you understand why I had a collision after all.
“I don’t understand how you could have had an accident. According to
my calculations, you left at exactly the right moment.” “Yes, but then I
went back inside to thank the host.” “Ah, now I understand.”
Perhaps what is going wrong in Strevens’s account is that he makes too
naive a use of the idea of probabilistic relevance. The probability of my
colliding with a unicyclist can be calculated, of course, but it depends on
the information we have about the potential difference makers. Given the
place and velocity of all unicyclists in town, my bad driving skills, my level
of intoxication and the visibility, the probability of a collision may be very
high. But add to this the fact that I was stepping into my car at the precise
moment t1, and the probability of a collision may suddenly be very low. If
that is the background knowledge from which we reason, my remembering to
thank the host has a huge probabilistic relevance. Such a set of background
knowledge against which the event has a huge probabilistic relevance can
necessarily be constructed for any difference maker – otherwise, it would
not be a difference maker. In this respect, there is absolutely no difference
between my thanking of the host and my driving skills.5
Thus, even if we wish to equate explanatory relevance to probabilistic
relevance, there is a sense in which all difference makers are highly relevant.
This fact may be obscured by looking at examples in which the ‘wrong’ set
of background information has been given; but it is a fact nonetheless. All
difference makers are relevant.
8.9 Deductive closure
In the previous section, I have tried to show that Strevens’s example of a
difference maker that is not explanatorily relevant is not convincing. I now
want to give a general argument against his claim that ID is superior to
LLD. The premise of my argument is that the set of propositions for which
a potential explanation X is an actual explanation (or, if you prefer, a good
explanation) is deductively closed. So if X is a good explanation of E, and
E logically implies E ′, then X (together with the statement that E implies
E ′) is also a good explanation of E ′. I will call this the principle of deductive
closureindexPrinciple of Deductive Closure. (As we will see, the principle is
5In private communication, Michael Strevens has pointed out to me that he is think-
ing of physical rather than epistemic probabilities. This complicates the issue, but may
not invalidate the argument I give: we would have to talk about ensembles rather than
background knowledge, but the relativity is still there.
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incomplete as it stands; a full version is given at the end of the paragraph.)
This premise is very natural. If we have a good understanding of why
some event E happened, then, provided that we understand the deduction,
we surely also have a good understanding of why its logical consequences
happened. If we understand why Smith has a daughter, we understand why
Smith has a child. If we understand why Gravity’s Rainbow is one of the best
novels of the twentieth century, we also understand why it is one of the best
novels of its decade. If we understand why the ball moves with a constant
speed of 1 meter per second, we understand why it has moved twenty meters
after twenty seconds. And so on.
Still, we need to exercise some caution, because explananda are not facts
but facts within contrast classes (Van Fraassen 1980 [28]; this thesis, chapter
5). For this reason it is somewhat misleading to say that if we understand
why the man called ‘Obama’ won the 2008 US presidential elections against
John McCain, we understand why a man won the 2008 US presidential elec-
tions. Even though “a man won the 2008 US presidential elections” is a
logical consequence of “a man called ‘Obama’ won the 2008 US presidential
elections against John McCain”, the former is likely to invoke the idea that
we are explain why a man, rather than a woman, won; the latter that we are
explaining why Obama, rather than McCain, won. And of course explaining
the latter is not equal to explaining the former.
For the principle of deductive closure to kick in, the contrast class of E
must contain the contrast class of E ′. (Here I use ‘contrast class’ to denote
the set which contains both the fact to be explained and its foils.) What
does this mean? The contrast class of E contains the contrast class of E ′
just in case every instantiation of an element of the contrast class of E ′ is also
an instantiation of an element of the contrast class of E. If E ′ is “Obama
(rather than McCain) won the elections” and E is “Obama (rather than
anyone else) won the elections”, the contrast class of E contains that of E2:
every instantiation of “McCain won the elections” is also an instantiation of
“someone not Obama won the elections”, and every instantiation of “Obama
won the elections” is obviously also an instantiation of “Obama won the
elections”.
It is easy to understand why this additional criterion must hold for the
principle of deductive closure to kick in: the contrast class furnishes a premise
for the explanation. If we are asked why Obama rather than McCain won,
we are allowed to take for granted that nobody else won. But if we are asked
why a man rather than a woman won, we are allowed to take for granted only
the much weaker claim that the elections were not won by a gender-neutral
or ungendered being. If we can prove p from q, we can then conclude that
we can prove r from s provided that (a) p is at least as strong as r, and (b)
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s is at least as weak as q.
With this caveat in mind, let me repeat how natural it is to believe that
if we have a good understanding of why some event E1 happened, we also
have a good understanding of why any of its logical consequences happened
(provided that we understand the deduction). Given that I understand why
Obama won, rather than anyone else (including all individual women), I
surely understand why a man won, rather than a woman. This is true even
if (say) gender discrimination were one of the causes of Obama’s victory:
if gender discrimination made it the case that a man rather than a woman
won, then it must also be the case for at least one woman (Hillary Clinton,
perhaps) that she did not win because of gender discrimination, and therefore
gender discrimination will appear as a cause of Obama’s victory in the first
explanation as well as in the second.
Strevens’s account of explanation, however, is incompatible with the prin-
ciple of deductive closure. This is very easy to see. According to Strevens, we
can have good understanding of why trials 1 to 500 on a wheel of fortune all
came up red; we can have good understanding of why trials 501 to 1000 all
came up black; and yet have only a very bad understanding of why approxi-
mately half the trials came up red. This is because Strevens denies that good
explanations for the first two facts (which will necessarily be low-level deter-
ministic) can form a good explanation of the third fact (since a combination
will also be low-level deterministic, whereas a good explanation of E must
be indeterministic). Strevens’s claim that LLD is not a good explanation of
E thus commits him to a denial of the principle of deductive closure.
Indeed, on Strevens’s account, we can have good understanding of why
exactly half of the trials came up red, while having only very imperfect un-
derstanding of why approximately half of the trials came up red. But surely,
getting the latter understanding is strictly easier than getting the former?
Saying that LLD perfectly explains why 503 of the 1000 trials were red, but
at the same time denying that LLD is successful at explaining why approx-
imately half of the trials were red, is very strange. (And please note that in
these examples, all the conditions on contrast classes formulated above are
fulfilled.)
The example we have seen in the last section also shows that Strevens
claims that a good explanation of why I collided with a specific unicyclist
(rather than not colliding with that unicyclist) need not be a good explana-
tion of why I collided with a unicyclist (rather than not colliding with one).
Again, this is like claiming that I can understand why there are fewer than a
thousand countries in the world without understanding why there are fewer
than a million.
Strevens counters (in private communication) that although it is true that
154 CHAPTER 8. DETERMINED EVENTS
if you can explain E you can also explain any deductive consequence E ′ of
E, it need not be the case that the first explanation is identical to the second
one. For the first explanation may contain details that are difference makers
for E but not for E ′, and mentioning them as if they were difference makers
might invalidate the explanation. Thus one can hold on to the claim that
LLD∗ perfectly explains why 503 of the 1000 trials were red, but cannot
explain why approximately half of the trials were red, because it contains
many irrelevant difference makers.
The point is logically sound, but I am not very worried about irrelevant
difference makers: since full explanations give us the relations of determi-
nation, it should always be obvious which of the determining bases actually
make a difference. If one required explanations to make explicit which of
their statements give us difference makers (which I do not), then we could
not use LLD to explain why half the trials were red; but we could use LLD′,
which is LLD plus this explication, to do so. The explication would consist of
a statement saying how many of the low-level facts would have to be changed
in what way in order for the number of red trials to deviate significantly from
500. Not only would LLD′ still be a low-level deterministic explanation, it
would arguably be essentially identical to LLD.
But the opposite, namely that the explanation of E lacks difference mak-
ers for E ′, seems to me a real problem. Let us look once again at the contrast
class. Suppose we have an argument that explains why 503 of the trials were
red (rather than this not being the case). Such an argument could take the
form of citing one difference maker which made the difference between 503
and 504 red outcomes. This would not be an explanation with great strength,
but it would be an explanation. However, it could not be adapted to explain
why approximately 500 of the outcomes were red (rather than this not being
the case), since it contains no difference makers relevant to this contrast. In
order to avoid such problems, we need to add a requirement to the principle
of deductive closure, which I will write out again for clarity:
Principle of Deductive Closure : If X is a good explanation of E (rather
than any other member of DE), and E logically implies E
′, then X to-
gether with the statement that E implies E ′) is also a good explanation
of E ′ (rather than any other member of DE′), given that the following
two condition hold:
1. the contrast class of E ′ is contained in the contrast class of E;
that is, any instantiation of one of the member of DE′ is also an
instantiation of one of the member of DE;
2. at least one combination of elements in the determining bases of
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X changes the probability distribution over DE′ in such a way
that the probability of E ′ is no longer 1.
Our new second condition is easily satisfied by LLD, because its low-level
deterministic description of the trials contains all the difference makers one
could ever want. So I would argue that the principle of deductive closure,
although it has some limits, holds in the situation where Strevens claims it
does not.
I have tried to show, first, that the low-level deterministic explanation
does not contain any irrelevancies; second, that Strevens’s explicit example
of a critical event that is not explanatory does not work; and third, that
Strevens’s claim that the low-level deterministic explanation is not a good
explanation leads to the undesirable consequence that the principle of de-
ductive closure must be abandoned. Together, this gives enough reason to
hold on to the thought that all difference makers are explanatory and that
the low-level deterministic explanation has the greatest explanatory power.
8.10 Conclusion
Michael Strevens argues that a deterministically produced statistical event
can be explained in three ways: by a low-level deterministic explanation, by a
statistical deterministic explanation, and by an indeterministic explanation.
The low-level explanation can be abstracted to the statistical deterministic
explanation, it contains many irrelevancies and must be judged inferior. The
indeterministic explanation is the best of all, since it is more general than
the statistical deterministic one, while being only a little less accurate.
My counterargument consisted of two stages. In the first stage, I have
shown that the statistical deterministic explanation does not exist. It there-
fore no longer follows that the low-level deterministic explanation is inferior,
because it no longer follows that it contains irrelevancies. In the second
stage, I have argued that the low-level deterministic explanation is superior
to the indeterministic one. We first discussed an example used by Strevens
to show that critical events can be non-explanatory. I suggested that no such
conclusion followed from the example. Then we looked at the principle of
deductive closure and saw that Strevens’s account violates this principle.
My final conclusion, then, is that Strevens has no convincing arguments
that show the low-level deterministic explanation to be inferior to the inde-
terministic explanation. As long as such arguments are lacking, I would like
to suggest that the fact that the deterministic explanation mentions more dif-
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ference makers is still a prima facie reason to see it as the more explanatory
of the two.
Chapter 9
Discussion and Implications of
the Determination Theory
9.1 Introduction
In this final chapter, we will look at some further questions about and some
further consequences of the determination theory. Unlike the earlier chapters,
this chapter is then something of a capita selecta. Each of the topics in this
chapter could be done justice only by a much longer discussion, but for rea-
sons of time and space this is impossible. It nevertheless seems preferable to
give an imperfect answer to some of the big questions that the determination
theory must generate than to give none at all.
In section 9.2, we ask whether all explanations are arguments. Many
philosophers have said that they are not; the determination theory says that
they are. I argue that the traditional reasons for rejecting this view are not
valid against the determination theory.
Section 9.3 discusses whether explanations must contain laws and regular-
ities, as Hempel famously claimed. I argue that they need not; explanations
can be purely singular. I also discuss the related phenomenon of explanation
through redescription.
In section 9.4, a source of ambiguity in explanatory requests is described;
this leads to a discussion of how and under what circumstances different
explanations of the same phenomenon can be combined into a single big
explanation. I also show how several positions in the debate on explanatory
pluralism can be combined with the determination theory.
We discuss the difference between explanation and understanding in 9.5.
I first discuss this difference at length, and then show that the proposed gap
between the two does not invalidate my methodology, which relied heavily on
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judging whether proposed explanations really provide us with understanding.
I then discuss the original debate about the differences between Erklären and
Verstehen, and suggest how the determination theory can help us see the
relation between these two notions (and perhaps unify them).
Finally, in section 9.6 I propose a way to identify explanations with zero
explanatory power. This turns out to lead to the admission of a limited
amount of subjectivity into the concept of explanation.
9.2 Are explanations arguments?
Wesley Salmon, in his 1977 [109] (reprinted in Salmon 1998 [113]), argues that
in addition to the two dogmas demolished by Quine 1951 [96], a “third dogma
of empiricism” had been erected. This dogma is the unquestioned claim that
explanations are arguments. As evidence, Salmon refers to Braithwaite 1953
[11], Nagel 1961 [86], Popper 1959 [91] and of course Hempel’s work in the
philosophy of explanation (for instance, Hempel 1965 [41]). For all these
philosophers, a good explanation is an argument with the explanandum as
the conclusion.
Salmon’s terminology about the third dogma has not caught on (un-
doubtedly because of Davidson’s more successful coinage of the same term in
Davidson 1974 [19], where the third dogma is the thesis that one can make a
clear distinction between conceptual scheme and empirical content), but his
criticism was influential, and the idea that explanations are not to be seen
as arguments did become something of an orthodoxy. Today one can write
that of course we must not assume that all explanations are arguments, and
most philosophers will nod and read on.
Now the determination theory explicitly states that explanations are de-
ductive arguments. It will therefore be interesting to see what this does and
what it doesn’t mean; and to inquire whether Salmon’s arguments against
the third dogma – let us say, against argument theories of explanation – are
effective against the determination theory or not.
Let us start with Salmon’s arguments against the third dogma. It will
turn out that we have discussed most of them already.
1. Salmon’s first argument is that irrelevant premises are harmless for
deductive arguments, but fatal for explanations. This is, of course,
not a knock-down argument: nobody claims that explanations are just
arguments; if they are arguments, they are arguments that satisfy an
additional condition X. This X might explain why irrelevant premises
harm explanations. But many argument theories do not give us such
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an explanation. In the DN model, for instance, X is the condition
that a law of nature is essentially involved in the deduction – and that
condition is still fulfilled when we add an irrelevant premise.
We have already discussed some of the canonical examples of irrele-
vance in section 5.4. We reached the conclusion that “irrelevancies are
harmful if and only if they are (or suggest) irrelevant contrasts. Irrele-
vant information that does not imply (or suggest) an irrelevant contrast
is not harmful”.
The determination theory is in perfect accord with this conclusion.
There is no condition stating that irrelevant premises are forbidden;
and in fact, I stated in a footnote that irrelevant premises are allowed,
since they cannot harm the deductive structure of the explanation.
However, irrelevant contrasts – that is, in the terms of chapter 6, de-
termining bases that do not conform to condition 4 – are forbidden be-
cause they make false claims about which interventions would change
the explanandum. Obviously, making false claims harms an argument;
and that is why irrelevant contrasts are harmful to explanation.
On my theory, the following is a good (if somewhat curious) explana-
tion, in the same way that it is a good (if somewhat curious) deduction:
This is a sample of salt, rather than of some other substance.
Salt dissolves in water; many other substances do not.
This salt is hexed.
This sample dissolves in water, rather than not dissolving.
And it seems to me that this is the right conclusion.
2. Salmon’s second argument is that we can explain low-probability events,
but that arguments require the premises to give the conclusion either
certainty (deduction) or high probability (induction). Obviously, we
have already discussed this problem at length in chapter 6, and noth-
ing more needs now be said.
3. Salmon’s third argument is that explanations, at least of events, have
a causal asymmetry that arguments lack. We can deduce the height of
the flagpole from the length of the shadow, but we cannot so explain it.1
1Van Fraassen’s humorous story “The Tower and the Shadow” notwithstanding. (Van
Fraassen 1980 [28], pp. 132-134.) In his example, the height of the tower is explained by
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The burden is on argument theories to explain this difference between
explanations and arguments.
This argument makes sense against the DN model, but not against
the determination theory. Our interventionist conditions generate the
kind of asymmetry that Salmon is looking for, and that Hempel had
trouble explaining. (It might of course turn out that the concept of
intervention does not always generate the right asymmetries. But in
order to make such a claim believable, a specific counterexample against
the determination theory would be needed.)
The determination theory, then, is immune to what were thought to be
arguments against argument theories in general. Salmon’s third dogma of
empiricism isn’t such a bad idea after all.
But we might want to stress what it does not mean to claim that all
explanations are arguments. It does not mean that the premises must be
more certain than the conclusion, so that the explanation increases our belief
in the explanandum. Suppose that we see a volcano erupting, that I ask you
why the volcano erupts, and that you tell me that the local pressure in
the Earth’s magma became too high. This is a good (if somewhat shallow)
explanation, even though we have no evidence that the premises are true
that is independent of our evidence that the conclusion is true.
That all explanations are arguments also does not mean that all ex-
planations have the same canonical logical form, for instance, that of an
Aristotelian syllogism. The determination theory does not even affirm the
relatively relaxed requirement of the DN model that all explanations must
involve at least one general law (a statement that begins with a universal
quantifier, and needs to have some other properties as well). Indeed, we will
see in the next section that laws and regularities are perhaps not necessary
for explanation.
9.3 Laws and regularities
9.3.1 Explanation without regularity?
The determination theory does not require explanations to contain a “law”,
a “regularity” or a “generalisation”. (I will use these terms interchangeable
in this section.) Explanations can often – perhaps always – be formulated
how long the builder wanted the shadow to be, not by the actual length of the shadow –
as we can easily see when we think about which things we could manipulate in order to
change the height of the tower.
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as singular statements that imply the explanandum through the use of what
Ryle 1949 [107] called “achievement words”. Here are some examples, all of
which are perfectly good explanations:
(1) “Why did William the Silent die on the 10th of July, 1584?” “Because
on that day he was killed by Balthasar Gérard.”
(2) “Why did the dam burst?” “Because through days of rain, the water
pressure became too high.”
(3) “Why do Kepler’s laws hold?” “Because they are implied by Newton’s
laws of motion, which hold.”
The emphasised words all involve a relation of necessity. If Gérard killed the
prince of Orange, the prince must have died. If the water pressure became
too high, the dam must have burst – this is what “too high” means. If
Kepler’s laws are implied by something that holds, then they must hold as
well.
Or suppose that Adam ate the apple because (a) Adam was hungry, (b)
Adam believed eating the apple would relieve his hunger, (c) Adam believed
that no other preferable action would do so, and (d) Adam wanted to relieve
his hunger. We can then have the following explanation:
(4) “Why did Adam eat the apple?” “Because Adam successfully carried
out that action which he judged to be most effective in relieving him
from the hunger that was bothering him, namely, eating the apple.”
Again we find that the explanans can be written in such a way that it logically
implies the explanandum through an achievement word, although this fourth
example is hardly as elegant as the three former ones.
What is the point of these examples? They show that, at least prima
facie, explanations do not need to involve laws or regularities. If explana-
tions (1) to (4) contain any regularities at all, they are analytic, definitional
regularities, e. g. “if X is killed at t, X dies at t”, hardly candidates for
lawhood.
This is a problem for theories of explanation – let us call such theories
generality theories – that claim that a causal explanation, such as that given
in (1), must always involve a causal generalisations or a law of nature. Gen-
erality theories claim that an explanation of William the Silent’s death would
have to involve at least two events (for instance, an action of Gérard and the
death of the prince) and a “causal” generalisation that connects them.
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Several major theories of explanation are generality theories.2 The DN
model requires that all explanations involve a law of nature. Strevens’s ac-
count involves the claim that explanations are “law-involving deductive ar-
guments” (Strevens 2008 [132], p. 72). Although he adds that he uses “the
term law liberally” (idem.), subsequent discussion makes clear that it has
to be at least a “causal law” (p. 76). Woodward 2003 [142] also requires
that explanations contain “a generalization G” (p. 203), although he doesn’t
always strictly enforce this requirement.
9.3.2 Hidden regularity
Our examples are not knock-down arguments against generality theories. We
know that explanations can wear masks: beneath the surface of explanation
(1), some law or regularity that links an act of Balthasar Gérard to the
death of the prince of Orange may be hidden. Let us see if we can find such
a generalisation.
We will first have to unpack the achievement word in the explanans.
“Gérard killed the prince” can perhaps be read as “Gérard shot at the prince,
and this act of shooting caused the prince’s death.” Next we must abstract
away from these particular events. A regularity, after all, holds not between
two token events, but between two types of event. Let us then describe the
cause as “X is shot at by Balthasar Gérard on the 10th of July, 1584” and
the effect as “X dies on the 10th of July, 1584”. We link these in a regularity
R which says that if the first proposition holds for any X, then the second
will hold as well.
This can hardly be called a success for the generality theories, since R is
clearly unacceptable. The problem is not that R has only one instantiation in
the history of the world – I have already argued, in section 3.5, that explana-
tory power is not linked to the number of instantiations that a generalisation
has. No, the problem is that R is almost certainly false. Unless we have
some reason to suppose that on the 10th of July, 1584, Balthasar Gérard was
a perfectly accurate and utterly lethal gunman, we have no reason to believe
that everyone he would have shot at would have died. (And remember that
explanatory generalities are supposed to be counterfactual supporting.)
2Perhaps surprisingly, unification theories are not an obvious example of this. Uni-
fication theories obviously do require generalisations, but they do not all require causal
generalisations, and might perhaps make do with definitional generalisations – see section
2.3 for details. However, it is certainly not clear that unificationists can accept (as they
would seem to have to) that (1) is an explanation in virtue of the fact that it instantiates
the unifying argument pattern “if X is killed at t, X dies at t”. We will not discuss this
issue.
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This problem of the falsity of R will of course become only worse as
we make the descriptions more abstract: there is certainly no exceptionless
causal generality that connects events of type “X is shot by Y at time t” to
events of type “X dies within a few hours of time t”. The prince of Orange
himself can serve as evidence: he survived being shot at by Jean Jaureguy
in 1582. In order to arrive at a true law, we would need to start doing
serious science; in this case, psychology, ballistics and medicine. Perhaps it
is possible to find laws of the form “If a bullet with a mass of at least m, a
size of at least s and a velocity of at least v enters the body of person X at
such-and-such a place and under such-and-such an angle, then X will die a
short time later.”. Even if we cannot find it, such a law may exist. Let us
call this hypothetical law L.
Such an unknown law L could well appear in an explanation: this would
simply be an instantiation of the non-specific deductive model that I endorsed
in section 7.1. Thus, it seems to be possible to reinterpret explanation (1) as
an explanation involving a causal regularity.
9.3.3 The heart of the matter
But what if no law L exists? What if there is no true counterfactual support-
ing regularity that links the act of Gérard to the death of the prince, while it
is nevertheless the case that intervening on when and whether Gérard killed
the prince changes the date of the prince’s death? In such a case regular-
ity theories must state that Gérard’s shooting does not explain the prince’s
death. But, contrary to what the regularity theories claim, (1) would still be
a good explanation of the prince’s death. The explanatory power of (1) does
not depend on the existence of L.
Here is how the explanation would look according to the determination
theory:
Balthasar Gérard killed William the Silent (rather than doing
something else with him).
This event happened on the 10th of July, 1584 (rather than on
some other day).
Some interventions on either of these two variables would have
ensured that the prince survived the 10th of July, 1584.
William the Silent died on the 10th of July, 1584 (rather than on
some other day).
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All conditions of the determination theory are met, even though no regularity
has been given.
Now we are facing many difficult questions here, perhaps the most impor-
tant of which is the question whether there can be facts about counterfactual
interventions where there are no laws. If the truth conditions of counterfac-
tuals always involve laws, the situation sketched above (where there are no
laws, but there are truths about interventions) is logically impossible. This
is of course a position that regularity theorists can adopt.
However, it is surely preferable to keep our theory of explanation as free
from metaphysical commitments as possible, and more so if the commit-
ments are the subject of controversy. Since the question of causal singularism
(Anscombe 1971 [3]) is still hotly debated,3 and since the outcome of this
debate will surely be relevant for the question whether singular explanations
exist, we should prefer a theory of explanation that does not commit us to
the view that explanations always involve regularities. The determination
theory has been formulated to be such a theory.
9.3.4 Explanation through redescription
Another conclusion that can be drawn from the examples given in this section
is that there is such a thing as explanation through redescription. We can
explain an event by redescribing that event – or, to be more precise, we
can explain an event under one description by citing that same event under
another description. The prince of Orange died because he was killed; but
of course “the prince of Orange’s dying” and “the prince of Orange’s being
killed” are different descriptions of the same event.
The idea that redescriptions can function as explanations is not new.
For instance, Bradie 1998 [10] argues that many scientific explanations are
“metaphorical redescriptions”. And a lot of attention has been given to a
specific type of explanation through redescription, namely, constitutive ex-
planation, that is, explanation of the properties of an object by redescribing
the object in terms of its constituent parts. A typical example is the expla-
nation of an object’s being hot by pointing out that the molecules of which
it is composed move about rapidly. Constitutive explanation in the natural
and biological sciences is discussed by Salmon 1998 [113] (p. 324), Kuorikoski
2008 [63], Cummins 1985 [18] and Craver 2007 [17]; Tannenwald 2005 [133]
and McCann 1996 [78] give an interesting overview of the discussion about
constitutive explanation in the social sciences.
3See Moore 2009 [83] for an overview. Nanay 2009 [87] and Wilson 2009 [139] are recent
contributions.
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The determination theory can not only accommodate constitutive ex-
planations, it also helps us see that these explanations do not derive their
explanatory power from the fact that in giving them we come nearer to the
fundamental particles and laws of nature. According to the determination
theory, explaining the large-scale properties of a system by redescribing the
system in terms of its small-scale properties is just as acceptable as doing
the opposite, and as giving a redescription which does not involve a change
of scale at all. This is surely the correct conclusion: we can explain the fact
that the object is hot by pointing out that its constituent molecules have
high velocities, but we can also explain the high velocities of the constituent
molecules by pointing out that the object has just come out of the oven.
Of course, not all redescriptions function as explanations. Let us look at
an example, taken from contemporary neuroscience, of a redescription that is
not explanatory. Bermúdez 2008 [7] complains against a hypothesis advanced
by earlier authors that it does nothing but “redescribe the phenomena it is
trying to explain”. The explanandum is:
(b) Non-human animals do not have representations that have
components corresponding to higher-order relations, abstract roles,
and functions.
and the explanans is:
(a) Non-human animals are not able to represent higher-order
relations, abstract roles, and functions.
And of course this isn’t a very enlightening explanation, especially since
“do not have representations of” and “are not able to represent” are here
to be understood as synonyms. The problem with this explanation is not
that it is a redescription, but that it doesn’t give us more information about
which interventions will change the explanandum – it basically says that to
change the explanandum, we must change the explanandum. Explanatory
redescriptions, on the other hand, can be very informative: if we know that
the prince died because he was killed, we know we can prevent his death by
incapacitating the killer, and that we cannot prevent it by convincing the
prince to give up smoking.
Thus we again meet the problem of explanations with zero explanatory
power, as we already did in section 7.4. As I said there, I prefer to say that
these are explanations, but simply the worst possible ones. I would say that
the explanation Bermúdez complains about is indeed an explanation, but a
very bad one. (And the same goes for self-explanations, i.e., “A because A”,
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which are a limit case of uninformative redescriptions.4) If one disagrees, an
extra condition must be added to the determination theory, which says that
explanations must have more than zero explanatory power. In order to do
this, one would have to say more about explanatory power; I will do so in
section 9.6.
9.4 Ambiguity and pluralism
9.4.1 Ambiguity and combination
We have seen that an explanatory request is ambiguous as long as the contrast
class is not given, and indeed the notion of the contrast class was introduced
to dissolve this ambiguity. (Van Fraassen, in The Scientific Image ([28],
p. 127) traces the recognition of this ambiguity back to Alan Garfinkel, Jon
Dorling, and finally to an unpublished work of Bengt Hannson circulated in
1974.) In this section I will suggest that there is a second kind of ambiguity
in explanatory requests, and that a fully specific why-question involves more
than giving just a fact and a contrast class.
We meet on the street, I am carrying a bunch of red roses, and you ask:
“Why are these roses red (rather than some other colour)?”
Many different answers to this question are possible.
1. “These roses are red because they contain red pigments, which have
been synthesised in these and these complex biochemical processes.”
We will call this the biochemical explanation.
2. “These roses are red because over the past hundred million years, their
ancestors lived in an environment where having a distinctive colour
had a positive pay-off in survival; red was the most distinctive colour
in that environment; and there were no really significant barriers on the
evolutionary path towards redness.” We will call this the evolutionary
explanation.
3. “These roses are red because red is the colour of love and I’m going to
give them to Jill, whom I love deeply and passionately.” We will call
this the semiological explanation.
4Note that the option of accepting that self-explanations are real, although bad, ex-
planations was not open to Kitcher in subsection 2.2.2. On his theory, unificatory power
and explanatory power are linked, and it seemed as if self-explanation was extremely
unificatory and therefore extremely explanatory – which is, of course, not an acceptable
conclusion.
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All of these are valid explanations and potentially satisfying answers to the
question “Why are these roses red (rather than some other colour)?”. But
the answers are so different that they seem to be answers to different ques-
tions; and indeed, it would be a strange situation in which the interlocutor
is satisfied with any of these answers. Why is this the case?
One reason is that the different answers correspond to different ways of
evaluating the truth value of “these roses are red” in counterfactual scenarios.
Suppose that our cultural conventions had been different, and that white
roses had been expressive of love. In that case, when I went into the flower
shop, I would have bought white roses, and the roses I would be carrying
when we meet would not be red. On the other hand, the roses which I did
buy in the actual scenario and did not buy in the counterfactual scenario
would, of course, still be red. When we are evaluating the proposition “these
roses are red” in the possible world(s) described in this scenario, does it come
out true or false?
The question has no single answer; it depends on what we refer to with
“these roses”. The answer to the question depends on how we want “these
roses” to refer in other possible worlds: do we want it to refer to the roses
that I carry in those worlds, or to the roses that physically and historically
have the greatest resemblance to the roses that I carry in the actual world?
The phrase can mean both, and what is the right explanation depends on its
intended meaning. If the former is the intended meaning, interventions in
the greenhouse will not make a difference, while interventions in our cultural
history may. If the latter is the intended meaning, the exact opposite is the
case.
It would seem to be the case, then, that explanation 1 and explanation 3
cannot be combined into a single ‘ideal explanatory text’, to use the phrase
from Railton 1981 [98]: they explain something different, and are not answers
to the same question. Whether this is because they explain a different fact
or because they explain the same fact set in a different modal context, is a
question I will not attempt to answer. (I suspect it comes down to a linguistic
decision on how to use the word ‘fact’, but we would have to analyse the
concept of fact, and perhaps those of reference and counterfactual as well, in
order to be sure.)
What about the difference between explanations 1 and 2? Are they as
fundamentally different as 1 and 3, or can they be combined in a single
explanatory text?
Let us add some detail to the example. Assume that the roses are red
because they are genetically disposed to make a substance S, and S reflects
red light and absorbs light of all other colours. Let us also say that the roses
are red because they evolved under a selective pressure to attract bees, and
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because bees are attracted by red light. And let us now try to answer the
following counterfactual question: would the roses have been red if substance
S had had slightly different properties, such that it reflected blue light and
absorbed red light?
If we take as given the genetic and chemical composition of the roses I
currently carry, the answer is no: the roses, containing substance S, would
have been blue. But if we do not do so, the answer is yes: the roses would
still have been red if S had had different properties, because they would
have evolved to make some other substance S ′, which would have been red.
(That this is true is of course a further assumption, and depends on the evo-
lutionary accessibility of such a substance.) The biochemical explanation,
then, must take the genetic and chemical composition of the roses as given,
since otherwise the fact that substance S acts as a red dye is not explanato-
rily relevant. Equally obviously, the evolutionary explanation cannot do so.
Here too, then, we find that the truth of the explanandum in counterfactual
scenarios is evaluated differently in the different explanations. This time,
however, the difference is not one of reference, but of which facts are taken
as fixed and which are allowed to vary.
Can these explanations be merged into a single more encompassing ex-
planation? It turns out that on Woodward’s account of intervention they
can, and this feature is inherited by the determination theory. Let us first
formulate this combined explanation.
(1) These roses evolved under a selective pressure to attract bees
(rather than not having evolved in this way).
(2) Bees are attracted to red flowers (rather than to flowers of
other colours).
(3) If the roses evolved under selective pressure to become red,
they now have genes that ensure they make the evolutionarily
most accessible red dye (and if they had not evolved under such
pressure, they would not have those genes).
(4) S is a red dye, i.e., the presence of S in a rose ensures that
the rose is red (rather than ensuring that the flower is some other
colour).
(5) There were no red dyes evolutionarily more accessible than S
(rather than there being such dyes).
(6) These roses contain S (rather than not containing it).
These roses are red (rather than some other colour).
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If this is a good explanation, we have combined explanation 1 and 2 in a
larger explanation that shows us both how the colour of the roses depends
on biochemical detail, and how it depends on their evolutionary history. But
the problem we identified was that if we hold (4) and (6) fixed, (1) and
(2) don’t make a difference to the explanandum – and determining bases
that do not make a difference are forbidden. And to see whether a certain
determining basis makes a difference, we have to hold the actual values of
the other determining bases fixed – otherwise, we would have to condone the
false claim that the man who died from thirst after he had accidentally lost
his flask of poisoned water died because the water was poisoned.
Let us look back, however, at section 4.9, where we adapted Woodward’s
notions of cause and intervention. There we saw that X is a ground of Y ,
and can therefore be used to do interventions that change Y , if changing X
changes Y “when all other variables in V that are not on this path are fixed at
some value” (italics added). Here the path is a chain of direct grounds. Now
in the system of variables defined by the previous explanation, (1), (2), (4)
and (5) are independent variables (they are not grounds for one another),
but all of them are direct grounds of (6). Intervening on any of the four
independent variables will change the value of (6) – for instance, intervening
on bees such that they are attracted to yellow would have led to roses that
do not contain S. Thus, if we wish to check whether this explanation fulfills
the conditions of the determination theory, we must check (among other
things) whether intervening on (1) changes the value of the explanandum
while holding (2), (4) and (5) but not (6) fixed. And it will turn out that the
conditions of the determination theory are fulfilled.
As long as there is no ambiguity about modal reference, then, we can
combine explanations of the same fact into bigger explanations.
But is this true even for explanations of radically different types, for in-
stance, causal and functional explanations? Are all these types of explanation
valid according to the determination theory? And do reductive explanations
trump non-reductive explanations? We will take an all too quick look at
these questions in the next subsection.
9.4.2 Explanatory pluralism
In this subsection we will see that the determination theory has room for
reductive and non-reductive ideas about explanation, both in terms of reduc-
tion of the special sciences to fundamental sciences and in terms of reduction
of reasons and function to causes. If one is an anti-reductionist in the latter
sense, one may believe it to be the case that not all explanations of the same
explanandum can be combined into a single explanation.
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Explanatory pluralism is the claim that there are several different kinds of
explanation, all of which are important and none of which is the ‘ideal’ kind
to which all others must be reduced. This idea can take several forms. For
Jackson and Pettit 1992 [52] explanatory pluralism is the idea that macro-
level and micro-level explanations should live side by side, and that expla-
nations that mention recent causes and explanations that mention far-off
causes should live side by side as well. McCauley and Bechtel 2001, [79]
place explanatory pluralism explicitly in the context of reductionism:
Explanatory pluralism holds that the sorts of comprehensive the-
oretical and ontological economies that microreductionists and
New Wave reductionists envision and antireductionists fear offer
misleading views of both scientific practice and scientific progress.5
For them, explanatory pluralism is the claim that explanations at different
ontological levels strengthen each other; the opposites to their position are
the idea that microphysical explanations will make all other explanations un-
necessary (explanatory reductionism) and the idea that the different sciences
construct explanations in complete isolation (explanatory anti-reductionism).
The determination theory can be accepted by proponents of all three
positions. The theory allows explanations on all ontological levels, and even
allows them to be combined, as we saw in the previous subsection. Thus,
explanatory pluralists can accept the determination theory. However, the
theory doesn’t claim that scientists actually do combine explanations from
different ontological levels, or that it is useful to do so, or that it can always
be done – we haven’t said anything on this topic. Hence, explanatory anti-
reductionists can accept the determination theory as well.
As far as explanatory reductionists are concerned, they can accept the de-
termination theory because it leaves open not only the possibility that there
are microphysical explanations for all explananda, but even that microphys-
ical explanations are superior to other explanations. This will depend on
the theory of explanatory power that is chosen; we will explore this to some
extent in subsection 9.6, although we will not there be interested in proving
or disproving explanatory reductionism.
The determination theory, then, is agnostic about reductionism. And this
is, I think, the correct stance for a theory of explanation. The truth or falsity
of reductionism depends to a large extent on a posteriori metaphysical and
methodological facts, and perhaps on difficult analyses in the philosophy of
language and the philosophy of mind as well. A theory of explanation should
remain neutral about such things.
5McCauley & Bechtel 2001 [79], p. 736.
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Let us now consider a second kind of explanatory pluralism. According
to Van Bouwel and Weber 2008 [9], explanatory pluralists subscribe to the
following two theses:
(1) There are no general exclusion rules with respect to expla-
nations in history and social science; it is, for instance, im-
possible to rule out intentional explanation or functional ex-
planations.
(2) There are no general preference rules with respect to ex-
planations in history and social science; it is, for instance,
unwarranted to claim that intentional explanations are al-
ways better than macro-explanations.6
Where McCauley and Bechtel were interested only in explanations at different
ontological levels, Van Bouwel and Weber are interested also in explanations
of different types – causal, intentional, functional, and so on. Their arguments
for explanatory pluralism in the social sciences are, in my opinion, persuasive;
but rather than show that Van Bouwel and Weber are right, I will here try
to show only that the determination theory can accommodate different types
of explanation, and discuss how it handles the types of why-questions that
Van Bouwel and Weber distinguish.
Why does the car have round wheels, rather than square wheels? We can
give a causal explanation: the wheels were made by pouring liquid rubber
into a round mould, rather than by pouring it into a square mould. We can
give an intentional explanation: the boss of Renault, who ordered all cars to
be fitted with round wheels rather than square wheels, believed that cars with
round wheels would sell better. And we can give a functional explanation:
the function of the car is to transport people in speed and comfort, and both
speed and comfort will be greatly diminished if the car has square rather
than round wheels.
Perhaps intentional explanations are really just causal explanations; per-
haps the same holds for functional explanations. We can safely remain ag-
nostic about this, since all three explanations above already fit into the de-
termination theory as given. Manipulating the form of the mould, the beliefs
of the boss or the function of the car will change the form of the wheels.7 All
three explanations thus fit into the determination theory.
6Van Bouwel and Weber 2008 [9], p. 168.
7One could debate what exactly a manipulation of the function of the car consists
in. This is a complex metaphysical question. But I take it that anyone who accepts the
functional explanation of the shape of the wheels will also accept the counterfactual that if
the function of the car had been to stop a horde of stampeding bison, then it would have
had square wheels rather than round wheels. This is enough to apply the manipulation
172 CHAPTER 9. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
Can they be combined into a single explanation? One might think that
if the mould for the wheel is round, the intentions of the boss make no
difference, and describing them serves no purpose. However, in subsection
9.4.1 we saw how to combine explanations with determining bases that screen
each other off. If the intentions of the boss determine the shape of the mould,
and the shape of the mould determines the shape of the wheel, then we can
combine those two determining bases in a single explanation.
But this procedure, which is unproblematic when we are dealing with
straightforwardly causal factors, may run into problems when we switch to
functions, aims, reasons and other explanatory factors that may be thought
to be not straightforwardly causal. For instance, which of the following two
claims is true?
1. Changing the mould for the wheels from round to square, would have
changed the function of the car from locomotion to bison stopping.
2. Changing the function of the car from locomotion to bison stopping
would have changed the mould for the wheels from round to square.
Now if one believes that talk of functions can be reduced to talk of causes,
this question presumably has an answer – it depends on what the reduction
of functions actually looks like. But if one does not believe this, it is not
clear that the two claims are even meaningful. And if they are not, we can
no longer answer questions about intervention if we allow both factors (the
form of the mould and the function of the car) to appear as determining
bases in the same explanation. For non-reductionists, then, it is far from
clear that all explanations of an event can be combined into a single large
explanation.
Finally, how must we understand the different kinds of explanatory re-
quests that Van Bouwel and Weber distinguish? They notice that we can
explicitly ask for a causal, or a functional, or an intentional explanation, by
asking questions of the following forms:
What is the cause of a having property P?
What is the function of a having property P?
What is the reason for a having property P?8
Here, the contrast class of the explanandum is the same (“rather than not
having property P”) – so what is the difference? In our terminology, what
theory; as far as our theory of explanation is concerned, the metaphysics of functions can
be ignored.
8Van Bouwel & Weber 2008 [9], p. 171.
9.5. EXPLANATION AND UNDERSTANDING 173
is happening is that the person who asks the question stipulates that the
determining bases used in the answer must be of a certain kind. They must
be variables ranging over causes, functions, and reasons respectively.
Answers to such what-questions are thus not a different kind of explana-
tion than answers to the why-questions we have analysed until now. These
what-questions are why-questions, but with an added ingredient. The second
question, for instance, can be rewritten thus: “Why does a have property
P? And be sure to use at least one determining basis that contains functions
of a.” Once again we see that these kinds of explanation fit well into the
determination theory.
9.5 Explanation and understanding
9.5.1 Understanding: introduction
Throughout this thesis, I have assumed that an explanation is what gives us
understanding and that we have understanding of something just in case we
can explain it. This assumption used to be, and perhaps still is, the received
view, although some philosophers have gone so far as to banish the notion
of understanding from philosophy of science altogether. (Thus Hempel 1965
[41] dismisses the notion because it does not “belong to the vocabulary of
logic” (p. 413).)
But this strong connection between explanation and understanding has
been challenged recently. This challenge could have methodological relevance
for my project, since in order to see which purported explanations really are
explanation, we have, throughout this dissertation, judged whether they do
or do not give us understanding. If there can be understanding without
explanation, or explanation without understanding, this may have led us
into error. In this section, I wish to argue that there is indeed understanding
without explanation, and will spend some time discussing the differences
between understanding and explanation. During this discussion I will show
that no methodological problems for my project have been raised.
One preliminary remark. It may seem that the debate about the difference
between explanation and understanding goes back at least to the nineteenth-
century hermeneuticists, most importantly to the work of Wilhelm Dilthey,
and that it would be very strange not to start our discussion there. I will
say something about this debate in subsection 9.5.5, in order to locate my
theory in the broader debate; but presently we will to focus on the discussion
that has been taking place in recent analytic philosophy of science. This is
made both possible and desirable by the fact that these two discussions have
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different histories, terminologies and aims, and have indeed far less to do
with each other than a merely cursory glance would suggest.9
9.5.2 The feeling of understanding
Are explanation and understanding the same thing? Is it the case that we un-
derstand X if and only if we can explain X? One reason to believe that this
is not the case is that one may think that understanding is merely a psycho-
logical state, a feeling, which has nothing to do with objective explanation.
In the words of Trout 2002 [135], “the psychological sense of understanding
is just a kind of confidence, abetted by hindsight, of intellectual satisfaction
that a question has been adequately answered” (p. 213), where this question
is a why-question, i.e., a request for explanation. And of course we can be
confident when we do not have a real explanation, or have a real explanation
and not be confident.
Salmon 1998 [113] wishes to safeguard a place for understanding, by mak-
ing the “absolutely fundamental distinction between ‘understanding’ in the
scientific sense and ‘understanding’ in the psychological sense” (p. 90). Un-
derstanding in the scientific sense “involves the development of a world pic-
ture, including knowledge of the basic mechanisms according to which it
operates, that is based on objective evidence” (p. 90). Thus on the one hand
we have ‘real’ understanding, and on the other the psychological sense of
understanding. We have this psychological sense when an explanation “feels
right” (Trout 2002 [135], p. 212); Gopnik 1998 [34] suggests it is the epistemic
equivalent of an orgasm.
Salmon’s strategy is one way to keep understanding linked to explanation:
we split the concept into a part that is psychological and a part that we can
freely define in terms that guarantee the link to explanation. But why would
we call this second part “understanding” if it is only accidentally related to
the feeling of understanding? Something important is lost when we make the
radical split that Salmon (perhaps) suggests.
We should not let the fact that we can mistake a bad explanation for a
good one, or a good explanation for a bad one, persuade us that the feeling
of understanding is not essentially related to having a good explanation. We
9Salmon 1998 [113] contains a chart of “types of human understanding”, p. 83. At the
top level he distinguishes between understanding meaning, understanding others through
empathy, understanding purposes and understanding natural phenomena. If this distinc-
tion holds, it explains – on a more than sociological level – why the continental debate and
the analytic debate have remained separate: the former focuses on the first three types of
understanding, while the latter focuses on the fourth. I have my doubts, as will become
apparent in subsection 9.5.5.
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can have a feeling of fear in situations where no danger is present; and yet
we would not call anything a feeling of fear if there were no disposition for
this feeling to arise in dangerous situations. We might go even further, and
claim that a feeling of fear is justified in dangerous situations, and a feeling
of understanding is justified when we have a good explanation – but arguing
for the claim that feelings can have cognitive content and be justified and
unjustified would take us too far afield.10
Without having to go that far, however, we can still exploit the analogy
between the feeling of understanding and perception. Red things give us
the sensation of red, although they do not do this invariably; the situations
in which they do not can be systematically described. We would not call
anything a sensation of red if it was not habitually caused by red things,
and we would not call any thing red if it did not cause sensations of red
in “standard circumstances”. Furthermore, if we wish to discover what it
takes for a thing to be red, we will need to first distinguish between red and
non-red objects on the basis of our perceptions (and their stability when the
circumstances are varied).
We can assimilate understanding to this model. Objective understanding
is analogous to the redness of objects, while subjective understanding is anal-
ogous to the perception of red. The same logical connections hold between
these two concepts. If we wish to understand what it takes for something to
give us objective understanding, we first need to distinguish between texts
(or arguments, or whatever the objects under investigation are) that do and
texts that do not give us the subjective feeling of understanding. And again,
we can systematically describe the situations in which we have the feeling
of understanding but no real understanding: for instance, when the truth
condition has not been met but we erroneously believe that it has; when the
premises of our argument, although true, are not difference makers; and so
on.
Of course this is exactly what every philosopher of science interested
in explanation and understanding has always done: we have constructed
examples where we all felt that understanding was achieved (or not achieved),
and we have used these examples to test our theories. This has often been
described as using ‘our intuitions’, where ‘intuition’ is doubtlessly one of the
least clear concepts of contemporary analytic philosophy – made even less
clear by it having no connection with the long-established use of the term
in Kantian and neo-Kantian philosophy. In fact we have been using the
sense or feeling of understanding as if it were a perception of explanatory
power; and we have duly sharpened this sense by excluding ‘non-standard
10See for instance Nussbaum 2001 [90].
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circumstances’. Rather than this procedure infecting the entire enterprise
with the ‘merely psychological’ and ‘subjective’ dimension of the feeling of
understanding, it is the necessary first step of any theory of explanation and
understanding. Without it we would not even know what we are talking
about.11
9.5.3 Understanding versus explanation
Even if we do agree that the sense of understanding is an important part
of any theorising about explanation, new problems loom if it turns out that
there can be explanation without understanding or understanding without
explanation. This latter possibility especially has been recently explored.
In this subsection, I will discuss four possible ways in which there could be
understanding without explanation, and I will attempt to give a theoretical
overview of types of understanding, which will show why we all call them
by the same name. In subsection 9.5.4 we will see whether the identified
differences between explanation and understanding compromise the method
used in this thesis.
Let us see, then, four (in many respects closely related) proposals for
understanding without explanation:
1. Lipton 2009 [74] suggests that there are types of understanding that
are non-linguistic, whereas explanations are necessarily linguistic. His
examples fall into two classes. First, there are examples of “theoretical”
understanding gained in a non-linguistic way: for instance, we under-
stand the retrograde motion of the planets after seeing a planetarium
in motion. We may not be able to transform this understanding into
words, so we cannot give a real explanation. Second, there are examples
of what we may perhaps call “embodied” or “practical” understanding:
we understand how a machine works if we can operate it, we under-
stand how to do something if we can do it. Again, Lipton’s point is
that on the one hand it would be weird to say of someone who has
the skill of making a cake that that person doesn’t understand how
to make a cake; while on the other hand, there doesn’t seem to be a
necessary connection between this skill and the separate skill of con-
structing a verbal explanation of how to make a cake. So this suggests
that there are forms of understanding that do not involve language,
and thus cannot be linked with explanation.
11Some of the worries that might be raised in this context have already been addressed
in subsection 1.3.1.
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2. We now look at the theory of understanding proposed by De Regt 2001
[99] and De Regt and Dieks 2005 [102]. De Regt and Dieks 2005 offer
the following criteria for understanding (they are to be interpreted as
sufficient but not necessary):
A phenomenon P can be understood if a theory T of P exists
that is intelligible (and meets the usual logical, methodolog-
ical and empirical requirements).
A scientific theory T is intelligible for scientists (in context C)
if they can recognise qualitatively characteristic consequences
of T without performing exact calculations.12
In later work, De Regt (2009 [103]) offers a broader version of the crite-
rion of intelligibility, when he states that intelligibility is “the value that
scientists attribute to the . . . virtues (of a theory . . . ) that facilitate
the use of the theory for the construction of models”.
In both cases, then, understanding implies a skill – the scientist must
be able to use the theory in a certain way. De Regt (2004a [100]) writes
that understanding “is not only knowing the formula, but in addition
being able to use the formula in the case at hand” (p. 101). And De
Regt 2009 [103] argues that “understanding is associated with skills
and judgments of scientists” (p. 25). A theory is intelligible when we
can use it in certain ways.
At least two different ways of using a theory seem to feature in this
proposal. On the one hand, there is the quick recognition of charac-
teristic consequences. In the terminology of the determination theory,
this is the skill of being able to judge at least roughly how changes
in the elements picked out from the determining bases will change the
elements picked out in the determined set. Thus, a theory of the fall of
the Roman Empire is intelligible (and makes us understand that fall)
just in case we can quickly judge which changes in the world would have
hastened the fall, slowed it down, or would have stopped it altogether,
according to the theory.
On the other hand, a theory is intelligible if we can quickly use it to
construct models. This involves being easily able to describe the salient
features of a phenomenon in terms of the theory; it is not so much being
able to recognise the characteristic consequences of the theory as it is
being able to recognise the characteristic antecedents or determining
bases of the theory in a concrete situation.
12De Regt and Dieks 2005 [102], pp. 150-151; see also De Regt 2001 [99], pp. 260-261.
178 CHAPTER 9. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
Given that we can lack both these skills even when we have an ex-
planatory theory, because the theory could be too complex to grasp in
the required way, these point to the possibility of explanation without
understanding; and at least the latter skill, the ability to make models,
does not seem to depend on the theory having a form needed to give
explanations, thus pointing to the possibility of understanding without
explanation. (We discuss these issues further in the next subsection.)
3. A similar kind of understanding without explanation is proposed by
Lipton 2009 [74] when he states that we sometimes achieve under-
standing not through explanations, but through our internalisation of
Kuhnian exemplars (Kuhn 1970 [62], pp. 187ff.). These exemplars,
Lipton writes, “set up perceived similarity relations, and normal sci-
entists . . . attempt solutions that seem similar to those that worked in
the exemplars”. Why is this understanding? Because
these abilities correspond also to a knowledge that goes be-
yond the explicit content of the theory. The exemplars pro-
vide knowledge of how different phenomena fit together.
and here we are very close to De Regt’s idea of an intelligible theory
being one which allows us to easily model phenomena. Kuhnian ex-
emplars provide the link between the phenomena and the theory by
giving us a readily applicable set of unwritten rules that tell us how
to model the phenomenon; in other words, we are able to understand
some phenomenon (a swinging chandelier, for instance) by assimilating
it to one or more familiar exemplars (an ideal pendulum). This is an
understanding of the world that does not take the form of explana-
tions, but of something like a classification – we understand something
about the phenomenon of the chandelier just by being able to recog-
nise it as pendulum-like, even if we cannot explain the behaviour of the
pendulum itself (because we lack the right mechanics).
4. Which brings me to the thesis that successful classification is a kind of
understanding. As an example, take 18th-century biology as described
by Foucault (1966 [27]): a pure science of classification, uninterested in
explaining, but with rigorous criteria of success. (Whether Foucault’s
description is entirely spot-on is less important for our purposes than
the fact that such a science would be possible.) To classify all organ-
isms into a tree-like structure, based on as few characteristic anatomical
features as possible, in such a way that every organism is assigned a
unique place in the structure, that organisms grouped close together
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share as many features as possible, and that newly discovered organ-
isms can be habitually (though perhaps not unfailingly) added to the
structure without coming up with new, ad hoc, characteristics – this is
no mean feat, and very worthy to be called a scientific achievement. It
is, moreover, an achievement that allows us to make predictions, that
gives us understanding, but that does not give us explanations. This
will be most easily seen from the discussion of an example.
Suppose that, given the skull of an animal of a hitherto unknown
species, we are asked to predict whether it is warm-blooded or cold-
blooded. Biology as a science of pure classification will be able to do
so. The class of animals which share certain characteristic features of
this skull – let us call these features A and B – are (for instance) all
warm-blooded. We thus predict that the newly discovered species will
be warm-blooded as well. Such a prediction will generally turn out to
be true.
Now it could be said that this is just induction, and that we do not
need any biological science for that, any more than we need physics in
order to predict that the next apple will also fall down. But this misses
the essential point. For indeed the induction itself is common sense,
but the selection of characteristic features A and B from among all the
features of the skull is not; it is, rather, a hard-won scientific insight that
can be obtained only through a thorough investigation of the animal
kingdom. Only a classificatory science that manages to pick out those
characteristic features that turn out to support inductions is successful;
and in this respect, 18th-century biology certainly was successful. What
is more, this success clearly shows an understanding of the world. We
see how the animals species “fit together”, in Lipton’s words.
Let us belabour this for a moment. Leonelli 2009 [66] defines under-
standing as “the cognitive achievement realizable by scientists through
their ability to coordinate theoretical and embodied knowledge that
apply to a specific phenomenon”. The crucial word here is coordinate,
which she defines as using “strategies that a scientist can learn to use
in order to (1) select beliefs that are relevant to the phenomenon in
question, and (2) integrate these components with the goal of applying
them to the phenomenon.” The selection of relevant information from
the infinite variety of things that could be said about a certain plant
or animal is evidently the main achievement of classificatory biology.
If we follow Leonelli, we will want to call this understanding.
And yet it is not explanation. The form of the skull does not explain
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that the animal is warm-blooded, and the fact that the animal is warm-
blooded does not explain the form of its skull. To be sure, in modern
biology such phenomena can be put together, using the theory of evolu-
tion, in an explanatory scheme. But 18th-century biology did not have
the theory of evolution. It made (at least in our ideal description of it)
no causal claims. It did not aim to explain. And yet it would be weird
to say that it gave us no understanding before the theory of evolution
was invented and accepted (although the theory of course increased our
understanding).
But what do we understand when we understand the classification of
organisms? We cannot say that we understand why some organism has
a certain feature, or why there are (for instance) mammals and fishes,
because those phrases would imply that we have an explanation. It
seems more correct simply to say that we understand the variety of
living organisms. We understand the phenomena in the sense that we
know our way around, we see how they hang together.
Given these observations of types of understanding without explanation,
we are now in a position to indicate a more general theory of understanding.
The theory is that we speak of understanding whenever we can relate facts
to each other, whenever we have, concerning the world, not just a list of
brute givens, but when we grasp actual, real connections. There are different
types of connection. The first type is what we might call (borrowing our
metaphor from space-time diagrams) vertical connection: we see how events
hang together in time, how A causes B and is in turn caused by C. When we
know about causal connections, we know that there is not just a succession
of events, but that these events are related to each other through relations
of determination. Throughout this thesis, we have argued that it is such
vertical connection that is essential to explanation, and that there are more
examples of this than just causation.
The second type can be called horizontal connection: we see how events
(or other objects) hang together by being able to point at the significant
similarities, the respects in which one phenomenon is like another. Rather
than being presented with just a random collection of phenomena, we can
classify them; we “know our way around” the space of phenomena. This
allows us to make successful inductions, and to apply our existing theories
to new cases. This type of understanding does not involve explanation.
Making a distinction between these two types of understanding shows us
that there can indeed be understanding without explanation. It also explains
why we would want to call them both by the same term: both are essentially
types of connectedness that reduce the bruteness of facts; we show, in the
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words of Kosso 2007 [60], “the coherence among facts” by either “[d]eriving
one result from another, or applying ideas to novel situations” (p. 175).
This typology captures the types of understanding discussed above, but it
does not say anything about the ideas that understanding must be thought
of as a skill, and that there can be non-linguistic understanding but not
non-linguistic explanation. I do not here wish to theorise about these issues,
though I will touch on them in the next subsection. I do wish to point
out, though, that if “non-linguistic” means “non-conceptual” (and can it
mean anything else after the linguistic turn?), the possibility of non-linguistic
understanding seems very unlikely.
9.5.4 Methodological problems?
The previous discussion has shown that trusting our intuitions about when
we understand X after reading Y , and using these to check whether Y is an
explanation of X – which is the dominant method of this thesis –, might go
wrong in several ways.
1. Our intuitions might be confused, and we have the idea that we under-
stand when we do not understand.
2. The understanding-giving Y is non-linguistic, but all explanations must
be linguistic.
3. Y is an explanation of X, but we fail to gain understanding because
we do not have the required skills: for instance, Y uses a theory so
complex that we have no grasp of its characteristic consequences.
4. Y gives us understanding of the type we have called horizontal, whereas
only vertical understanding is an indication of explanation.
This list is intended to be exhaustive. Given that understanding is still a
poorly explored subject, it is probably not; but if new possibilities turn up,
the method of this thesis (and most other philosophy of explanation) will
have to be checked again.
In order to justify the method of this thesis, we now have to show that
we stepped into none of these four pitfalls.
Trout 2002 [135] and 2005 [136] warns that the sense of understanding can
lead us astray: we sometimes think we understand something even though,
on careful reflection, it turns out we do not. Did we use any examples
where we were led astray by a merely spurious feeling of understanding?
Perhaps – there is surely no general way of excluding this possibility, unless
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it is by application of a theory of understanding or explanation, which we
ex hypothesi do not have when we are looking for it. But we have carefully
considered all the controversial cases. And the very fact that all our examples
of understanding fit together in the determination theory is an argument
against the idea that we have inadvertently admitted some cases of spurious
understanding.
We can be more firm about the other three pitfalls. It is impossible that
we have fallen into the second, since we discussed only linguistic examples.
It is highly unlikely that we have fallen into the third, since none of our
examples discussed extremely complicated theories, big science, or idiosyn-
cratic individual scientists. And it is impossible that we have fallen into
the fourth, because anyone who falls into that will end up with a (spurious)
counterexample to the determination theory, which we (obviously) did not.
Thus, I conclude that no important methodological problems for this
thesis follow from the recent insight that understanding and explanation are
not identical.
9.5.5 Erklären and Verstehen
Nothing that has been said in the previous subsections has anything much
to do with the original debate about Erklären (explaining) and Verstehen
(understanding) that has been so central to the hermeneutic tradition from
Droysen, Dilthey and Weber to Collingwood, Gadamer and beyond. In that
discussion, the distinction between explanation and understanding was first
made in order to make a distinction between the natural sciences, which give
us explanations, and the humanities, which in addition give us understanding.
The philosophical background for this distinction is very different from
that against which the present-day analytic debate is being held. Central
to the thought of Dilthey 1914 [22] is the claim that there are two kinds of
experience: outer experience given through the senses, and inner experience,
independent of the senses (pp. 8-9). The values and purposes that inform
human actions cannot be successfully researched by sciences which use only
the outer experience of the senses; in addition, one must make use of the
inner experience of our feeling and our will. Using such inner experience, the
humanities can give us understanding of individual acts, whereas the natural
sciences, using only outer experience, can give us only regularities in nature.
The natural sciences can give us explanations of events only in so far as they
fall under general laws, whereas the humanities have access to the individual
case, and the knowledge gained this way is understanding. Using the terms of
Windelband 1900 [140], the natural sciences are nomothetic, the humanities
idiographic.
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For Collingwood 1964 [16] the understanding that a discipline like history
can give is a mental re-enactment of the thoughts of the original actor:
Suppose, for example, [the historian] is reading the Theodosian
Code, and has before him a certain edict of an emperor. Merely
reading the words and being able to translate them does not
amount to knowing their historical significance. In order to do
that he must envisage the situation with which the emperor was
trying to deal, and he must envisage it as the emperor envisaged
it. Then he must see for himself, just as if the emperor’s situation
was his own, how such a situation might be dealt with; . . . and
thus he must go through the process which the emperor want
through in deciding on this particular course. Thus he is re-
enacting in his own mind the experience of the emperor. . . (p. 283;
emphasis added.)
The crucial phrase are the two words which I have emphasised: to understand
someone is to make that person’s thoughts and decisions your own. And while
this can perhaps be done in the humanities (which will involve the faculties
of feeling and will that Dilthey emphasises), it is impossible to make the
boiling of the water or the expansion of the gas or the Big Bang your own.
In this way, Collingwood generates a distinction between explanation and
understanding that is very close to Dilthey’s.
We cannot discuss the rest of this debate, nor do we need to. All I want
to do is make the following two points. First, suppose we mean by “under-
standing” a kind of knowledge that is grounded in experiences with a special
ontological status, or in making something “your own”. In that case, nothing
I have said in this thesis and nothing anyone said in the previous subsections,
is relevant to deciding whether such understanding exists, whether it is an
aim of science, whether the humanities do and the natural sciences do not
aim for it, and so on. This is an entirely different discussion from that in
which Trout, De Regt and Lipton participate.
Second, and more interestingly, explanation as understood by the de-
termination theory is broad enough to encompass at least some notions of
Verstehen. When Collingwood puts himself in the mental state of the em-
peror, he sees that yes, this is the edict that must be made – he experiences
a relation of determination. (Presumably, on his theory this experience of
necessity is special to the humanities; we cannot have in the natural sci-
ences, although we may of course have knowledge of natural necessity.) Once
Collingwood understands the emperor’s edict, he will be able to say that
if the situation had been different in this and that way, the edict would
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have been different. In other words, in understanding, he is able to explain.
He cannot explain by giving a general law, to be sure, but I have already
argued in section 9.3 that explanation does not need to use general laws –
explanation can exist outside nomothetic science.
Thus, the determination theory at least leaves open the possibility to
understand both nomothetic explanation and idiographic understanding as
forms of explanation. This does not entail that there are no important differ-
ences; but it certainly helps us to see why Erklären and Verstehen are both
aims of science, and indeed, why it is useful to see them as parallel aims of
different sciences.
9.6 Explanatory power and objectivity
We have seen that it would be desirable to indicate which explanations (if
we want to call them that) give us no understanding at all, or, to say it
another way, have zero explanatory power. We have already met two kinds
of explanation that have zero explanatory power: the TUDEs of section 7.4
and the non-explanatory redescriptions of subsection 9.3.4. A quick reminder
of what they were. Let the explanandum be “the prince of Orange was killed
today (rather than on some other day)”. Then the following explanation
is a TUDE: “the prince of Orange was killed today (rather than on some
other day) because there is some (unspecified) causal factor X such that X
determined this to happen”. The following explanation is a non-explanatory
redescription: “the prince of Orange was killed today (rather than on some
other day) because the prince of Orange died today (rather than on some
other day)”. Why do these explanations have no explanatory power? What
do they have in common?
Both explanations correctly identify something we can manipulate in or-
der to change the day on which the prince is killed. If we change X – whatever
it may be – we ex hypothesi change the day on which the prince is killed. And
it is a fact of logic that if we manipulate whether the prince dies today, we
also change whether the prince is killed today. But neither explanation tells
us how to manipulate the world so that the explanandum changes. They
don’t tell us what could have been changed in the world in order to prevent
the explanandum.
This leads straightforwardly to the following thesis about explanatory
power:
An explanation E has more than zero explanatory power if
and only if (1) E implies at least one counterfactual of the form:
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If A had been the case, the explanandum would not
have been the case.
that is not presupposed by the explanatory request itself,13 and
(2) this A is a member of one of the determining bases of E.
This condition is met by neither of the examples above. It is not met by
the TUDE, since the TUDE merely repeats the implications of the explana-
tory request, namely, that something determined the explanandum.14 It is
not met by the non-explanatory redescription either, since the only counter-
factual implied by it is that “if the prince had not died today, he would not
have been killed today”.15 But this is an analytic truth, and was already
implied by the explanandum (or indeed by the empty set). Or, to take a
third example of an explanation with no explanatory power:
FOOL: [. . . ] The reason why the seven stars are no more than
seven is a pretty reason.
LEAR: Because they are not eight?
FOOL: Yes, indeed [. . . ]16
fails to meet the requirement because, again, that the seven stars would be
more than seven if they were eight is a necessary truth already implied by
the explanatory request.17
All explanations that do meet the condition have at least some explana-
tory power. Here are two examples, with the implied counterfactual given
13The explanatory request presupposes that (a) the explanandum is true, and (b) an
explanation of the explanandum conforming to the determination theory exists. It also
presupposes, trivially, all analytic truths.
14One could argue that our example of the prince of Orange implies the new counter-
factual “if X had not been present, the prince would not have died”. But since X is only
defined as that which determined the prince to die, I would argue that this counterfactual
is in fact a disguised analytic truth. Proponents of certain theories of reference might
disagree with this, in which case our thesis would have to be tweaked more specifically
disallow such counterfactuals. I will not attempt to do so here.
15Though this counterfactual may sound weird, one can easily see that it comes out true
when we use a possible worlds semantics.
16King Lear I.v.33-36, [124].
17What about the famous example of the dormitive virtue of opium? It seems to me that
this explanation has some explanatory power, since it implies several counterfactuals not
implied by the explanatory request. As it claims that the opium itself has a power to put
people to sleep, it implies that the falling asleep is not a psychological effect that could also
be obtained with a placebo. Thus it implies the counterfactual that if someone had been
given a placebo instead of opium, he would not have fallen asleep. If this counterfactual
was already implied by the question how opium caused sleep, then the answer is vacuous
for exactly the reasons outlined in the text.
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between parentheses. “Why did the prince die today?” “Because he was
killed today.” (If the prince had not been killed today, he would not have
died today.) “Why did Jones get paresis?” “Because there is an X such that
X plus untreated syphilis causes paresis, and Jones had untreated syphilis
and X.” (If Jones had not had untreated syphilis, he would not have got
paresis.)
Does our proposed requirement satisfactorily categorise all examples?
One possible problem is that mathematical explanations, such as those given
in section 4.5, may seem to come out as never being explanatory. Suppose
the axioms and the deduction rules are given – how then could anything that
is true in the system not be implied by the axioms and deduction rules? After
all “there can never be surprises in logic.”18 (And the axioms and deduction
rules might well be taken as given in the explanatory request, since it can
be argued that they give meaning to the other strings in the mathematical
language – including those in the request for explanation.) In the light of our
previous discussion of mathematical explanation, this would obviously be an
unwanted conclusion.
Let us look for a moment at the explanation of the fact that the sum of
1, 2, 3, . . . , n is n(n+1)
2
. The determining basis we use in our explanation is
that, starting at the two ends of the sequence, pairwise addition of the terms
always gives the outcome n+ 1 (rather than some other outcome). We then
state that if the sequence had not had this property, its sum might not have
been n(n+1)
2
. Was this counterfactual already implied by the explanatory
request?
I would like to argue that it was not. The truth of the counterfactual
depends on more than the truth of the propositions within the system; it
depends also on the relations of grounding that hold in the system. In other
words, although everything is always already implied about the truth of
every decidable proposition within the system, it is not the case that all the
counterfactual propositions about how the truth values of these propositions
hang together are also already implied. For these depend on the relations
of grounding. These relations of grounding depend, as I analysed them in
section 4.7, on how we construct mathematical objects – which is a fact not
about the abstract mathematical system, but about the human activity of
doing mathematics (or perhaps about human cognition). So mathematical
explanations do explain, because the counterfactuals they present are facts
about our way of doing mathematics, rather than about the logical system
itself.
For a mathematically omniscient being who can hold all of mathematics
18Wittgenstein 1921 [141], proposition 6.1251.
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in his mind at a single time, then, mathematical explanation does not exist.
Such a being could not have a conception of a “mathematical intervention”.
But an analogous argument could be made for causal explanation and a being
outside of time who is conscious of all possible histories of the world at once
– though we will not attempt to make such an argument here.19 Explanation
always involves the notion of intervention, and explanations can exist only
where interventions can be found.
For the last 187 pages I have discussed explanation as if it were something
purely objective. At this point, I think we have to admit the possibility that
explanation inherits some subjectivity from the notion of intervention. It
can at least be argued that we have the notion of intervention in the physical
universe only because we are finite beings in time. It can also be argued that
we can have a notion of intervention in mathematics because we are finite
beings that perform mathematical operations in time. “Understanding the
world for a man is reducing it to the human, stamping it with his seal”, Camus
wrote (Camus 1991 [12], p. 17). While the familiarity theory of explanation
has failed to attract much support in the face of all the weird and unfamiliar
scientific concepts we use to explain the everyday world, it might nonetheless
be true at a deeper level.
Exploring these issues would go beyond the boundaries that must of ne-
cessity be set on this thesis; it cannot be attempted here. But very interesting
work is to be done here, not least because it is a discussion where ideas from
analytic and continental philosophy would seem to come together.
9.7 Conclusion
Since this chapter discussed five separate topics, there cannot be a single con-
clusion. What we have seen is that all explanations are arguments, but that
this does not have any of the bad philosophical consequences it was supposed
to have; that explanations need not involve laws, and can be redescriptions;
that as long as there is no referential ambiguity, explanations of the same
phenomenon can be combined into larger explanations; that the distinction
between explanation and understanding does not invalidate my method; that
the determination theory suggests a way to see the link between Erklären and
Verstehen; that an explanation has non-zero explanatory power if it implies
counterfactuals (of the right kind) that were not implied by the explanatory
request; and that this final idea points to notions of intervention that might,
19Nor will we attempt to decide whether such beings are logically possible. Well-known
strands of phenomenological, structuralist and post-structuralist thought would imply that
such beings could not be said to use concepts at all – see for instance Derrida 1967 [21].
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in the final analysis, not be purely objective. The discussions in this chapter
were more explorative than those in other chapters, however, and each of
them would be a good starting point for further research.
Chapter 10
Conclusions
In this chapter, I will summarise the conclusions drawn over the course of
this dissertation.
In chapter 2, we first considered the definitions of unification given by
the unificationist theories of explanation. Kitcher’s proposed definition faces
serious difficulties, since it cannot solve the problem of spurious unification;
the theory of Schurz and Lambert is more successful in this respect. As
unificationist theories of explanation, however, both Kitcher’s and Schurz and
Lambert’s theory are unsatisfactory. They do not appear to give sufficient
conditions for explanation, as they cannot generate the notions of causality
and lawhood which many believe to be important to characterise explanatory
power. Moreover, it was seen that unification is not necessary for explanation,
since explanations can have a disunifying instead of a unifying effect. I
proposed that the only reason unifying explanations are deemed preferable
is that we are often more justified in believing their premises.
We then considered the topic of Inference to the Best Explanation in
chapter 3. My general argument was that explanatory loveliness (greater
explanatory power if true) is not an indicator of truth; that there is not, in
other words, a valid inference from high explanatory power to high probabil-
ity. In the course of the discussion we saw three arguments for IBE: the first
claims that there are explanatory virtues which are also epistemic virtues,
thus linking loveliness to likeliness; the second claims that we can simply see
IBE at work in specific instances of scientific research; and the third claims
that IBE has a role to play within the framework of Bayesianism. We then
saw that all these three arguments fail – or at least, that they have not yet
been adequately defended. What is more, the doubts raised in the chapter
lend credence to the idea that a successful defence of IBE cannot be found.
However, it also became clear that explanatory considerations play an
essential role in the methodological decisions of scientists. No theory of
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scientific method which does not take account of both the importance of
explanation and the structure of explanations will be able to make sense of
what scientists actually do.
With unificationism out of the way, full room was given in chapter 4 to
the causal theory of explanation – more specifically, to James Woodward’s
version. I discussed his theory and defended it from the charge of circularity
brought against it by De Regt and Glymour. We then discussed the topic of
mathematical explanation, including Steiner’s theory. We saw that Steiner’s
theory has several weaknesses, and that a more satisfactory theory of math-
ematical explanation can be constructed by taking the formal structure of
Woodward’s theory, replacing the notion of causation by that of ground, and
indicating how the notion of ground is to be understood within mathematics.
We then repeated this procedure, though at less length, for explanations of
laws of nature by other laws of nature: here we saw again that Woodward’s
formalism could be adapted to encompass non-causal explanations, this time
by drawing on our intuitive judgments about counterfactual relations be-
tween laws. At the end of the chapter, a general interventionist theory of
explanation was given. In the context of the thesis, this theory functions as
something of a preliminary version of the determination theory.
In chapter 5, we saw that the phrase “rather than” can be used in two
different ways within explanatory requests: it can be used either to specify a
contrast class, or to set up a contrast of parallels. Making a sharp distinction
between contrast classes and contrasts of parallels allowed us to show that the
apparent counterexamples to the theory that all explanations are contrastive
– in the sense that they all involve a contrast class in the explanandum – were
in fact no counterexamples at all. I argued that with these counterexamples
removed, the contrastive theory must be preferred to the conjunctive theory.
In the second half of the chapter, we saw that not only the explanandum,
but also the explanans must be understood as containing a contrast class.
I argued that the resulting double-contrast theory should be acceptable to
theorists favouring a variety of approaches to explanation; they can all agree
that an explanation consists of a contrastive explanans and a contrastive
explanandum, while disagreeing about the nature of the relation that holds
between them. I also showed that at least one puzzle of explanation – why
irrelevant information sometimes (and only sometimes) invalidates explana-
tions – can be solved by the double-contrast theory.
Chapter 6 presented the determination theory. I first argued for the cen-
trality of the notion of determination to our ideas of explanation: wherever
we look, we find that A explains B only if A determines B to be the case.
Combining this insight with the previously defended claims about contrasts
and intervention led to the claim that an explanation is a true deductive
191
argument where both the conclusion and at least one of the (non-redundant)
premises have the form of a fact embedded in a contrast class of alterna-
tives, and where intervening on those facts in the premises changes the fact
in the conclusion. This informal claim was formalised in section 6.3. Several
elements of the determination theory were then defended, but not the im-
portant claim that all explanation is a matter of determination and can be
put into the form of a deductive argument.
Defending this claim was the aim of chapters 7 and 8. In chapter 7, I
showed that a large class of seemingly non-deductive explanations can be
reconstructed as instantiations of the determination theory, specifically, of a
model of the determination theory that I called the non-specific deductive
or ND model. We used this model in our discussion of two debates about
probability and explanation: the size debate and the change debate. The
determination theory and the ND model automatically save the intuitions
of both sides in the size debate. We can also make excellent sense of the
conflicting intuitions in the change debate if we assume that (a) even abbre-
viated explanations must mention one of the contrastive premises, and (b)
making the non-specific premise in an explanation more specific increases
understanding. Both these assumptions are plausible. I concluded that the
determination theory can successfully account for the role of probability in
explanations of deterministically produced events.
The rest of the chapter argued that the determination theory, which obvi-
ously cannot handle indeterministic explanation, doesn’t have to: in cases of
pure indeterminism, we do not have explanations. There is no phenomenon
here for the determination theory to save.
Chapter 8 went over some of the same ground, this time discussing a set of
arguments recently brought forward by Michael Strevens. I showed that sta-
tistical deterministic explanation does not exist. This defeated the argument
that the low-level explanation is a bad explanation because it contains many
irrelevancies. I then argued that the low-level deterministic explanation is
superior to the indeterministic one by showing, first, that critical events are
always explanatory, and, second, that Strevens’s account violates the prin-
ciple of deductive closure. This means that we still have good reasons to
believe that the deterministic explanation, which mentions more difference
makers than the statistical alternative, is the most explanatory explanation
– exactly as the determination theory would have it.
The final chapter, 9, saw us discuss a variety of topics. We concluded
that all explanations are arguments, but that this does not have any of the
bad philosophical consequences it was supposed to have; that explanations
need not involve laws, and can be redescriptions; that as long as there is
no referential ambiguity, explanations of the same phenomenon can be com-
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bined into larger explanations; that the distinction between explanation and
understanding does not invalidate my method; that the determination the-
ory suggests a way to see the link between Erklären and Verstehen; that
an explanation has non-zero explanatory power if it implies counterfactuals
(of the right kind) that were not implied by the explanatory request; and
that this final idea points to notions of intervention that might, in the final
analysis, not be purely objective.
Let me end by reiterating the hope expressed in the introduction, that
this thesis has contributed to the philosophy of explanation, first, by pre-
senting a theory of explanation that is better than the ones we already have;
and second, by adding new and interesting arguments to the discussions
on unification, IBE, mathematical explanation, contrastive explanation, de-
terministic versus non-deterministic explanation, and several other topics.
Much work remains to be done, but some progress has, I hope, been made.
Nederlandse samenvatting
Dit proefschrift handelt over verklaringen. Centraal staat de vraag wat ver-
klaringen precies zijn. Wanneer we als voorbeeld een concreet feit nemen dat
we zouden willen verklaren, dan is het over het algemeen heel gemakkelijk om
aan te geven of een bepaald verhaal wel of niet een verklaring voor dat feit is;
of in ieder geval, of het verhaal een verklaring zou zijn indien het waar was.
(De concrete twijfels liggen dus meestal bij de waarheid van de potentiële
verklaring, maar niet bij haar verklarende kracht.) Proberen we echter een
theorie te geven die ons vertelt wat alle concrete gevallen van goede verkla-
ringen met elkaar gemeen hebben, dan blijken we met allerlei problemen te
maken te krijgen.
In hoofdstuk 2 van het proefschrift wordt één verzamelingen theorieën
over verklaringen kritisch tegen het licht gehouden: de zogenaamde unificatie-
theorieën. Het basisidee van deze aanpak, dat door verschillende auteurs op
verschillende wijzes wordt uitgewerkt, is dat een theorie verklarende kracht
heeft dan en alleen dan wanneer deze theorie feiten van verschillende aard
unificeert, onder één noemer brengt. Zo zou de theorie van Newton verklaren
waarom appels vallen doordat zij niet alleen het vallen van appels, maar ook
het bewegen van de planeten en het ontstaan van de getijden beschrijft. De
unificerende kracht van Newtons theorie zorgt ervoor dat we het vallen van
appels begrijpen.
Het eerste deel van het hoofdstuk bespreekt de verschillende definities
van unificatie die gegeven worden door aan de ene kant Kitcher, en aan de
andere kant Schurz en Lambert. Het blijkt dat Kitchers definitie onhoudbaar
is, aangezien zij leidt tot de valse conclusie dat de meest unificerende theorie
een triviale theorie is die elk feit afleidt uit dat feit zelf. Kitcher probeert dit
te omzeilen, maar zijn poging faalt. De definitie van Schurz en Lambert lijkt
wel houdbaar.
Vervolgens is de vraag of unificatie en verklaring inderdaad zo nauw met
elkaar samenhangen als de unificatie-theorieën stellen. Het tweede deel van
het hoofdstuk beargumenteert dat dit niet zo is. Noch de theorie van Kitcher,
noch die van Schurz en Lambert, kan de asymmetrie van verklaringen die in
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bekende causale scenario’s optreedt reproduceren, tenzij deze asymmetrie er
met de hand in wordt gestopt. Unificatie is dus kennelijk niet een voldoende
voorwaarde voor verklarende kracht: één van de centrale eigenschappen van
verklaringen kan er niet uit worden afgeleid. Daarnaast geef ik voorbeelden
waaruit blijkt dat unificatie ook geen noodzakelijke voorwaarde voor verkla-
rende kracht is: verklaringen kunnen anti-unificerend zijn. De enige reden
dat verklaringen vaak gebruik maken van unificerende theorieën, is dat unifi-
cerende theorieën over het algemeen een grotere waarschijnlijkheid hebben
om waar te zijn dan disunificerende theorieën; maar dit is voor de hoofdvraag
van de dissertatie niet van belang.
In hoofdstuk 3 wordt kritisch gekeken naar het idee dat er speciale soort
inferentie is die gebruik maakt van verklaringen, de zogenoemde inferentie
naar de beste verklaring of IBE (inference to the best explanation). De verkla-
rende kracht van een potentiële verklaring zou hierbij een indicatie zijn voor
de waarschijnlijkheid van die potentiële verklaring: een beter verklarende
theorie heeft ook meer kans om waar te zijn. IBE zou een aanvulling moeten
zijn op bestaande vormen van inferentie.
Aan de hand van een bespreking van de drie soorten argumenten die voor
deze these gegeven worden laat ik zien dat er geen adequate verdediging van
IBE is gegeven. Het eerste soort argument claimt dat eigenschappen die een
theorie verklarende kracht geven die theorie ook een hogere waarschijnlijkheid
geven. Maar in veel gevallen is dit onduidelijk, en in de andere gevallen is het
zelfs simpelweg onwaar: zo zal een theorie die meer precies is daardoor beter
verklaren, maar uiteraard ook minder waarschijnlijk zijn. Het tweede soort
argument probeert IBE aan te wijzen in specifieke gevallen van succesvol
wetenschappelijk onderzoek. Ik bespreek het meest uitgewerkte voorbeeld,
Liptons analyse van het werk van Semmelweis, en toon aan dat Semmelweis
geen andere inferenties hoefde te doen dan normale probabilistische infe-
renties. Het derde soort argument probeert aan te tonen dat Bayesiaanse
probabilistische inferenties in feite gebruik maken van verklarende kracht;
ook hier vinden we echter geen bewijs voor.
De conclusie van het derde hoofdstuk is aldus dat inferentie naar de beste
verklaring niet lijkt te bestaan. Dat betekent uiteraard niet dat verklaringen
geen rol spelen in de wetenschap. Integendeel: bij Liptons bespreking van
Semmelweis hebben we juist gezien dat het een belangrijk deel van de weten-
schappelijke methode is dat je op zoek gaat naar verklaringen. De waarheid
van die verklaringen wordt echter niet getest door hun verklarende kracht
tegen het licht te houden.
Hoofdstuk 4 gaat in op het belangrijkste alternatief voor de unificatie-
theorieën uit het tweede hoofdstuk: causale theorieën, dat wil zeggen, theo-
rieën die verklaring koppelen aan de relatie van oorzaak en gevolg. Het basale
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idee hier is dat oorzaken hun gevolgen verklaren. De (lastige) uitdaging is
om dit basale idee in meer detail uit te werken.
Eén van de causale theorieën die op dit moment in de belangstelling staan
is de interventietheorie van James Woodward. In dit hoofdstuk verdedig
ik die theorie eerst tegen de claim dat zij circulair zou zijn: ik suggereer
een manier waarop deze circulariteit omzeild, of in ieder geval onschadelijk
gemaakt, kan worden. Daarna is mijn doel om de theorie van Woodward
dusdanig te generaliseren dat zij niet alleen causale verklaringen, maar alle
soorten verklaringen kan vatten. Hiertoe bespreek ik uitgebreid het fenomeen
van wiskundige verklaringen. De beste theorie hierover is van de hand van
Steiner, maar deze heeft enkele zwakheden. Ik laat zien hoe deze zwakheden
opgelost en de onderliggende intüıties toch behouden kunnen worden door
een theorie van wiskundige verklaringen te gebruiken die dezelfde formele
structuur heeft als Woodwards causale theorie. Vervolgens herhalen we deze
procedure voor verklaringen van natuurwetten door middel van meer omvat-
tende natuurwetten. Aan het eind van het hoofdstuk wordt een theorie van
verklaringen gegeven die dezelfde vorm heeft als Woodwards theorie, maar
volkomen algemeen is. Deze theorie zal als voorlopige versie fungeren van de
determinatietheorie van hoofdstuk 6.
In hoofdstuk 5 kijken we naar het soort contrasten dat in verklaringen
voorkomt. Het is bekend, onder andere uit het werk van Van Fraassen,
dat veel verklaringen een ‘contrastklasse’ hebben: een verzameling feiten
waartegen het te verklaren feit wordt afgezet. We vragen waarom Adam de
appel at, in plaats van deze niet te eten. Dat is een andere vraag, met een
ander antwoord, dan de vraag waarom Adam, in plaats van iemand anders,
de appel at.
Er bestaat echter ook een ander soort contrast in verklaringen, dat in
de literatuur met het eerste soort contrast wordt verward. Ik noem dit een
‘contrast of parallels’, en een typisch voorbeeld is de vraag waarom Piet wel en
Jan geen voldoende voor zijn tentamen heeft gehaald. In het Engels kan deze
vraag gesteld worden met dezelfde frase, “rather than”, die gebruikt wordt
bij het aanduiden van een contrastklasse. In het Nederlands zien we direct
dat “in plaats van” niet gebruikt kan worden: immers, Piets voldoende zorgt
er niet voor dat Jan geen voldoende kan halen, en dus is er geen sprake van
een “in plaats van”. Wanneer we een contrast van parallellen opstellen, willen
we weten welke verschillen ervoor gezorgd hebben dat in het ene geval de ene
mogelijkheid (voldoende in plaats van onvoldoende), en in het andere geval
de andere mogelijkheid (onvoldoende in plaats van voldoende) werkelijkheid
is geworden.
Wanneer we dit onderscheid consequent hanteren kunnen we laten zien
dat de tegenvoorbeelden die zijn ingebracht tegen de theorie dat alle verk-
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laringen een contrastklasse bevatten, niet kloppen. Ik beargumenteer dat
deze ‘contrastieve theorie’ valt te prefereren boven het alternatief, de ‘con-
junctieve theorie’, die juist beweert dat geen enkele verklaring een contrast-
klasse bevat, en zogenaamde contrastklassen geanalyseerd moeten worden in
termen van conjuncties van niet-contrastieve verklaringen.
In de tweede helft van het hoofdstuk laat ik zien dat in een goede verkla-
ring niet alleen het explanandum (het feit dat verklaard moet worden), maar
ook het explanans (het feit of de feiten die als verklaring worden gegeven), in
een contrastklasse zijn ingebed. Zo kom ik tot de ‘double-contrast theory’ van
verklaringen. Er wordt aangetoond dat deze theorie, hoe minimaal zij ook
is, reeds de vraagstukken rondom irrelevante informatie kan oplossen: we
kunnen ermee begrijpen wanneer het toevoegen van irrelevante informatie
een verklaring van zijn geldigheid berooft en wanneer dit niet het geval is,
een vraagstuk dat voor andere theorieën van verklaring vaak lastig is.
We komen dan in hoofdstuk 6 bij de formulering van mijn eigen deter-
minatietheorie. Eerst beargumenteer ik dat het idee van determinatie een
centrale rol speelt in ons concept van verklaren: A verklaart B alleen wan-
neer A er op de een of andere manier voor zorgt dat, determineert dat, B
het geval is. De combinatie van dit inzicht met de eerdere conclusies over
interventies en contrasten leidt tot mijn centrale claim: een verklaring is een
waar deductief argument waarin zowel de conclusie als minstens één van de
premissen de vorm heeft van een feit ingebed in een contrastklasse, en waar
een interventie die zo’n in de premissen genoemd feit verandert in een van
zijn contrasten, er toe zou leiden dat het feit in de conclusie verandert in een
van zijn contrasten. Deze claim wordt in de rest van het hoofdstuk formeel
uitgewerkt, en gedeeltelijk verdedigd.
De belangrijkste verdediging die nodig is, is het aantonen dat verklarin-
gen inderdaad een deductief/deterministisch karakter hebben. Er zijn im-
mers veel schijnbare tegenvoorbeelden: probabilistische en indeterministi-
sche verklaringen. In hoofdstuk 7 laat ik eerst zien dat een grote klasse
van ogenschijnlijk niet-deductieve verklaringen gereconstrueerd kan worden
als instantiaties van de determinatietheorie, om precies te zijn van een model
hiervan dat ik het niet-specifiek deductieve (ND-)model noem. Vervolgens
laat ik zien dat het ND-model en dus ook de determinatietheorie in overeen-
stemming zijn met de verschillende intüıties in het ‘size debate’, het debat
over de vraag of je alleen kan verklaren wanneer de premissen de conclusie
een hoge waarschijnlijkheid geven. Wanneer we twee plausibele aannames
maken, namelijk (a) dat zelfs afgekorte verklaringen in ieder geval een con-
trastieve premisse van de bijbehorende volledige verklaring moeten noemen,
en (b) dat een ND-verklaring kan worden omgevormd tot een betere ver-
klaring door de niet-specifieke premisse meer specifiek te maken; dan volgt
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dat de determinatietheorie ook in overeenstemming is met alle intüıties in
het ‘change debate’, het debat over de vraag of alleen feiten die de kans
op het te verklaren feit doen toenemen verklarend zijn. De conclusie van
dit deel van het hoofdstuk is dat de determinatietheorie recht doet aan de
rol van waarschijnlijkheid en statistiek in verklaringen van deterministisch
geproduceerde gebeurtenissen.
Het is duidelijk dat de determinatietheorie geen recht kan doen aan ver-
klaringen van indeterministische gebeurtenissen. Het laatste deel van het
hoofdstuk is er dan ook op gericht aan te tonen dat deze verklaringen geen
rechten hebben, aangezien ze helemaal niet bestaan. Daarmee is de grootste
horde voor de determinatietheorie genomen.
Eenzelfde soort vraagstukken wordt behandeld in hoofdstuk 8, waar ik
een verzameling argumenten van Michael Strevens bespreek. Het doel van
zijn argumenten is om te laten zien dat zelfs in deterministische gevallen inde-
termistische verklaringen soms het beste zijn. Hiertoe stelt hij een hiërarchie
van verklaringen op: de laag-niveau deterministische verklaring, de statis-
tisch-deterministische verklaring en de indeterministische verklaring, waarbij
de laatste de beste is. Ik laat eerst zien dat de tweede soort verklaring niet
bestaat, waarmee ook het belangrijkste argument tegen de laag-niveau deter-
ministische verklaring (namelijk dat deze veel irrelevanties bevat aangezien
er een veel simpeler deterministische verklaring is) komt te vervallen. Daarna
beargumenteer ik dat de laag-niveau deterministische verklaring beter is dan
de indeterministische verklaring, omdat (a) kritische gebeurtenissen altijd
verklarende kracht hebben; en (b) Strevens’ theorie het plausibele principe
dat ik ‘deductive closure’ noem weerspreekt, namelijk het principe dat als
we een goede verklaring hebben voor A, en we weten dat A impliceert B, we
dan ook een goede verklaring voor B hebben.
De conclusie van deze twee hoofdstukken is dat het goed is vol te houden
dat alle verklaringen deterministische verklaringen zijn.
Het laatste hoofdstuk, hoofdstuk 9, fungeert als een capita selecta van
onderwerpen die voor de determinatietheorie van belang zijn. Ten eerste
beargumenteer ik dat we kunnen claimen dat alle verklaringen argumenten
zijn zonder dat dit de slechte gevolgen heeft die sommige auteurs hieraan
hebben toegeschreven. Daarna laat ik zien dat verklaringen geen gebruik
hoeven te maken van wetmatigheden, en maak ik in dit verband duidelijk
hoe herbeschrijvingen verklarend kunnen zijn. We onderzoeken hoe en onder
welke omstandigheden verschillende verklaringen met elkaar kunnen worden
gecombineerd tot grotere verklaringen, waarbij blijkt dat dit niet kan wanneer
er sprake is van referentiële ambigüıteit. Ik beargumenteer dat de methode
die in dit proefschrift gebruikt is niet geproblematiseerd wordt door het ver-
schil tussen verklaren en begrijpen dat de laatste tijd zeer in de belangstelling
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staat; en dat de determinatietheorie ons in staat stelt een verband te zien
tussen de meer klassieke termen Erklären en Verstehen. Uiteindelijk maak
ik duidelijk onder welke omstandigheden een verklaring die aan de determi-
natietheorie voldoet geen enkele verklarende kracht heeft: de verklaring heeft
alleen dan verklarende kracht wanneer ze de juiste soort counterfactuele uit-
spraken impliceert, met als extra eis dat deze niet al door de vraag naar
de verklaring werden gëımpliceerd. We vinden hier ook aanwijzingen dat de
notie van interventie niet geheel subject-onafhankelijk is, zodat ook verkla-
ring als geheel een niet puur objectieve notie zou zijn.
Als geheel heeft dit proefschrift de ambitie om op twee manieren bij te dra-
gen aan de filosofie van verklaring. Ten eerste, door een nieuwe en mogelijk
betere theorie van verklaringen te postuleren en te verdedigen. Ten tweede,
door licht te laten schijnen op een scala aan gerelateerde onderwerpen, zoals
unificatie, inferentie naar de beste verklaring, mathematische verklaring, con-
trastieve verklaring, en deterministische versus non-deterministische verkla-
ring. Er is nog veel te doen, maar enige vooruitgang is hopelijk geboekt.
Curriculum vitae
Victor Gijsbers was born in Leiden on July 22nd, 1982. After completing
his secondary education at the Utrechts Stedelijk Gymnasium (1993-1999),
he studied physics and philosophy at Utrecht University, getting an MSc in
Foundations of physics (cum laude) and an MA in Philosophy of the exact
sciences, both in 2004. Since 2004 he has been working at the philosophy de-
partment of Leiden University, first as a PhD student and from 2008 onwards
as lecturer (docent) in philosophy of science, philosophy of the humanities,
and epistemology. He has also visited the Department of History and Phi-
losophy of Science at Cambridge University in 2007, where he worked with
Peter Lipton.
199
200 CHAPTER 10. CURRICULUM VITAE
Acknowledgements
This dissertation owes most to my supervisor, James McAllister. Our many
discussions of its contents have been enormously helpful, as has been his
advice about the more practical side of doing academic research. I also
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